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3Introduction
The  serious  threat  to  democracy  is  not  the  existence of  
foreign  totalitarian states.  It  is  the  existence within  our  
own personal attitudes and within our own institutions of  
conditions  which  have  given  a  victory  to  external  
authority, discipline, uniformity and dependence upon The  
Leader  in  foreign  countries.  The  battlefield  is  also 
accordingly here – within ourselves and our institutions.
– JOHN DEWEY1
The wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II has absorbed generations of 
historians and experienced numerous shifts in focus and interpretation. At first glance it is a history of 
a minority singled out for discrimination during wartime. In a wider sense, however, it is a telling 
example of the zeitgeist of the age of totalitarianism, of the nature of the American democracy, and of 
problems concerning national and cultural identity in a multi-ethnic society. While the present thesis 
ineluctably relates to these fundamental issues, the main purpose of this microhistoric study is to 
examine  dominance,  resistance,  and  social  patterns  in  one  of  the  sixteen  Assembly  Centers  for 
Japanese Americans. 
In this introduction, I will first delineate how the political leadership of the United States dealt 
with this  episode in hindsight.  This leads over to an excursus into the still  contested question of 
terminology. This excursus serves to set apart the summary incarceration of Japanese Americans from 
other forms of wartime imprisonment; along the way it provides essential facts to this complex of 
events. Next, I will sketch the main concerns and watersheds in the historical discourse, and comment 
on a recent debate to illustrate the topicality of the wartime incarceration. After this historiographical 
survey I will set forth the goals of this study. Following that I lay open my method and discuss the 
sources used in the analysis. Lastly, by outlining the structure of this thesis I will bridge the gap to the 
first chapter. 
Two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 
9066 which authorized the Army – without the declaration of martial law – to remove all persons of 
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast of the United States. More than 110,000 people, two-thirds of 
them U.S. citizens, were rounded up and shipped off to prison camps in desolate regions. There most 
remained  until  the  war  ended.  In  1976,  President  Gerald  Ford  rescinded  Executive  Order  9066, 
stating: “We know now what we should have known then; not only was the evacuation wrong, but 
Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans.”2 In 1980, his successor Jimmy Carter signed 
legislation to create the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC). 
The CWRIC was to conduct an official governmental study of Executive Order 9066 and its impact on 
1 John Dewey: Freedom and Culture, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939, p. 65. 
2 Presidential Proclamation 4417, Feb. 19, 1976. Presidential documents are online at www.presidency.ucsb.edu. 
4the Japanese Americans on the Pacific Coast. In 1982, after lengthy public hearings, the commission 
concluded: 
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 was not just justified by military necessity, and the 
decisions which followed from it – detention, ending detention and ending exclusion – were 
not driven by analysis of military conditions. The broad historical causes which shaped these 
decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread 
ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in haste and executed in an 
atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave injustice was done to American citizens and 
resident  nationals  of  Japanese  ancestry  who,  without  individual  review  or  any  probative 
evidence  against  them,  were  excluded,  removed and  detained  by  the  United  States  during 
World War II.3 
The CWRIC’s recommendation that the survivors be given an official apology and be paid reparations 
was later passed by Congress and signed into law by Ronald Reagan.4 Scholarly research played a 
major role in laying open the true reasons of the wartime incarceration. In fact, already in 1967, when 
the first academic conference on the wartime experience of the Japanese Americans was held at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, not a single scholar was willing to defend the actions of 1942.5 
While today there is a consensus that the incarceration was unjust and unnecessary, terminology for 
this phenomenon has remained contested to the present. More specifically, historians are still at odds 
when it comes to find appropriate substitutes for the official euphemisms “Assembly Center” and 
“Relocation  Camp.”6 The  following  paragraphs  explore  the  meaning  of  the  most  common 
nomenclatures in use. I will discuss their appropriateness and expose the rationale behind their usage. 
As a starting point of our inquiry, let us have another look at the CWRIC’s report: 
There  is  a  continuing  controversy over  the  contention that  the  camps were  “concentration 
camps”  and  that  any  other  term is  a  euphemism.  The  government  documents  of  the  time 
frequently use the term “concentration camps,” but after World War II, with full realization of 
the atrocities committed by the Nazis in the death camps of Europe, that phrase came to have a 
very different meaning. The American relocation centers were bleak and bare, and life in them 
had many hardships, but they were not extermination camps, nor did the American government 
embrace  a  policy  of  torture  and  liquidation  of  the  ethnic  Japanese.  To use  the  phrase 
“concentration camps” summons up images and ideas which are inaccurate and unfair.7 
In the same year Raymond Y. Okamura published an essay in which he elucidated the effects  of 
government euphemisms and defended the usage of “concentration camp.”8 More importantly, while 
the  quote  above  posits  only  “concentration  camp”  as  an  alternative  to  government  euphemisms, 
3 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC):  Personal Justice Denied. Report of the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians,  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1982, p. 18. 
4 The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 provided each survivor with a $20,000 redress payment and a Presidential apology. 
5 Roger  Daniels:  “Words  Do  Matter.  A Note  on  Inappropriate  Terminology  and  the  Incarceration  of  the  Japanese 
Americans” in Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest. Japanese Americans and Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century, ed. 
Louis Fiset and Gail Nomura, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005, p. 203.
6 In addition to the variations “Assembly Camp” and “Relocation Center,” officials occasionally used “Relocation Project” 
and “Reception Center” to denote Relocation Camps.  
7 CWRIC: Personal Justice Denied, p. 27. 
8 Raymond Y. Okamura: “The American Concentration Camps: A Cover-up Through Euphemistic Terminology,” Journal 
of Ethnic Studies Vol. 10 (1982), pp. 95-109.
5Okamura proposed another option, namely “internment camp:” 
An incongruous  situation  presently  exists  wherein  authors  provocatively  use  internment  or 
concentration camp in their titles, but revert to the old “evacuation-relocation” nomenclature in 
their text, tables, and illustrations. The record needs rewriting.9
Anxious  to  avoid  government  euphemism at  all  costs,  Okamura,  and  with  him many  historians, 
authors, and journalists, paid little attention to the terms they used as replacement – with momentous 
consequences. Let us set aside for a moment the different views on the matter and examine more 
closely the three terms proposed: 1) Assembly Center and Relocation Camp; 2) internment camp; 3) 
concentration camp. 
“Assembly Center” and “Relocation Camp” represent the terms most commonly employed by 
the agencies, which operated the camps – that is, the WCCA (Army) and the WRA respectively. The 
Army, for example, insisted that Assembly Centers were “temporary shelters where evacuees could be 
assembled and protected.”10 In reality, Japanese Americans were forced to leave their homes to be 
rounded up in these camps, which were surrounded by barbed wire fences and watchtowers. Armed 
guards held watch day and night, and anybody who left without permission could be shot, as happened 
in  some  instances.  Without  descending  to  the  details  of  the  prison-like  conditions,  the  terms 
“Assembly  Center”  and  “Relocation  Camp”  evidently  misrepresent  the  camps’ true  nature.  They 
should not be perpetuated without setting them in context and thus exposing them as euphemisms. On 
the other  hand,  “Assembly  Center”  and “Relocation Camp” have the  advantage that  they  clearly 
designate which kind of camp – of the various camps operated by various agencies during war – is 
meant. 
The  term  “internment  camp”  is  problematic,  too,  albeit  for  different  reasons.  Internment 
designates a procedure that has long been recognized in both American and international law. By 
World War II  internment  was regulated  by  a  system of  rules.  The government  could  only intern 
prisoners of war and enemy aliens residing in the United States. The latter were arrested by the FBI 
and formally accused of being engaged in subversive activities. Internees could appeal to a hearing 
board,  which  could  recommend  parole  or  internment.  Of  the  approximately  8,000  West  Coast 
Japanese interned, one-third was released after such hearings. Finally, in internment camps, Geneva 
Convention conditions applied; living conditions were generally superior to the Assembly Centers and 
Relocation Camps.11 
The procedure vis-à-vis the Japanese Americans incarcerated under Executive Order 9066 was 
fundamentally different. First of all, two-thirds of them were American citizens. Second, there was no 
formal charge brought up against them individually. (We must bear in mind that a great number of the 
incarcerated were infants and elderly people, who could hardly pose a threat to national security.) 
9 Raymond Y. Okamura: American Concentration Camps, p. 105. 
10 U.S. Army, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army:  Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast,  
1942, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 93. 
11 Daniels: Words Do Matter, pp. 191-195. 
6Consequently,  Japanese  Americans  incarcerated  under  Executive  Order  9066 could  not  appeal  to 
hearing boards. As Roger Daniels aptly sums up: 
While the decision to intern an individual may not have been just, internment in the United 
States generally followed the rules set down in American and international law. What happened 
to  those  West  Coast  Japanese  Americans  who  were  incarcerated  in  army  and  WRA 
concentration camps was simply lawless.12 
Hence, “internment camp” and its derivations are inappropriate, not because they are euphemistic: 
“Internment” is simply misleading because both types of imprisonment happened at the same time. It 
is for the sake of clarity that “internment” and “internment camps” should be reserved to those enemy 
aliens who were imprisoned with due process of law. 
Unfortunately,  many  authors  use  “internment”  to  describe  the  mass  incarceration  of  the 
Japanese-American  West  Coast  population,  and  to  add  to  the  confusion,  some  book  titles 
indiscriminately mix both types of imprisonment, such as “The Unknown Internment: An Oral History 
of  the Relocation of  Italian Americans  During World II.”13 It  is  therefore not  surprising that  one 
commonly gets to hear that there was nothing special about the fate of the West Coast Japanese, as the 
same happened to Germans and Italians,  only in lesser numbers.  Indeed, selected German enemy 
aliens  and  Italian  enemy  aliens  were  interned  along  with  Japanese  enemy  aliens.  However,  the 
government did not summarily incarcerate them without due process because of their ethnicity. WRA 
director  Dillon  S.  Myer  nicely  summed up the  problem of  ambiguous  nomenclature,  when,  in  a 
memorandum to his staff, he explains his objections to the term “camp:”
The term “camp” when used to refer to a relocation center is likewise objectionable. It leads 
people to confuse the relocation centers administered by the War Relocation Authority with the 
detention camps and internment camps administered by other agencies [such as the INS and 
Justice  Department].  The  evacuees  are  not  “internees.”  They  have  not  been  “interned.”14 
(emphasis added) 
Myer  also  rejected  the  term “concentration  camp,”  although it  was  used  by  many  of  his 
contemporaries, among them President Roosevelt.15 Immediately after World War II, shocked by Nazi 
atrocities,  the  term  was  off-limits.  In  the  last  two  decades,  however,  “concentration  camp”  has 
reappeared  to  designate  Santa  Anita,  Tanforan,  Heart  Mountain,  Manzanar,  and  their  likes.  An 
increasing  number  of  historians  deem it  to  be  an  appropriate  nomenclature,  and  the  Library  of 
Congress established the subject heading “Concentration Camps – United States of America” which, 
so far, contains only items about the wartime incarceration of the Japanese Americans.16 Let us briefly 
review its meaning. According to the most recent edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica concentration 
camps keep, 
12 Ibid., p. 195. 
13 Stephen R. Fox: The Unknown Internment: An Oral History of the Relocation of Italian Americans During World War  
II, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990. 
14 Memorandum to All Staff Members, War Relocation Authority, Tule Lake Project, Newell, California, October 2, 1942; 
see also Memorandum: Functions of the Military Police Units at Centers for Japanese Evacuees, WCCA, JERS: 12:131. 
15 Daniels: Words Do Matter, p. 201. 
16 Ibid., p. 201. 
7[…] political  prisoners  and  members  of  national  or  minority  groups  who are  confined  for 
reasons of state security, exploitation, or punishment, usually by executive decree or military 
order. Persons are placed in such camps often on the basis of identification with a particular 
ethnic or political group rather than as individuals and without benefit either of indictment or 
fair trial. Concentration camps are to be distinguished from prisons interning persons lawfully 
convicted of civil crimes and from prisoner-of-war camps in which captured military personnel 
are  held under  the laws of  war.  They are also to  be distinguished from refugee camps or 
detention  and  relocation  centres  for  the  temporary  accommodation  of  large  numbers  of 
displaced persons.17 
Since Assembly Centers and Relocation Camps fit all these criteria they are, put bluntly, textbook 
concentration camps. The definition in the Encyclopedia Americana is wider but no less fitting: 
[A concentration camp is] a guarded enclosure set up by a government for the confinement of 
special categories of people. Assignment to a concentration camp usually follows a roundup or 
mass arrest without judicial trial. Men, women, and children may be sent to a camp, where their 
quarters are generally barracks or tents surrounded by barbed wire.18 
However,  the  term  “concentration  camp”  has  one  obvious  drawback:  Even  though  the  term  is 
technically appropriate, in the public imagination concentration camps are associated with Nazi death 
camps. Thus, using concentration camp would evoke images of gas chambers and mass extermination, 
which was neither the policy of the Army, nor the WRA. 
Having cleared up the three predominating nomenclatures let us now evaluate which is best 
fitted to describe the camps in which Japanese Americans where summarily incarcerated. First of all, 
“internment  camp” –  in  fact  every  phrase  containing  “internment”  –  is  misleading  and therefore 
should be abandoned. Oddly enough, it is probably the term most widely used, particularly in the last 
twenty  years.  The reason behind  the  omnipresence  of  “internment”  is  most  likely  that  historians 
hesitated to use “concentration camp,” which they considered too harsh a term. Thus “internment 
camp” emerged as a makeshift solution, a seemingly happy medium between government euphemisms 
and the ominous “concentration camp.” However, awareness of the confusion caused by the stopgap 
“internment” has risen substantially within the last five years, resulting in a slight lessening in the use 
of “internment.”19 
To dismiss  out  of  hand the term “concentration camp” surely would be  wrong despite  its 
connotation. It appears that there is more behind the rejection of “concentration camp” than concern 
about the word’s bitter aftertaste: Underneath lies the half-conscious belief that language is a natural 
growth and not an instrument which we shape for our own purposes.20 But the process of coinage is 
not an irreversible one. Historians are able to coin words themselves, and they should not be silent for 
the sake of political correctness. We need to find terms that accurately reflect events and enlighten our 
17 Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 3 (151993), p. 513. 
18 Encyclopedia Americana,  Vol. 7 (1986), pp. 497-499. It lists three categories of concentration camps: 1) “Western 
Camps,” among them Lord Kitchener’s camps for the families of Boer guerilla fighters, as well as the U.S. Relocation 
Camps of World War II; 2) “Communist Camps;” 3) “Nazi Camps.” 
19 Daniels: Words Do Matter, p. 206. 
20 This notion, albeit in a different context, is expressed in the illuminating essay by George Orwell: “Politics and the 
English Language,” in The Penguin Essays of George Orwell, eds. Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, London: Penguin Books, 
1984, pp. 354-366. 
8understanding of the past, and in doing so we certainly have considerable responsibility not to mislead 
our readers. So it all comes down to the question: Is the term “concentration camp” misleading? With 
respect  to  readers  in  the  United  States,  I  would  say  no.  The  unlawful  incarceration  of  Japanese 
Americans  is  part  of  the  high  school  curriculum,  and  classes  on  it  are  taught  at  most  colleges. 
Moreover,  living  conditions  in  these  camps  have  been  accurately  depicted  in  popular  novels, 
newspaper articles, exhibitions, and documentaries, not to mention the plethora of scholarly work.21 
Hence, in the United States the general standard of knowledge is such that historians can trust their 
readers to distinguish between American concentration camps and the Nazi death camps. 
In Germany, on the contrary, knowledge of this episode of American history is virtually absent. 
Moreover, the term  Konzentrationslager, in particular its acronym  KZ, are inextricably linked with 
extermination camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau.22 For these reasons I will refrain from using the 
term “concentration camp.” After all, there are ways to paraphrase Assembly Centers and Relocation 
Camps: for example, by using “incarceration” and its derivatives. As for Raymond Okamura’s call to 
completely  cut  the  “evacuation-relocation”  nomenclature  from  text,  tables,  and  illustrations,  I 
disagree.  When used sparsely and in  the proper  context,  these  euphemisms lose  their  effect,  and 
sharpen the reader’s awareness of deceptive language. Furthermore, government euphemisms have the 
practical advantage that they allow us to distinguish between the temporary incarceration camps under 
Army jurisdiction (i.e. Assembly Centers) and the long-term inland incarceration camps administered 
by the WRA (i.e. Relocation Camps) without using these long-winded phrases. For these reasons I will 
use “Assembly Center” and “Relocation Camp” occasionally, but write them with initial capitals, to 
make clear that the terms are not to be taken literally. 
21 Recent works focusing on different ways of presenting the incarceration include bilingual picture books such as Amy 
Lee-Tai, Felicia Hoshino: A Place Where Sunflowers Grow, San Francisco: Children’s Book Press, 2006, novels such as 
John Hamamura’s  Color of the Sea, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006, and books that combine primary sources with 
scholarly analysis, such as Karen L. Ishizuka: Lost & Found: Reclaiming the Japanese American Incarceration, Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2006, and Lawson Fusao Inada (ed.):  Only What We Could Carry. The Japanese American  
Internment  Experience,  Berkeley:  Heyday  Books,  2000.  In  addition,  various  documentaries  and  movies,  including 
Academy Award winning Days of Waiting (1990, dir. Steven Okazaki), and the highly acclaimed Snow Falling on Cedars 
(1999, dir. Scott Hicks).
22 A telling indicator for the coinage in Germany, albeit by no means a conclusive one, is the item list one gets under the 
subject heading “Konzentrationslager.” The electronic catalog of the Thuringian State Library in Jena, for example, lists 
105 items, 103 of them referring indiscriminately to either concentration camps or death camps of the Third Reich. Of the 
other two books, one provides an overviews of the history of concentration camps but does not include the camps for 
Japanese Americans during World War II (Andrej J. Kaminski: Konzentrationslager 1896 bis heute. Geschichte, Funktion,  
Typologie, München: R, Piper , 21990). The other book is Joёl Kotek, Pierre Rigoulot: Das Jahrhundert der Lager, Berlin: 
Econ Ullstein List Verlag, 2001 (a translation of Le siècle des camps (2000)). Kotek and Rigolout dedicate a full chapter to 
the  incarceration  of  Japanese  Americans  during  World  War  II.  They  argue,  for  the  same  reasons  I  outlined,  that 
concentration camp is the proper nomenclature for these camps. But while the book as a whole is illuminating, the chapter 
on the incarceration of Japanese Americans is flawed by a number of wrong and misleading facts. For example, on page 
432 it says that in 1940 some “240,000 Japanese lived in the United States, 77,000 of whom held American citizenship.” 
However, according to the census of 1940, less than 127,000 Japanese and Americans of Japanese descent lived in the 
United States (Hawaii was a Territory). Also, by summing up U.S. citizens and aliens as “Japanese” (U.S. citizenship is 
merely  an  attribute  to  Japanese  nationality),  the  authors  imply  the  very  same  paradigm of  unassimilability  that  the 
architects of incarceration employed to justify their actions. In addition there are numerous mistakes that are probably to be 
ascribed to the translators. For example, Executive Order 9066 becomes Executive Act 9066, U.S. Attorney General Francis 
Biddle becomes Attorney General of California, WRA becomes WAR, and so on. 
9After this excursus into terminology, I will outline major currents and debates in the historical 
discourse;  this  also  serves  to  demonstrate  the  topicality  of  the  wartime  incarceration.  The  main 
watershed in historiography goes back to the civil rights movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
when revisionist historians for the first time argued that the episode was not merely a tragic mistake 
but  part  of a pattern of systematic  government discrimination against racial  groups in the United 
States.23 Today, merely a handful of scholars and journalists contest this premise.24 Yet the debate was 
revived  only  recently,  in  2004,  by  the  release  of  the  book  In  Defense  of  Internment,  written  by 
Michelle Malkin, a frequent FOX news contributor.25 In her book Malkin claims to “set the historical 
record straight.”26 She challenges the view that the West Coast evacuation was the result of wartime 
hysteria and race prejudice,  arguing that given the threat of espionage and sabotage the summary 
incarceration of Japanese Americans was the only feasible response.27 
Although her argument can easily be repudiated, In Defense of Internment became a New York 
Times bestseller. Hence, while as a historical analysis her book has little value, it  is still  a telling 
document about the political culture of the contemporary United States, particularly about the fear of 
terrorists after  the attacks of September 11, 2001. The success of her book is  emblematic for the 
general phenomenon that contemporary discussions of politics (as well as race relations, gender, and 
class) influence our core beliefs about our own history, and vice versa. In the case of Malkin’s book, 
the topicality of the wartime incarceration stems from the parallels between the attack on Pearl Harbor 
and the attack on New York’s Twin Towers, and the resulting debate on national security versus civil 
23 While revisionist historians agree that the summary incarceration was needless, their accounts vary in style and tone. 
One group summed up as liberal sympathizers; see, for example, Morton Grodzins: Americans Betrayed: Politics and the 
Japanese Evacuation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949; Audrie Girdner, Anne Loftis: The Great Betrayal. The  
Evacuation of the Japanese-Americans during World War II, New York: Macmillan, 1969; Michi Weglyn: Years of Infamy: 
The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps, New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks Inc., 1976. While this does not 
impair the value of their research, they distinguish themselves from more sedate and matter-of-fact accounts, for instance, 
Roger Daniels:  Concentration Camps: North America. Japanese in the United States and Canada during World War II, 
Malabar:  Krieger  Publishing  Company, 1981;  Douglas  W.  Nelson:  Heart  Mountain.  The  History  of  an  American 
Concentration Camp, Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976; Peter Irons: Justice at War, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983. 
24 That so few contested this premise is clearly due to the abundance of empirical evidence supporting the claim of 
revisionist  historians.  The  most  notorious  dissenter  is  probably  Lillian  Baker.  See,  for  example, Lillian  Baker:  The 
Concentration Camp Conspiracy: A Second Pearl Harbor, Lawndale: AFHA Publications, 1981. The preface says: “This 
book's aim is: a) to uncover the big lie; b) provide facts and documentation to allow The Congress to justifiably deny 
unjustified monetary reparations; c) expose the persons behind the 'redress & reparations' movement; and d) uphold and 
preserve the HONOR OF OUR COUNTRY.” (p. i) Trying to repudiate the findings of the CWRIC, Baker abandons all 
principles of sound research and presents a work that is sloppy and naïve to the point of being entertaining. Scholars who 
dissent  but  largely  adhere  to  scholarly  principles  include  Page Smith:  Democracy  on  Trial.  The  Japanese  American 
Evacuation  and  Relocation  in  World  War  II,  New  York:  Simon  & Schuster,  1995,  and  Dwight  D.  Murphey:  “The 
Relocation of Japanese Americans Was Not a Racist or Shameful Episode,” in Japanese American Internment Camps, ed. 
William Dudley, San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2002, pp. 56-71. However, these works, too, are flawed methodologically 
and fail to stand up to the more exhaustive and conclusive studies listed above. 
25 Michelle Malkin: In Defense of Internment. The Case for “Racial Profiling” in World War II and the War on Terror, 
Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc., 2004.
26 Malkin: In Defense of Internment, p. xvi. 
27 A cursory examination of her work, however, shows that it is a textbook polemic, replete with half-truths, loosely 
applied terminology, non-sequiturs, and distortions of fact. That her argument is untenable has been demonstrated by Eric 
L.  Muller  and  Greg  Robinson.  For  their  highly  illuminating  debate  with  Michelle  Malkin  see 
http://www.isthatlegal.org/Muller_and_Robinson_on_Malkin.html (consulted 03/30/2007). 
10
liberties. Unfortunately, Malkin’s book exploits history by submitting sound research and stringent 
analysis  to  political  ideology  and  personal  agenda.  The  works  of  most  revisionist  historians,  by 
contrast, first of all seek to further our understanding of the past,  before they denote analogies to 
contemporary issues. To discuss exhaustively the historiography of the wartime incarceration in its 
relation to contemporary discourses would lead us far away from the main road we are taking in this 
introduction. However, the above discussion makes clear that the wartime incarceration represents a 
topical complex of events, and it will inevitably remain so since issues such as national security, civil 
liberty, and identity are always contested. 
Returning to  developments in historiography, apart  from the re-evaluation of the decision-
making process and the role of national security, there is another significant tendency discernable. 
Whereas  historians  up  to  around  1980  mainly  analyzed  the  motives  and  policies  of  government 
officials, later the overarching concern of scholars shifted to the evacuees’ responses to forced mass 
exclusion.28 The present study picks up the debate on resistance, a central aspect of this tendency 
which first rose to prominence in the early 1970s. 
The first two historians specifically discussing resistance were Douglas W. Nelson (1970) and 
Roger Daniels (1971).29 Their views were taken up and refined by Gary Okihiro in his essay Japanese 
Resistance  in  America’s Concentration  Camps:  A  Re-evaluation (1973),  in  which  he  explicitly 
challenged the image of the Japanese-American inmate as loyal and subject victim, a view promoted 
in the majority of earlier accounts.30 Okihiro proposed that the assumptions of the revisionist histories 
of slave and colonized groups provide a more realistic basis for an analysis of Japanese reaction to 
concentration camp authorities. Post-colonial studies show that African and slave societies tended “to 
resist externally imposed change of their institutions, that these acts of resistance are continuous and 
that  they  are  effective.”31 Okihiro  argued  that  Japanese  Americans,  too,  had  a  vital  and  resilient 
tradition of resisting oppression,  and that  resistance was part  of the historical  legacy of the anti-
immigrant movement on the West Coast.32 His hypothesis inspired a number of studies on the pre-war 
communities,  which  confirm that  patterns  of  cultural  resistance  were  established  long before  the 
28 For a bibliographical essay on works up to 1975, see Roger Daniels: “American Historians and East Asian Immigrants,” 
in  The Asian American: The Historical Experience,  ed. Norris Hundley, Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1976, pp. 1-25. A 
synopsis of historical perspectives up to 2000 can be found in Alice Yang Murray (ed.):  What did the Internment of 
Japanese Americans mean?, Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000, pp. 20-26. For a select bibliography of books published 
since the issue of redress was resolved, see Roger Daniels: “Incarceration, Redress, Reconsiderations: Reviewing the Story 
of the Japanese-Americans,” The Immigration and Ethnic History Newsletter Vol. 37 (2005), p. 8.
29 Nelson’s virtually unchanged 1970 MA thesis was published as Douglas W. Nelson: Heart Mountain. The History of an 
American Concentration Camp, Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976. Roger Daniels: Concentration 
Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War II, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, see especially the last 
paragraph of chapter 6. 
30 Gary Y. Okihiro: “Japanese Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation,” Amerasia Journal Vol. 1 
(1973),  pp.  20-34.  The seminal work on the orthodox interpretation of  resistance  is  Dorothy S.  Thomas,  Richard S. 
Nishimoto: The Spoilage, Berkeley: University of California Press, 21969 (orig. 1946). 
31 Okihiro: Japanese Resistance, p. 21.
32 There was no (post-)colonial situation in the United States in literal sense. What these so-called  “post-colonial,“ or 
ethnic, historians argue is that the results of post-colonial studies can also be transferred fruitfully to countries and groups 
that have never been colonisers nor colonised, at least in the formal sense. 
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creation of the camps in reaction to racial discrimination.33 
At the same time as these historians placed resistance into the context of the pre-war struggles 
in the American West, they also reassessed the nature of resistance. They argued that before World 
War II resistance took form in the preservation of Japanese institutions and values, and that this was 
also the true nature of resistance in Relocation Camps. As Okihiro put it, “Resistance was rechanneled 
away from open rebellion into ethnic beliefs and practices, which, because of the nature of oppression, 
themselves  constituted  resistance.”34 In  other  words,  following  pre-war  patterns,  resistance  in 
Relocation Camps was caused by discriminatory measures against pro-Japanese elements and resulted 
in an upsurge of Japanese ethnic identity. Hence, for historians who assume an analogy to a post-
colonial situation, culture explains both the cause of resistance as well as the goal of resistance.35 
Related  to  this  paradigmatic  shift,  post-colonial  historians  also  re-examined  the  tripartite 
picture  of  the  Japanese-American  prison  community  as  it  was  promulgated  by  the  traditional 
interpretation of resistance. Early scholars qualified Issei generally as pro-Japan, equated Kibei with 
pro-fascist troublemakers, and characterized Nisei as “good” citizens, assimilated and pro-American.36 
This community picture constituted the basis for the two classic  explanations of resistance.  First, 
resistance was commonly attributed to pro-fascist Kibei who used bullying tactics to coerce others into 
joining their protest.  The other explanation suggested that resistance was merely an expression of 
pent-up pressures due to mismanagement that would dissolve once the grievances had been removed.37 
By contrast, post-colonial historians demonstrate that there was an underlying discontent and potential 
for resistance, no matter how efficient the camp was run. They also argue that resistance was carried 
by  a  wide  majority  and  not  by  a  few maladjusted  individuals.  Finally,  they  show that  the  most 
important expression of resistance was the struggle to preserve community values. 
Although Okihiro’s essay lies more than thirty years in the past, there is a striking lack of 
micro-studies testing the historical validity of his claims.38 The overarching concern of this study, 
33 See, for example, John Modell: The Economics and Politics of Racial Accommodation: The Japanese of Los Angeles,  
1900-1942, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977, as well as Louis Fiset and Gail M. Nomura (eds.):  Nikkei in the 
Pacific  Northwest.  Japanese  Americans  and  Japanese  Canadians  in  the  Twentieth  Century,  Seattle:  University  of 
Washington Press, 2005. 
34 Okihiro: Religion and Resistance, p. 233.
35 Arthur A. Hansen, David A. Hacker: “The Manzanar Riot: An Ethnic Perspective,” Amerasia Journal Vol. 2 (1974), pp. 
112-157, Gary Y. Okihiro: “Religion and Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps,” Phylon Vol. 45 (1984), pp. 220-
233. 
36 Issei are the first generation Japanese immigrants. Born in Japan, they were barred by law from becoming U.S. citizens. 
Nisei denotes  the second generation Japanese Americans, born in the USA and citizens by right of birth. Nisei is used 
throughout this work synonymously with “American-born” and, therefore, includes the Sansei (third generation). Kibei are 
Nisei  who  were  sent  back  to  Japan  for  education  or  employment.  Kibei  is  a  quasi-Japanese  term composed  of  the 
characters “ki” (return) and “bei” (the first character in the term “Beikoku,” the term for the United States.) Nikkei is an 
umbrella term for all people of Japanese lineage. 
37 Okihiro: Japanese Resistance, pp. 20-21.
38 Most of the recent overviews on the wartime incarceration maintain that passive resistance was a common feature in 
Relocation  Camps  but  rarely  submit  that  the  preservation  and  revival  of  Japanese  culture  was  the  central  aspect  of 
resistance. For case studies confirming the ethnic perspective see Hansen and Hacker, The Manzanar Riot, pp. 112-157 and 
Gary Y. Okihiro: “Tule Lake under Martial Law: A Study in Japanese Resistance,” Journal of Ethnic Studies Vol. 5 (1977), 
pp. 71-85. Another important work on resistance – though the book does not fit the ethnic perspective – is Eric Muller’s 
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therefore,  is  to determine to what  extent  the findings of post-colonial historians hold true for the 
Tanforan Assembly Center. In this context I will ascertain the degree of mobilization as well as causes, 
aims, and means of resistance. Defining resistance as any conscious act of disobedience to an external 
authority,  I  will  take  into  account  phenomena  such  as  anti-administration  rumors,  jokes  about 
appointed  personnel,  factional  conflicts  among the  evacuees,  and  nonparticipation  in  government 
programs, which all can be interpreted as forms of resistance to administrative dominance. In this 
context I will  be explain why resistance in Tanforan remained peaceful and did not galvanize the 
inmates  to  mass  protests.  Further,  I  will  examine  the  development  of  social  patterns  within  the 
community, paying special attention to generational and cultural conflicts. 
In addition,  this study asks a number of questions that are not explicitly addressed by the 
ethnic perspective, but that further our understanding of this episode: What other strategies, apart from 
resistance, did the penned-up community employ to cope with captivity? How did the evacuees make 
sense of their imprisonment? What distinguished Tanforan, a temporary camp under Army rule, from 
the more permanent  WRA Relocation Camps? By answering these questions  we will  capture the 
essence of the experience of the inmates and set forth a canon of issues that might be used as a model 
to compare different Assembly Centers.
Finally,  this  study  argues  that  the  Assembly  Center  phase  was  an  important  stage  in  the 
wartime incarceration as a whole. Surveying existent studies one finds numerous works on Relocation 
Camps, while there is a notable scarcity of works on Assembly Centers. Presumably this is because 
Assembly  Centers  posed  merely  a  makeshift  solution  while  the  long-term Relocation  Camps are 
considered the “proper” experience.39 Yet the Assembly Center phase was a most formative period for 
the Japanese Americans, being the prologue to mass incarceration which would last, in most cases, 
until the end of the war. As a War Relocation Community analyst aptly stated:
In order to gain a greater understanding of the attitudes and reactions of the evacuees as they 
came to the relocation centers, it is necessary to study the events and administration of each 
assembly center. The assembly centers represent the initial experiences of evacuation.40
Having outlined the goals of this study, the following section discusses the methods used. How to 
analyze the historical reality of an Assembly Center, whose salient features are a restricted, contiguous 
Free to Die for Their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2001. 
39 There is no study on Tanforan so far, only a chapter in Sandra C. Taylor:  Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American 
Internment at Topaz, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 62-88. There are two studies on other Assembly 
Centers: Anthony L. Lehman: Birthright of Barbed Wire. The Santa Anita Assembly Center for the Japanese, Los Angeles: 
Westernlore Press, 1970, and Francis Feeley: A Strategy of Dominance: The History of an American Concentration Camp,  
Pomona, California, New York: Brandywine Press, 1995. Apart from these two studies, Louis Fiset currently works on a 
study on the Puyallup Assembly Center. 
40 Anne O. Freed, Community Analysis Section, WRA: Summary of Available Data on Assembly Centers, July 14, 1943, 
as cited by Takeya Mizuno: “Journalism under Military Guards  and Searchlights:  Newspaper Censorship at  Japanese 
American Assembly Camps during World War II,” Journalism History Vol. 29 (2003), p. 99. 
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time and space?41 In order to reconstruct camp life, and to answer the questions of this study, I will 
provide detailed analyses of everyday interactions, placing each into its respective context. I argue that 
the propelling forces of Tanforan’s history are neither administrators (the “great men” in the histoire 
événémentielle), nor the silent, anonymous masses of inmates who, as some social historians might 
argue, can only be measured by numbers, and who act only as classes or collectives. Instead, the basic 
units of my analysis are sentient individuals as actors with their own agenda and strategies. In short, 
“small people” and everyday interactions form the basis of my analysis. Thus I write a microhistory.42
Conducting a microanalysis of Tanforan means to scrutinize the unfolding of events through a 
framework of constantly changing interactions and contexts, yet without dispensing with efforts to 
formalize and generalize. This has several ramifications. First, by focusing on empirically verifiable 
mechanisms and microscopic social processes, the findings of post-colonial historians can be verified 
without remaining captured in their premises. Second, this approach enables us to disclose essential 
phenomena of camp life that have hitherto remained underrated or even unnoticed. Third, as the study 
abandons and turns to dynamic forms, the reader will have to put up with a good deal of incoherence 
and non-linearity,  which  are  found in  macrohistories  that  commonly  follow the  pattern  of  grand 
narratives.  Fourth,  this  approach means  that  I  have  to  find  ways  to  connect  disjointed  everyday 
discourses, place them into context, and to explain variations within each given context. In brief, our 
task will be to “conceptualize disorder.”43
Finally, when analyzing the power relations between the incarcerated and their keepers, I will 
draw on Foucault’s concept of the “microphysics of power,” as put forward in his study Surveiller et  
punir: Naissance de la prison (1975).44 Foucault argues that power is a modus of relationship that 
develops, shifts,  and works in multiple directions. Following Foucault,  I  will consider power as a 
strategy, not a property.45 Adopting Foucault’s dynamic approach allows us to disclose power relations 
between prisoners and keepers in everyday life, to determine the role of coercion, and to analyze the 
strategies the inmates used to oppose coercion. 
Having thus laid out the methods, I will now comment on the sources I use in this study. The main 
sources pertaining to Tanforan are the records of the Japanese Evacuation and Resettlement Study 
(JERS),  a  research  project  conducted  during  World  War  II  under  the  tutelage  of  Dr.  Dorothy  S. 
41 The period under discussion takes up about five months, and the analysis is confined to the interaction of about 8,000 
people – some 7,800 evacuees, and less than 100 wardens and administrators – living and working in Tanforan.
42 Jürgen Schlumbohm (ed.):  Mikrogeschichte – Makrogeschichte. Komplementär oder inkommensurabel?,  Göttingen: 
Wallstein-Verlag, 1998, pp. 16-22. 
43 Fredrik Barth:  Balinese Worlds,  Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  1993, pp. 3-8.  See also Winfried Schulze: 
“Mikrohistorie versus Makrohistorie? Anmerkungen zu einem aktuellen Thema,” in  Historische Methode. Beiträge zur 
Historik, Bd. 5, eds. Christian Meier and Jörn Rüsen, München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988, pp. 319-341. 
44 Michael Foucault: Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison, Paris: Gallimard, 1975, pp. 31-35. 
45 Foucault’s concept of  power represents as a conscious departure from Karl  Marx, who asserted that  power is  the 
property of a group, typically the economic privileged. This privileged class, according to Marx, is the source of power, 
and in turn power is bound to the privileged, as property is bound to its owner. 
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Thomas, a professor of rural sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. As the war erupted 
Dr. Thomas anticipated the exclusion policy and got funding for a study whose overarching purpose 
was to trace the changes in the Japanese-American community during incarceration. Altogether more 
than 30 researchers assembled materials on various Assembly Centers and Relocation Camps.46 The 
project resulted in two studies focusing on three Relocation Camps as well as post-war adjustments.47 
Since much of the data remained unused, the collection of original data was gradually made available 
to other research workers. Today the Bancroft  Library at the University of California is the main 
repository for all unpublished material. 
JERS records concerning Tanforan contain more than 6,000 pages of microfilmed primary 
sources. The bulk of these sources consists of diaries, correspondence, and informal notes assembled 
by seventeen inmates. In the early phase of the JERS project there were neither formal guidelines nor 
specific  questions;  Dr.  Thomas  told  the  researchers  to  record  anything  they  deemed  worth 
mentioning.48 Consequently,  the JERS records pertaining to  Tanforan are highly heterogeneous in 
content  and  style,  ranging  from  purely  descriptive  observations  to  interpretive  analyses.  Some 
accounts are actually private diaries and letters, added to the JERS collection after the war, written 
without the awareness that one day they might be used for scholarly research. Many of them deal with 
intimate issues – thoughts, feelings and private conversations – giving valuable insights into everyday 
social interactions and the emotional state of the individual. Some of the texts even have a literary 
value. Other accounts contain detached observations. The sum of these notes constitute a canon of 
issues that the inmates deemed relevant, and by adhering to this canon I will be able to get close to the 
historical experience. Another advantage for the present study is the diversity of perspectives, which 
allows  us  to  shed  light  on  events  from  different  angles.  The  major  problem,  epistemologically 
speaking, will be to provide a synthesis of these multifarious perspectives while giving due attention 
to individual experiences. 
Another  feature  of  the  JERS records,  indicated  above,  is  that  they  are  very  close  to  the 
experience  of incarceration. Unlike memoirs and oral history interviews, JERS records are written 
without  the knowledge of  future events  such as the duration of their  incarceration or the redress 
movement.  Such hindsight  would  have  turned  the  fresh  impressions  into  colored  memories.  The 
following quote, taken from an inmate’s final entry in his diary, illustrates this point: 
46 Dorothy S. Thomas, Richard S. Nishimoto: The Spoilage, Berkeley: University of California Press, 21969, pp. i-v. Part 
of the JERS project are the  “Kikuchi Life Histories,” interviews of sixty-four Nisei  who resetttled during the war in 
Chicago. Recorded by Charles Kikuchi between spring 1943 and summer 1945 these autobiographic narratives illuminate 
individual experiences and show how the Nisei made sense of their times.  For an interpretation focusing on identity 
formation, see David K. Yoo: Growing Up Nisei. Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of California,  
1924-49, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000, pp. 158-171. 
47 Dorothy S. Thomas, Richard S. Nishimoto: The Spoilage, Berkeley: University of California Press, 21969, and Dorothy 
S. Thomas:  The Salvage: Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement,  Berkeley: University of  California Press, 
1952. 
48 See Kikuchi: “Through the JERS Looking Glass. A Personal View from Within,” in Views from Within. The Japanese  
American Evacuation and Resettlement Study, ed. Yuji Ichioka, Los Angeles: University of California, 1989, p. 189. 
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A brief retrospection invites various moods and reactions to a life totally new and different. 
Some day I was happy, other days sad, and moody, and sometimes cynical. As I look back into 
the diary, I feel like crossing out certain things because I don’t feel so gay now as I did at that 
time, or vice-versa.49 
Since this study focuses on the history and not on the memories of the wartime incarceration, the JERS 
records represent an indispensable source for our analysis. 
The  seventeen  chroniclers  of  Tanforan  were  all  second-generation  Japanese  Americans.50 
Almost all were between twenty and thirty years of age at the time of their incarceration. Most were 
students, male and female, and politically progressive, though to varying degrees. As prisoners these 
individuals  were  far  from  objective  observers,  and  the  records  are  replete  with  contradicting, 
emotional and ambiguous observations. A JERS researcher later recalled that “complete detachment 
and objectivity was the ideal goal, but not always completely possible.”51 This is, put mildly, slightly 
understated. However, since objective history is impossible – not only because our informants are 
unreliable, but also because the historian’s mind is grounded ineluctably in experience – this multitude 
of  partial  and  biased  perspectives  represent  no  handicap.  On  the  contrary,  it  accommodates  our 
approach to reconstruct historical experience by contrasting individual experiences and concentrating 
on social networks, conversational connections and power relations.52 
The main disadvantage of the JERS study is the absence of Issei accounts. However, since 
most researchers lived in family units, there is an abundance of references to the Issei. Although we 
have no direct access to the Issei’s view – all information is mediated through the eyes of the Nisei – 
much can be deducted. What has been said about the Issei also goes for Tanforan’s keepers. They, too, 
left no personal records telling us about their view. However, the evacuees comment thoroughly on the 
wardens and administrators. This spectrum of judgments, which are by no means univocal, enables us 
to evaluate individual attitudes and to make generalizations. 
Aside  from  observations  by  evacuees,  the  JERS  collection  contains  camp  bulletins, 
proclamations, the camp newspaper, and protocols of meetings between evacuee representatives and 
the camp administration, that provide essential data on the physical setting, the administrative frame, 
and on the relation between the incarcerated and their custodians. In addition to the JERS records, I 
will draw on a number of edited diaries and memoirs. Lastly, the Army’s Final Report is the single 
most important source for juxtaposing the human experience with the de-humanized perspective of a 
bureaucratic apparatus, which sees the exclusion and incarceration merely as a logistical problem. 
49 Diary, Ben Iijima, September 18, 1942, JERS: 17:519. Fortunately, Iijima refrained from “editing” his notes. 
50 The contributors are  Grace Fujii,  Doris Hayashi,  Fred Hoshiyama,  Ben Iijima, Charles Kikuchi,  Michio Kunitani, 
Kenny Murase, Haruo Najima, James Sadoka, Tamotsu Shibutani, Tomiko Shibutani, Nobumitsu Takahashi, Henry Tani, 
Kay Uchida, Earle T. Yusa, plus at least two anonymous contributors. 
51 Charles Kikuchi: Through the JERS Looking Glass, p. 188. 
52 This ontology, so-called relational realism, once predominated in social science, has become somewhat unfashionable 
among historians. See Charles Tilly: “Micro, Macro, or Megrim?,” in Mikrogeschichte – Makrogeschichte. Komplementär 
oder inkommensurabel?, ed. Jürgen Schlumbohm, Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag, 1998, pp. 38-41.
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While the main purpose of this work is a microcosmic study of the Tanforan Assembly Center, I start 
from the  premise  of  revisionist  historians  that  the  incarceration was a  result  of  half-a-century of 
mistrust  and  discrimination,  and  that  the  camps  were  an  extension  of  the  West  Coast  society. 
Therefore, the first two chapters introduce the wider context of the Japanese-American incarceration. 
Chapter 1 delineates the three decades of Japanese immigration up to the immigration halt in 1924. It 
reminds us that panicky acts in a national crisis emerge not just from immediate insecurity but also 
from deeper prejudices and fears. The second chapter traces central developments in the Japanese-
American community and outlines the history from the attack on Pearl Harbor up to the incarceration 
of the West Coast Japanese Americans. Both chapters are written from a macrohistorical perspective, 
drawing mainly from the rich canon of secondary literature. Towards the end of chapter 2 I will “zoom 
in” to the San Francisco Bay Area, and finally to the Tanforan Assembly Center, thereby switching 
from the macro- to the micro-perspective. The following six chapters constitute the main body of this 
thesis, employing the previously outlined methods and sources. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with aspects of 
physical subsistence; lodging, food, sanitation, health and the organization of everyday needs. Chapter 
5 inspects security and policing. Chapter 6 scrutinizes everyday life. Chapter 7 analyzes the camp 
press, while chapter 8 examines Tanforan’s self-government. 
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1 – Japanese in America and the Anti-Japanese Movement
Injustice has been the only American way of meeting a  
race problem.  We dealt  unjustly  by the Indian,  and he 
died. We dealt unjustly with the Negro, and he submits. If  
Japanese ever come in sufficient numbers to constitute a  
race problem, we shall deal unjustly with them – and they  
will  neither  die  nor  submit.  This  is  the  bigness  of  the  
problem.
– CHESTER ROWELL53
There are  two main reasons for reviewing the anti-Japanese movement on the West Coast of the 
United  States.  Most  importantly,  the  uprooting  of  112,000  Japanese  Americans  in  the  months 
following Pearl Harbor cannot be fully understood except in the context of the half-century of distrust 
and discrimination which preceded their removal. The other reason to recall the entrenched pattern of 
anti-Japanese sentiment is the fact that it persisted within the camps. In other words, the interaction 
between  Caucasian  custodians  and  Asian  charges  in  Assembly  Centers  and  Relocation  Camps 
followed  patterns  that  had  been  established  during  the  three  decades  of  Japanese  immigration. 
Therefore, this chapter sketches the history of Japanese immigrants up to the immigration stop in 
1924, focusing on the anti-Japanese movement. 
Substantial  emigration  from  Japan  began  only  after  1884,  the  year  in  which  the  Meiji 
government lifted its ban on emigration. The bulk of emigrants to the New World headed for the 
Kingdom of Hawaii in order to work as contract laborers on sugarcane plantations. In the decade after 
1884 some 30,000 arrived.54 The Hawaiian story needs to be mentioned, because the island kingdom – 
after its annexation in  1898 as an American Territory – served as an important staging point in the 
migration to the North American mainland; many Japanese immigrants came from Hawaii rather than 
directly from Japan. The migration of these lower-class rural Japanese, drawn by higher wages on the 
mainland, was spurred by the demand for low-wage labor following the exclusion of the Chinese in 
1882.  Also,  before  1908 there  was no effective immigration legislation preventing entry into the 
United States.55 
However, before these farm workers started to have a visible impact on the agrarian Pacific 
Coast,  most Japanese Americans settled down in thriving coastal towns such as Los Angeles, San 
Francisco,  and  Seattle.  As  early  as  1870  the  Japanese  government  opened  a  consulate  in  San 
Francisco,  but  significant  numbers  of  Japanese  did  not  arrive  until  1890,  when  the  U.S.  census 
enumerated 2,039 Japanese in the entire United States, about half of them residing in California (see 
Table 1). 
53 Chester H. Rowell Analyzes the Problem of Japanese Immigration in California (1914), in Sucheng Chan, Spencer Olin 
(eds.): Major Problems in California History. Documents and Essays, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997, p. 202.
54 Hilary Conroy: The Japanese Frontier in Hawaii, 1868-1898, New York: Arno Press, 1978. 
55 Roger  Daniels:  Asian  America:  Chinese  and  Japanese  in  the  United  States  since  1850,  Seattle:  University  of 
Washington Press, 1988, pp. 100-101, 107-109. 
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Among the first arrivals were upper-class students and other travelers, permitted to go by the 
Meiji government because they were viewed as “healthy, literate, and upstanding people who would 
reflect well on Japan's national honor.”56 They were sojourners rather than immigrants, who came to 
learn English, curious to discover an alien country, and intending to return after an adventurous stay. A 
few emigrated because they were shed by Japanese society; mostly Christians, and a few political 
refugees.  They came in  the  proverbial  search for  freedom and democracy,  hoping to  settle  down 
permanently  and to  live  free  of  repression.  An unknown number  of  Japanese emigrated to  avoid 
military  conscription.  Most  immigrants,  however,  were  displaced  farmers  who  were  looking  for 
economic betterment and an opportunity to own and farm land. As most of those early arrivals lacked 
sufficient funds to lease or buy land immediately, they first established toeholds as shopkeepers, hotel 
managers or restaurant owners. A few women were brought in to serve as prostitutes. During harvest 
season, many toiled as agricultural laborers. The initial employment for many urban people was in 
domestic service where little English was required. Gardening, too, was a profession easily accessible 
to Japanese newcomers, in which they quickly won the favor of their employers. 57 
These early immigrants were young, usually male, and they made little money, about $25-$30 
a month, scarcely enough to return home. Initially, the majority of Japanese settlers intended to save 
their money so that they could return to Japan quickly and buy land there, and a large number did so, 
following the pattern of other immigrant groups.58 But many Japanese realized that fortunes were not 
earned  quickly  and  changed  their  mind  to  establish  a  permanent  foothold.59 Moreover,  Japanese 
immigrants were predisposed to the United States not only for economic reasons: The United States 
and its  institutions  were deeply admired by the  Japanese;  in  Japanese government  textbooks,  for 
example, Benjamin Franklin and Abraham Lincoln were models to be emulated.60 All this contributed 
to the growth of a permanent immigrant community, which at the same time retained strong cultural 
links to its home country.61 
Although numerically these immigrant pioneers comprised less than a drop in the bucket of the 
growing Pacific Coast population, the history of pre-1900 urban communities already illustrates two 
recurring  and  central  aspects  of  Japanese  immigration  to  the  United  States:  the  anti-Japanese 
56 Sandra C. Taylor:  Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993, p. 2. 
57 Daniels: Asian America, pp. 104-107. 
58 Page Smith: Democracy on Trial. The Japanese American Evacuation and Relocation in World War II, New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995, pp. 52-53. On the relation between economic success and return migration see: Masao Suzuki: 
“Success Story? Japanese Immigrant Economic Achievement and Return Migration, 1920-1930,”  Journal of Economic 
History Vol. 55 (1995), pp. 889-901. 
59 There exists the influential and lasting notion that Asian immigrants came merely as temporary sojourners to the United 
States, and still continue do so. For a critical discussion of this idea see Eugene F. Wong: “Asian American Middleman 
Minority Theory: The Framework of an American Myth,” Journal of Ethnic Studies Vol. 13 (1985), pp. 51-88. 
60 Thomas Sowell: Ethnic America, New York: Basic Books Inc., 1981, p. 157; Yasuo Wakatsuki: “Japanese Emigration to 
the United States, 1866-1924,” Perspectives in American History Vol. 12 (1979), p. 465. 
61 Eiichiro Azuma:  Between Two Empires. Race, History and Transnationalism in Japanese America, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp. 17-34. Taylor: Jewel of the Desert, pp. 2-5. 
19
movement on the Pacific Coast, and, inextricably linked to it, the Japanese government’s concern for 
its subjects abroad. 
As Roger Daniels, a leading historian of the Japanese in America noted, “[f]rom the beginning 
of trans-Pacific migration, the Japanese government had evinced great interest in the way its subjects 
were treated abroad.”62 Japan’s vigilance against discriminatory treatment was less for humanitarian 
reasons but rather motivated by the desire to protect her prestige as an aspiring nation. Unlike China, a 
country torn by inner conflicts and exploited by western colonial powers, Japan had set upon a path to 
become a great power herself,  in order to evade  the very degradation China suffered. After being 
forced to open to the West in 1854, Japan underwent a rigorous modernization, following the example 
of European states such as Great Britain and Prussia. In foreign policy, too, Japan dissociated herself 
from the victimized Asian nations and tended to side with western colonial powers; during the Boxer 
Rebellion, for example, Tokyo dispatched the largest contingent of soldiers to aid the Eight-Nation 
Alliance in putting down the uprising. 
By 1905, when Japan defeated Russia, Nippon had become the dominant military power in the 
Western Pacific. Consequently, Japan expected its citizens to be treated like citizens of any other great 
power; dignity and respect became a question of national honor. When the Chinese exclusion act was 
signed in 1882, there was little that victimized China could do about it. In contrast, every measure 
designed  to  discriminate  against  Japanese  immigrants  was  carefully  scrutinized  and  promptly 
responded to by policy makers in Tokyo. 
Whereas the Japanese encountered derogatory and racist comments as early as in the 1860s, 
nothing that can be called an anti-Japanese movement existed until the 1890s. It was in San Francisco, 
the city with the most important  Nihonmachi, or “Japan town”, where the first brief but significant 
anti-Japanese  flurry  occurred  between  1891  and  1893.  The  flurry  was  triggered  by  depressed 
economic conditions combined with the arrival of a few hundred rather ragged immigrants from Japan 
proper. As the press denounced the new labor immigration, Sutemi Chinda, the new consul general, 
tried to find jobs for those whom the authorities threatened to bar. He then informed his superiors in 
Tokyo,  that  any  passenger without  fifteen  dollars  in  his  possession  would  likely  be  rejected  and 
advised port officials in Japan to prevent the emigration of impoverished emigrants.63 
The negative newspaper headlines subsided eventually, and long-term political ramifications 
failed to appear. Only the San Francisco Board of Education took brief issue with the Japanese: On 
June 10, 1893, the board passed a resolution ordering all persons of Japanese race to attend Chinese 
schools. Upon protest of the Japanese consul general, who pointed out that there were only between 
forty and fifty Japanese students in the whole school system, the school board eventually reversed its 
62 Daniels: Asian America, p. 103. 
63 Daniels:  Asian  America,  pp.  109-111.  For  Japan’s  emigration  restrictions  see  Mitziko  Sawada:  “Culprits  and 
Gentlemen: Meiji Japan’s Restrictions of Emigrants to the United States, 1891-1909,” Pacific Historical Review Vol. 60 
(1991), pp. 339-359. 
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action.64 The transience of this first wave of anti-Japanese sentiment was surely due to the very small 
numbers of Japanese immigrants.  As mentioned earlier,  the 1890 census found that a mere 1,147 
Japanese lived in California (590 in San Francisco) and less than another 1,000 in the rest of the 
country.65 
The  second  wave  of  anti-Japanese  sentiment  occurred  at  the  turn  of  the  century  and 
demonstrated how easily the anti-Chinese tradition in California, and on the West Coast as a whole, 
became an anti-Oriental tradition. During the campaign for further extension of the Chinese Exclusion 
Act, due to expire in 1902, some of those involved in the campaign wanted to keep out all Asians. 
James D. Phelan, a progressive Democrat who was then mayor of San Francisco, insisted that the 
struggles against the Chinese and Japanese were the same, arguing that “the Japanese are starting the 
same tide of immigration which we thought we had checked twenty years ago,” and that “Chinese and 
Japanese […] are not the stuff of which American citizens can be made.”66 But again the numbers of 
Japanese  were  too  low  to  bring  about  tangible  anti-Japanese  legislation.  The  prime  goal  of  the 
campaign was the exclusion of the Chinese, and this goal was achieved when on April 29, 1902, 
Theodore Roosevelt made the exclusion permanent.67 
By the mid 1890s, the urban locus of the Japanese-American community began to be replaced by a 
rural one. It began with a trickle of laborers from Hawaii, who had completed their contracts on the 
sugarcane plantations. After 1898, Hawaii’s annexation by the United States made further migration to 
the mainland possible. As mentioned earlier, there was no effective immigration legislation to keep 
them out; though a 1891 statute barred the entry of any paupers likely to become a public charge, such 
as prostitutes and contract laborers,  those provisions were almost  impossible  to enforce.  Japanese 
immigrants quickly became an important factor on the agrarian Pacific Coast and would remain so 
until their removal in 1942. 68 
Since  a  great  many  contemporary  publicists  wrote  about  the  “yellow  flood”  of  Japanese 
immigrants, it is necessary to note the numerical insignificance, in both absolute and relative terms, of 
Japanese coming to the United States: According to the immigration data of the federal government in 
the peak period of immigration between 1901 and 1908, 125,000 immigrants came in, and then about 
10,000 a year until the Immigration Act of 1924 barred further immigration from Japan. In the entire 
period fewer than 300,000 Japanese arrived, many of whom were sojourners rather than immigrants. 
64 Donald Teruo Hata: “Undesirables”: Early Immigrants and the Anti-Japanese Movement in San Francisco, 1892-1893,  
Prelude to Exclusion, New York: Arno Press, 21978, pp. 140-153.
65 For immigrant figures see Table 1. 
66 San Francisco Examiner, May 8, 1900. As cited by Daniels: Asian America, p. 112. 
67 It should be noted that, in general, the federal government opposed the West Coast states in their demand to prohibit 
immigration of Orientals. Both President Hayes and President Arthur vetoed bills that called for permanent exclusion of 
the Chinese.  It  took two decades of intense lobbying to convince Congress to pass anti-Japanese legislation. See,  for 
example,  Daniel  T.  Tichenor:  Dividing  Lines.  The  Politics  of  Immigration  Control  in  America,  Princeton:  Princeton 
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68 Daniels: Asian America, pp. 107-108.
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In comparison, between the end of the Civil War and 1924 some 30 million immigrants came to the 
United  States.69 In  1907,  the  heaviest  year  of  immigration  from Japan,  30,842  were  recorded  as 
entering the United States, just 2.4 percent of the total of immigrants who arrived that year. And even 
as Japanese settled almost exclusively on the Pacific Coast, in particular California, the data shows 
that in 1920, the time of their highest incidence, merely one Californian in fifty was Japanese, and 
about one American in a thousand either came from Japan or was a child of Japanese immigrants.70 
Yet  the  anti-Japanese  agitation  rose  to  such  heights  that  in  just  two years  it  required  the 
intervention of the White House. In February, 1905, the Chronicle, the most important paper in San 
Francisco, began a crusade that lasted  for more than a year. In lurid language  Chronicle headlines 
warned of raging torrents of Japanese immigrants, and of their inassimilable character: “The Japanese 
Invasion: The Problem of the Hour”; “The Yellow Peril – How Japanese Crowd Out the White Race”; 
“Brown Men an Evil in the Public Schools”; “Crime and Poverty Go Hand in Hand With Asiatic 
Labor.”71 
While irresponsible journalists stirred anti-Japanese feelings on the West Coast, their headlines 
did little to keep immigrants from coming. Much more important for the exclusion of the Japanese, 
which was to be decided about by the federal government, were the views of educated middle-class 
Progressives  like  Fresno  Newspaper  editor  Chester  Harvey  Rowell  who  laid  out  the  pseudo-
intellectual  foundation  for  the  Japanese  exclusion.  Their  rationale  was  decisive  when  it  came to 
convince lawmakers of the necessity to exclude the Japanese. What follows are some of Rowell’s 
quotations from his numerous public remarks: 
[Racial discrimination] is blind and uncontrollable prejudice […] yet social separateness seems 
to be imposed by the very law of nature. – Race counts more than anything else in the world. It 
is the mark God placed on those whom he put asunder. It is grounded in the instincts of man, 
and is not amenable to reason. – Intermarriage between a Japanese and a white would be a sort 
of international adultery. The instinct of self-preservation of our race demands that its future 
members  shall  be  members  of  our  race.  […]  Personally,  I  think  this  instinct  is  wise  and 
beneficial.72 
Appalling  as  these  remarks  appear  to  the  modern  reader,  at  their  time  such  views  were  rather 
moderate. There was nothing objectionable in calling for the discrimination, exploitation or expulsion 
of  “racial  inferiors.”  Eugenics  had  many  prominent  adherents  in  the  Western  world  before  Nazi 
Germany used it  to justify its  racial  policies.  In fact,  in the Congressional  debates preceding the 
Immigration Act of 1924, eugenics played a central role as “experts” advised on the threat of “inferior 
stock” from Eastern and Southern Europe.73 
69 Daniels:  Concentration Camps: North America. Japanese in the United States  and Canada during World War II, 
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It was such arguments of educated middle-class Progressives that characterized much of the 
anti-Japanese movement, as opposed to the anti-Chinese movement, in which arguments were almost 
all on economic lines. Further evidence for the predominance of racial over economic considerations 
is  the  numerical  insignificance  of  Japanese  as  compared  to  the  significant  numbers  of  Chinese 
immigrants: In peak times (around 1870) the Chinese comprised perhaps 10 percent of California’s 
population, and almost a quarter of the population of San Francisco. Their economic impact was even 
greater as almost all of them were adult males. Japanese immigrants, in contrast, peaked at 2.1 percent 
of California’s population (in 1920), where by far the most Japanese lived. Even in the area of highest 
concentration of their population – Los Angeles County – out of every thousand Angelenos, only 
sixteen were Japanese. 74 
To be sure, there was an economic argument in the anti-Japanese movement, especially among 
the trade unionists. In San Francisco, for example, Japanese in the dry-cleaning business and art goods 
business were in fierce competition with white and Chinese entrepreneurs.75 In the countryside, newly 
arrived  Japanese  agricultural  workers  competed  with  Chinese  labor  gangs.76 There  was  little 
competition with white farmers, however, because Issei farmers usually opened up new lands and 
introduced new crops.77 Given the Issei’s significant contribution to Californian agriculture, and their 
inconspicuousness,  there  was little  reason for  Californians  to  complain  about  the  Japanese.  Even 
newspaper editor Rowell asserted: “If white immigrants of equal quality were available, they would be 
welcomed enthusiastically in unlimited numbers. The opposition to the Japanese is wholly racial.”78 
Having dealt with the ideological foundation of the anti-Japanese movement on the Pacific Coast, I 
will now turn to the events that lead to the exclusion of the Japanese, which was eventually achieved 
by a provision inserted into the Immigration Act of 1924. One major issue inciting the exclusionist 
movement anew was Japan’s new status as a world power. As indicated earlier, by 1905 Japan had 
become a military power to be reckoned with. Most of the overseas Japanese were proud of their 
homeland’s achievements and supported Japan’s aggressive stance in world politics.79 The emperor’s 
birthday was an important holiday and the anniversary of Admiral Togo’s victory in the Tushima 
Straits was celebrated annually. Japanese consular officials were, until perhaps the 1920s, the chief 
Eugenics,  American  Racism,  and  German  National  Socialism,  New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  22002.  For  a 
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spokesmen and leaders  of  Japanese-American  communities.  This  solidarity  between the  Japanese 
government  and  Japanese  expatriates  was  perceived  by  the  American  public  with  mistrust  and 
contributed to the negative image of Japanese Americans in the eyes of educated Americans.80 
After the Chinese exclusion had been made permanent in 1902, the Japanese immigration issue 
exploded into national and international prominence and stayed there for two decades. Anti-Asian 
exclusion leagues were formed, and the Californian legislature endorsed press agitation immediately. 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  publicly  condemning  the  “foolish  offensiveness”  of  California’s  press  and 
legislature, privately agreed with the substance of the exclusionist argument: that the “very frugality, 
abstemiousness  and  clannishness  [of  Japanese  laborers]  make  them  formidable  to  our  laboring 
class.”81 Yet, due to Japan’s aforementioned rise to world power, he acted diplomatically. When in 
1906 the San Francisco School Board Affair became an international incident, he assured the Japanese 
ambassador  of  his  regrets  and  denounced  the  hostility  towards  Japanese  which  he  claimed  was 
“limited  to  a  very  few  places”.  In  his  December  1906  annual  message  he  called  the  agitation 
“discreditable” and noted that “it might be filled with the gravest consequences to the nation.” To 
straighten  out  what  those  consequences  might  be,  the  President  then  hailed  Japanese  military 
achievements. He even went so far as to recommend that Congress pass a law allowing naturalization 
of Japanese who intended to become American citizens.82 
Roosevelt’s  statement  was  denounced by  almost  the  entire  western  press  but  no  evidence 
suggests that Roosevelt really wanted naturalization privileges for Japanese Americans. Instead he 
sought a political settlement that would placate both the Japanese government and public opinion in 
California.  First,  he  mollified  the  Californians,  promising  to  stop  immigration  if  the  Californian 
legislature  passed  no  legislations  discriminating  against  the  Japanese.  Turning  to  Congress,  he 
introduced  a  law  that  would  stop  immigration  from  Hawaii.  What  was  left  was  the  increasing 
immigration from Japan itself, which was addressed in the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement. In this 
executive agreement of 1908, the Japanese agreed not to issue passports valid for the continental 
United States to laborers, skilled and unskilled. However, passports could be issued to the parents, 
wives and children of laborers already resident there.83 
Although a triumph of diplomacy, the agreement did not solve the tensions between the two 
major powers in the Pacific. What it did was to change drastically the nature of the Japanese American 
population in the United States, which would more than double in less than twenty years as many 
Japanese would bring in “picture brides” and start to have children with them. At the time of the 
agreement  almost  90  percent  of  the  Japanese  immigrants  were  male.  By 1924 the sex  ratio  was 
80 Daniels: Asian America, pp. 114-115.
81 Ibid., p. 121. 
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beginning to approach a balance. Thus, the Gentlemen’s Agreement enabled the rise of a burgeoning 
Japanese-American  community,  with  its  center  of  gravity  slowly  but  surely  shifting  towards  the 
American-born second generation. 
The Gentlemen’s Agreement also placed responsibility on the Japanese government to register 
and to control the influx of Japanese Americans. Therefore, in February 1909, the Japanese consulate 
general in San Francisco had the Japanese Association of America set up. The organization’s primary 
task was to issue documents for Issei who wished to bring in wives, parents, and other relatives to the 
United States. Additional certificates were provided for marriages, divorces, births, inheritances, and 
other statistically significant events. Furthermore, the Japanese Association served as protective agent 
when Japanese Americans’ rights were attacked, and exhorted Issei and their children “to dress in the 
western fashion, to attend schools and excel academically, not to carouse in public, and, in general, to 
keep as low a social profile as possible.”84 The organization also served as cultural link between Japan 
and the United States, for which it was repeatedly accused of planning the takeover of America. 
After Roosevelt had curbed the influx of male Japanese immigrants, the Californian legislature 
sought to cut Japanese economic growth by depriving them of the right to own land. In 1913, a bill 
was introduced in two versions: One version would bar all aliens from owning land, which had the 
drawback of stalling investment by foreign corporations. The second version forbade land ownership 
only by “aliens ineligible to citizenship.” The phrase referred to the federal naturalization statute of 
1870 (based on the 1790 statute), which restricted citizenship to “white persons and persons of African 
decent”, deliberately omitting Chinese as the congressional debates show.85 Although the Supreme 
Court established the precise meaning of “white persons” only in 1922-23, it was generally assumed 
that white persons excluded Orientals.86 Japanese ambassador Sutemi Chinda immediately called upon 
President Woodrow Wilson, who assured the ambassador that he would use his influence to prevent 
any anti-Japanese legislation. However, California’s governor, Hiram Johnson, remained unmoved by 
the President’s  request  to  reformulate  the  phrase  that  would  bar  Japanese.  The popular  governor 
pointed out that neither the Japanese nor any other race was mentioned; it was the racist nature of the 
federal naturalization statute that made it possible for California to discriminate between Asians and 
non-Asians in the matter of agricultural land ownership. When in 1913 the Alien Land Act was signed, 
forbidding ownership of agricultural land by aliens ineligible to citizenship, the United States set off 
one of several war scares in the press. In Japan the legislation it sparked mass protests and calls for 
retaliation, but the Japanese government chose to silently accept the law.87 
84 Ibid., pp. 128-133.
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Despite  its  psychological  effects  on  the  Japanese-American  community,  the  law  did  not 
significantly inhibit Japanese control of agricultural land. There were two reasons for this. First, much 
of  the  land  that  Japanese tilled  was  leased  rather  than  owned.  Second,  Japanese  could  transfer 
ownership simply to their  native-born children,  who were citizens of the United States under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. For those without children the law could be evaded by 
transferring to local representatives fifty-one percent of the stock and thus making it officially held by 
American citizens.88 
Californians only slowly recognized the loopholes of the 1913 Alien Land Act. Seven years 
later,  however, the anti-Japanese forces once more gained momentum. The initiative came from a 
broad anti-Japanese coalition including  representatives of labor, farmers, and middle-class patriotic 
and fraternal organizations. Headed by Democrat and long-time Japanophobe James D. Phelan,  this 
grass-roots  movement  felt  betrayed  by  their  government  and  set  about  drafting  a  tougher  law, 
designed  to  plug  loopholes  in  the  1913  law.  The  proposition  was  overwhelmingly  popular  in 
California. The state government was a proponent of the measure, as were both political parties. The 
proposition  passed  by  a  vote  of  almost  exactly  three  to  one.  Its  four  major  provisions  were:  1) 
prohibition of any transfer of land to Japanese nationals; 2) barring of any leasing of land to Japanese 
nationals; 3) barring of acquisition, by lease or purchase, of land by any corporation in which Japanese 
held a majority of the stock; and 4) prohibition of non-citizens from acting as guardians for citizens in 
matters of land tenure. 89
But the 1920 Alien Land Act, too, failed to inhibit seriously the growth of Japanese American 
agriculture. With large numbers of native-born Japanese Americans, in whose name land could be 
owned or leased, the law was more of a nuisance than an inhibition. Still the renewed agitation was 
disconcerting for the Japanese, many of whom pondered whether to stay in the country or to return to 
Japan. According to a 1925 poll taken in Seattle, almost two-thirds  were indecisive as whether to 
return  to  Japan,  and  almost  one-fourth  said  that  they  would  return.  Not  one  of  2,000  families 
interviewed was willing to say that they “definitely will not go back to Japan.”90 
Stirred by the new anti-Japanese movement in 1920, Tokyo initiated a new series of diplomatic 
conversations with the United States. Feeling that the agitation might eventually lead to the abrogation 
of the Gentlemen’s Agreement and fearing loss of face, the Japanese government took another step to 
accommodate  American  prejudice.  In  February  1921  it  announced  that  it  would  no  longer  issue 
passports  to  picture  brides.  The  effect  was  immediately  visible,  with  the  excess  of  Japanese 
immigrants over emigrants going down from 8,000 per year from 1913 through 1919, down to 4,000 
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per  year  after  that.91 The  final  step  towards  the  exclusion  of  Japanese  immigrants  was  taken  by 
Congress: in 1924, lawmakers in Washington D.C. passed an Immigration Act to restrict immigration 
in general. This act modified the quota system introduced in 1921, limiting the number of immigrants 
allowed into the country in any one year to a set number. Japan was looking forward to receiving a 
quota like any other nation, but Californian Senator Hiram Johnson, aided by Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge of Massachusetts, pushed for a special anti-Japanese provision to be inserted into the bill. This 
provision barred from entry as immigrants any person who was “ineligible to citizenship.”  Thus, 
although not named, Japanese were excluded.92
With the Immigration Act of 1924 Japanese immigration was cut off, apparently forever. The 
whole community shrank for a time as many Issei left for Japan. Yet the triumph of the exclusionists 
was only partial. Those Japanese who resided in the United States could continue to come and go. 
Congress never considered an amendment to making the status of “aliens ineligible to citizenship” 
hereditary, and by 1924 the predominantly female immigration of the years since the Gentlemen’s 
Agreement  had  produced  a  self-sustaining  demographic  foundation  for  a  “permanent”  Japanese 
America. 
91 Daniels: Asian America, p. 147. 
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2 – From Pearl Harbor to Incarceration
This is  our time to get  things  done that  we have been  
trying to get done for a quarter of a century.
– THE CALIFORNIA JOINT IMMIGRATION COMMITTEE93 
The time has come
For my arrest
This rainy night.
I calm myself and listen
To the sound of shoes.
– SOJIN TAKEI94
On Sunday December 7, 1941, planes of the Imperial Japanese Navy crippled the American naval fleet 
berthed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.95 Ten weeks later, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, 
in which he transferred to the War Department the authority to exclude from designated areas along 
the West Coast “any or all persons” as a precautionary measure against espionage and sabotage.96 Not 
in a single line did the order mention Japanese Americans. Yet the Army singled out the Japanese-
American  community,  roughly  two-thirds  of  them  American  citizens,  and  incarcerated  them  in 
makeshift Assembly Centers pending their removal to inland Relocation Camps. 
To bridge the gap from the previous chapter I will first trace in brief the development of the 
Japanese-American community after the end of immigration in 1924. In the main part of this chapter I 
will  discuss  the  events  following  Pearl  Harbor,  and  close  with  the  uprooting  of  the  West  Coast 
Japanese  Americans  and  their  deportation  to  Assembly  Centers  in  spring  1942.  I  will  focus  in 
particular  on  Japanese  Americans  in  the  San  Francisco  Bay  Area  who  were  incarcerated  at  the 
Tanforan racetrack situated south of San Francisco, one of sixteen temporary Assembly Centers. This 
first stage of forced removal will be told from three perspectives: that of the authorities, that of the 
West Coast population, and that of the Nikkei community. 
First, however, let us have a brief glance at the composition of the Japanese-American community at 
the eve of Pearl Harbor: After immigration from Japan had been completely halted in 1924, the first 
generation  dwindled  in  numbers,  while  the  American-born  second  generation  grew up  and  soon 
outnumbered their parents (see Table 3). In a typical Issei family, children were born between 1918-
1922. This meant that most Nisei were coming of age between 1939 and 1943. Whereas the native 
Nisei grew up distinctly American-oriented, the Issei community remained somewhat Japan-centered; 
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Experience, Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2000, p. 1. 
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consequently,  the  Japanese-American  community  became  increasingly  divided  as  World  War  II 
approached.97 
The Issei,  drawn together  by  their  common heritage  and separated  from white  culture by 
racism,  remained  largely  insulated  against  Americanization.  This  is  not  to  say  they  remained 
untouched by American culture. For example, between 1900 and 1920, the inability to speak English 
on the part of adult Japanese immigrants dropped from 62 to 15 percent, and many Issei eagerly 
adopted the customs of the country.98 At the same time, however, they remained affiliated with Japan 
by forming various ethnic organizations, such as the kenjinkai, prefectural associations, which became 
the focal point of Issei life; here they associated with fellow countrymen, celebrated their cultural 
heritage, and provided financial help to those in need.99 The immigrant press, too, unified the Issei, 
and strengthened their ties to Japan. For many Issei, Japanese-language newspapers were the only 
access to world news, and like most immigrant newspapers, they tended to be pro-motherland. 
Religion,  on  the  contrary,  was  an  aspect  of  Issei  life  that  furthered  adaptation  into  the 
American mainstream. At their arrival, most Issei were Buddhist but their institutional ties were not 
strong. Protestant Christian missionaries, in particular Methodists, worked eagerly to convert fellow 
Japanese  Americans.  In  the  San Francisco Bay Area  these  efforts  had  produced a predominantly 
Christian Japanese-American community by the mid-1930s.100 One likely reason why Christianity 
expanded  was  that  Christian  churches  made  available  important  services,  such  as  serving  as 
employment agencies and teaching Issei English and American customs. Buddhism, which had no 
tradition  in  social  welfare,  lacked  these  services.  Eventually,  Buddhism became Americanized  to 
compete  more  successfully  with  Christian  missionaries.  Despite  some  competition,  the  relation 
between Christian and Buddhist churches in the Bay Area – and at the Pacific Coast as a whole – was 
marked by peaceful coexistence.101 
When it came to raise their children, Issei wanted to prepare them for life in either country 
because they feared that future discriminatory laws could prevent their children from succeeding in the 
United States. A further reason for passing on Japanese traditions lay in the Issei’s the hope that their 
children would share in their parents’ appreciation of the values and worldviews of the Meiji-era, in 
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which the Issei took considerable pride. 
A frequently  quoted indicator for  the Nisei’s  adherence to  Japan – and arguably the most 
overrated one – was dual citizenship. Japan's laws on dual citizenship went no further than those of 
many European countries in claiming the allegiance of the children of its nationals born abroad. Also, 
since 1924 ethnic Japanese born in the United States had to be registered promptly with the Japanese 
consul to obtain dual citizenship. Few did so, and by the 1930s only twenty percent of the Nisei held 
dual citizenship.102 
To pass on the cultural heritage, Issei sent their children to Japanese language schools, where 
the majority of Nisei spent almost eight years. Classes were usually an hour and a half every weekday 
after a full day of public school classes.103 Language schools taught not only the Japanese language but 
also Japanese etiquette and moral values. Much of the allegedly Japanese virtues paralleled the Puritan 
work ethic: self-reliance, obligation, hard work, along with respect for parents and elders. In a few 
instances, schools tried to commit their pupils to political doctrines of imperial Japan, but such efforts 
commonly  backfired,  estranging  the  Americanized  Nisei  from  their  heritage.  Moreover,  Nisei 
naturally detested spending their afternoons in school while their Caucasian classmates roamed freely. 
Finally, because few of the Japanese language school teachers were trained teachers of language, the 
majority of Nisei failed to reach proficiency in Japanese – much to the disappointment of United 
States Army intelligence recruiters.104 
Perhaps fifteen to twenty percent of the Nisei were Kibei, who had been sent to Japan to 
receive additional education.105 While there exists the stereotype of the rabidly pro-fascist Kibei, they 
were,  in  fact,  often  inclined  to  socialist  ideas  (which  made  them  no  less  suspicious  to  most 
Americans). As we shall see later, some Kibei utilized their deeper understanding of both cultures and 
languages  to  mediate  between  Issei  and  Nisei,  playing  a  pivotal  role  during  their  incarceration. 
However, the fact that there was a significant Kibei group also indicates the pervasive ambiguity of 
Japanese America, an ambiguity, which opponents of the Japanese played on extensively.106 
In spite of the Issei’s efforts to convey to their children an appreciation of Japanese culture, the 
Nisei grew up as Americans by heart and mind. As teenagers they wore bobby socks, played baseball, 
jumped  rope  and  dressed  as  other  American  teenagers  did.107 The  most  powerful  Americanizing 
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influence came from schools: Those who lived in San Francisco’s Nihonmachi attended school with 
other Nikkei, but most of the Bay Area’s Nisei went to school together with Caucasian classmates. 
Despite the general anti-Orientalism of that time, schools were almost without exception fair to the 
Nisei children. They were truly integrated, due to their small numbers, and regularly associated with 
their Caucasian peers.108 
Hence, Japanese American households typically represented a blend of Japanese and American 
elements. Yoshiko Uchida, a Nisei from Berkeley, remembered: 
Although our home was distinctly Japanese on mood, character and structure […] my parents 
were  not  strict  traditionalists.  […]  The dominant  language  […] was Japanese.  My parents 
spoke it to one another, to most of their friends and to my sister and me. But both understood us 
when my sister or I answered in English, and they had many non-Japanese friends with whom 
they conversed in English. […] Most of the stories my mother read to my sister and me were 
Japanese folktales or children’s stories she had ordered from Japan. […] And at night, when 
Mama came to say our prayers with us, she always prayed in Japanese. […]. 
There were also certain Japanese phrases that were an integral part of our daily lives. We 
never  began  a  meal  without  first  saying  to  my  mother,  “Itadaki  masu”  (a  gracious 
acknowledgement to a hostess or whoever prepared the meal), and “Gochiso sama” (a sort of 
thanks for the fine food) when we had finished eating. […] 
Our daily meals […] were often a mixture of East and West. We always had rice instead of 
potatoes, however, and used soy sauce on our meat and fish rather than gravies and sauces.109 
As the  Nisei  reached maturity,  the  conflict  between them and their  parents  became more 
accentuated, for various reasons: First of all,  as one of the founding fathers of immigrant history, 
Marcus Lee Hansen, pointed out, it is typical in immigrant families for the second generation to reject 
the values of the first generation, whereas the third generation finds more merit in those values.110 
Second, the generation gap in the Japanese-American community was particularly clear-cut because 
after  1924 no new immigrants arrived from Japan. Third,  the Nisei’s  superior status as American 
citizens conflicted with the Japanese tradition that designated the Issei father as the uncontested head 
of family. On a related note, the demeanor of Nisei girls proved a constant source of friction. The 
Issei’s  paternalistic  attitude  about  the  role  of  women  conflicted  with  the  more  progressive  ideas 
prevalent in the United States. Finally, to emancipate themselves from their parents, Nisei founded 
their own organizations, most notably the Japanese American Citizen League (JACL) in 1930. Many 
Issei resented the JACL because it stressed Americanization and minimized cultural ties with Japan. 
According to Roger Daniels, a large number of Issei was even aware that their wish to perpetuate 
Japanese customs conflicted with the necessity to let them become one hundred percent American. 
Yet, few Issei found a real solution to this predicament.111 
This generational conflict, which was in essence a cultural conflict, posed the lesser of two 
problems  the  Nisei  faced  as  they  reached  maturity:  Culturally  Americans,  typical  products  of  a 
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pluralist society, endowed with U.S. citizenship and outstanding educational records, the Nisei had to 
realize that outside their ethnic community there was almost a total lack of economic opportunities. 
The ongoing Depression severely limited the jobs available, but most importantly, discrimination shut 
out  the Nisei  from the white-run economy.112 The JACL was too young and poorly organized to 
improve the social and economic stature of the Nisei, so that they frequently remained trapped in their 
economic ghettos.113 
All these problems were overshadowed by the attack on Pearl Harbor. For Japanese Americans, Pearl 
Harbor brought emotions too deep and complex to be easily sorted out.114 Karl Yoneda, a Kibei from 
San Francisco, recalled: “December 7, 1941, was a warm Sunday with autumn-like sky. The morning 
San Francisco Chronicle banner read: ‘F.D.R. Sends Note to Emperor of Japan; Crisis Near Breaking 
Point.’”115 As the radio broadcasts the news from the attack, Yoneda was stunned: 
What a shock! Though we […] had discussed the possibility of a war between the U.S. and 
Japan, we never thought it would break out so soon […]. On the street, already the newsboy 
was shouting: “Extra, extra! Japan attacks Pearl Harbor!” In Japantown the only store open was 
the Goshado Book Store at Post and Buchanan streets. Inside the store, several Issei […] were 
proclaiming: “Hurrah for the Japanese Imperial Army.” […] 
In front of the bookstore a reporter was interviewing two Nisei GIs. “Will you fight Japan?” 
asked the reporter. “Of course,” the GIs replied. […]
Across  the  street,  Ichiro  Kataoka,  proprietor  of  the  Aki  Hotel,  was  coming  down  the 
stairway handcuffed to two FBI men.116
Across the Bay, where Japanese Americans were more dispersed, the news seemed unreal to many. A 
Nisei student from Berkeley felt disbelief first of all:
We all agreed […] it could only be an aberrant act of some crazy irresponsible fool. It never for 
a moment occurred to any of us that this meant war. As a matter of fact, I was more concerned 
about my approaching finals at the university than I was with this bizarre news and went to the 
library to study. When I got there I found clusters of Nisei students anxiously discussing the 
shocking event. But we all agreed it was only a freak incident and turned our attention to our 
books. I stayed at the library until 5:00 P.M. giving no further thought to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor.117 
The gamut of feelings among the Japanese Americans in the Bay Area and the West Coast as a whole 
encompassed contempt, anger, mistrust,  wonderment, a sense of helplessness, and, above all,  fear. 
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Charles Kikuchi, a graduate student at UC Berkeley, noted in his diary that “everybody was saying 
that the Japs are going to get it  in the ass,” and feared that the United States might apply “Nazi 
measures” to the Japanese-American community.118 
Contrary to these fears, in the days after Pearl Harbor the West Coast population remained 
calm. Open hostilities remained largely absent. The atmosphere was tense, but there was no mass 
hysteria.  The  Los Angeles Times,  published in the city with the country’s largest concentration of 
Japanese Americans, urged its readers to remain calm: “Let’s Not Get Rattled,” the paper warned in a 
December 10 editorial. It would take several Japanese aircraft carriers “together with a good-sized 
fleet of covering war vessels and fuel supply ships, to carry on a sustained campaign” against the West 
Coast.119 Most newspapers echoed these calls for restraint. The Sacramento Bee favorably commented 
on a speech by Roosevelt, in which he warned not to discriminate against immigrants from enemy 
nations: 
Even those whose ancestors came from the Axis nations are, in the vast majority of cases, 
antifascist and anti-Nazi. They are eager to do their share in America’s war effort. As for the 
other kind, the agents of the FBI will take care of them. The persecution mania – the race 
hatred theme – is a jarring note of discord in the American war symphony. It is […] the direct 
antithesis of liberty, justice, and decency.120
In  addition,  West  Coast  newspapers  reprinted  letters  that  Nikkei  organizations  had  sent  to  local 
politicians and to Washington, D.C., and in which they pledged their loyalty to the United States and 
volunteered to contribute in any possible way to the war effort.121 
In Washington, the outbreak of war in the Pacific had been expected.122 Since mid-1940 the 
Justice Department had been compiling a list of potentially dangerous aliens, including more than 
2,000 Japanese. On the very same day that war was declared, FBI agents picked  up 736 Japanese 
aliens on the West Coast, and a smaller number of Germans and Italians. By mid-February, 1942, the 
FBI had 2,192 Japanese aliens under detention. All in all, about 8,000 Japanese aliens were interned in 
the United States and Hawaii during the war. On the West Coast about 10 percent of the adult male 
Japanese population was apprehended, including Japanese language teachers,  Buddhist priests and 
priestesses,  newspaper  editors,  members  of  the  Japanese  consulate,  fishermen,  travel  agents,  and 
martial  arts instructors.123 Some were known for their pro-Japanese attitudes, but most individuals 
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were rounded up either because they were community leaders of some sort, or because their work 
made them likely fifth-column agents. They were arrested under a blanket presidential warrant, which 
did not specify any grounds for the arrests, and taken to internment camps run by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.124 In San Francisco, the FBI also arrested five citizens, among them Yasuo 
Abiko,  Nichibei English  editor,  George  Hagiwara,  third  generation  operator  of  the  Japanese  Tea 
Garden at Golden Gate Park, and Karl Yoneda, long-time labor activist. The FBI had mistaken them as 
spies from Mexico, and they were released shortly after the FBI realized its fault.125 In addition to 
arresting aliens who were suspected of being dangerous, a little known fact is that more than two 
thousand Latin Americans of Japanese ancestry were also arrested and sent to the United States as a 
“barter reserve.”126 
Had the problem been left to the Justice Department, the internment of some Japanese aliens 
most  likely  would  have  remained  the  only  step  of  the  U.S.  government  pertaining  the  Japanese 
American population. But as Axis victories fuelled the fear of fascism, and as the virulent racism 
turned public opinion on the West Coast against the Japanese-American minority, the War Department 
came under pressure to take more radical measures. Lawyers, military commanders, and politicians 
argued for ten weeks whether national security required additional measures or not. The campaign 
illustrates, in the words of Peter Irons, “the dominance of politics over law in a setting of wartime 
concerns and divisions among beleaguered government officials.”127 In the end political views, not 
military  views,  prevailed.  On  February  19,  1942,  Roosevelt  signed  Executive  Order  9066,  thus 
providing the legal basis for a policy of mass exclusion.128 
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Executive Order 9066 allowed the Secretary of War and his military commanders “to prescribe 
military  areas  […]  from  which  any  or  all  persons  may  be  excluded.”129 Furthermore,  the  order 
authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  “to  provide  for  residents  of  any  such  area  who  are  excluded 
therefrom,  such  transportation,  food,  shelter,  and  other  accommodations  as  may be  necessary.”130 
Lastly,  the order stripped the Justice Department  of jurisdiction over the evacuation program and 
delegated authority to the War Department: 
The designation of military areas […] shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted 
areas by the Attorney General […], and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the 
Attorney General […] in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.131 
Executive Order 9066 is remarkable for two reasons. First, its inconspicuous, general wording 
makes it sound more like a relief measure than a document that was to be used to sanction mass 
incarceration. Second, the order provided the Army with immense powers over the civilian population 
without  declaring  martial  law.  Executive  Order  9066 was a  carte  blanche,  no  more  and no  less. 
Technically, it authorized the Army to relocate and confine any person anywhere in the United States 
without due process of law, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus of every single citizens in the United 
States. “Be as reasonable as you can,” the President told his War Department staff.132
Despite its general nature, every person involved in the decision making process was aware 
that  Executive Order 9066 was aimed at  Japanese Americans on the West  Coast.  However,  some 
military commanders contemplated applying Executive Order  9066 to  German and Italian enemy 
aliens  –  no  one  even thought  of  doing  anything  to  citizens of  German or  Italian  descent.  When 
Roosevelt learned that East Coast commanders considered creating military areas along the East Coast 
to exclude German and Italian nationals, he immediately made clear to Secretary of War Henry L. 
Stimson that 
no action is [to be] taken under [Executive Order 9066] in relation to [German and Italian] 
enemy aliens without your talking to me first. […] The control of alien enemies seems to me to 
be primarily a civilian matter except of course in the case of the Japanese mass evacuation on 
the Pacific Coast.133 
Stimson immediately asked his  Assistant Secretary of War for a  status report,  whereupon John J. 
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McCloy assured him that  there  would  be  no collective action  against  German and Italian  aliens, 
neither on the East Coast nor on the West Coast. McCloy estimated that altogether less than 6,000 
Germans and Italians needed to be evacuated, a task to be accomplished by the Justice Department.134 
When General John L. DeWitt, chief of the Western Defense Command (WDC), continued to ponder 
collective actions against German and Italian aliens, Stimson sent him a letter explicitly stating that 
“[f]or the present there is to be no collective evacuation of German and Italian enemy aliens in the 
Western Defense Command,” and urging DeWitt “to proceed with caution and discretion.” To be on 
the safe side, Stimson required the overzealous Western Defense Commander to give weekly reports 
of the numbers of individuals excluded under the Executive Order.135 Thus, DeWitt’s earlier promise to 
follow the Japanese evacuation with those of the estimated 114,000 Italian and 97,000 German aliens 
in the western states never materialized.136 
By the time the die was cast in Washington, the situation on the West Coast had fundamentally 
changed. As mentioned earlier, the first reaction was one of tolerance and understanding. As late as 
February 6, the San Francisco Chronicle titled “Alien Hysteria Mostly Imaginary” and contended that 
the lack of popular hysteria […] is in interesting contrast with the situation in the last war, when the 
witch-hunting  seemed to  emanate  from the  people  themselves  –  though it  did  reach,  finally, some 
departments of the Government, which were among the worst offenders.137
Yet this editorial proved to be a foreboding omen for a title-wave shift in attitude towards the Japanese 
Americans. Wartime hysteria started to heat up as Secretary of Navy Frank Fox and WDC officials 
spread  false  reports,  which  blamed  Japanese  American  saboteurs  for  the  defeat  at  Pearl  Harbor, 
ignoring the fact that there was no single documented act of sabotage, and that Japanese Americans in 
large numbers had immediately come to aid in the defense of the island.138 That Knox and other Navy 
officials spoke of “treachery” in Hawaii against better knowledge had at least two reasons. First, Knox 
did not want the people to lose faith in their Navy, and second, he knew that Japanese Americans were 
the  perfect  scapegoats.  To  argue  that  the  humiliating  defeat  had  been  possible  only  due  to  fifth 
columnists  was  a  convenient  lie  to  divert  attention  from the  embarrassing  truth  and raise  public 
morale.139 West  Coast  newspapers  eagerly  picked up this  version of  events.  On February 21,  for 
example, the San Francisco Chronicle wrote: 
[Let us recall] the details of the Pearl Harbor affair [which] have been reluctantly accepted as 
facts. We know that thousands of Japanese in Hawaii were ready and went into action with 
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clockwork precision the instant the attack was started. Swarms of wheezing jalopies, ancient 
light trucks, poured from cane fields and truck gardens into the roads. Traffic was choked. [Our 
men], on leave in the outskirts, had to fight their way […] through a tangle of blocked traffic, 
broken down cars, flat tires, while the bombs were crashing on their ships and stations.140 
In truth, Japanese-American college students were quickly issued arms and sent to engage Japanese 
paratroopers  who  had  allegedly  landed  on  the  island.141 By  mid-February  unfounded  reports  of 
immediate invasion and sensational rumors of underground armies ready to lay West Coast cities in 
ruin gained momentum and drowned the cool-headed voices.142 
Equally  important  for fuelling hostility  toward the Japanese-American community was the 
sustained success of Japanese forces in the Far East. By Christmas the Japanese had captured Wake 
Island and occupied Hong Kong. They had struck the Malay Peninsula, Midway Islands, and attacked 
the  Philippines,  destroying  substantial  numbers  of  American  aircraft.  On  December  27,  General 
Douglas  McArthur  had  to  evacuate  Manila  and,  after  being  isolated  for  almost  three  months, 
surrendered unconditionally, arguably the worst American defeat since the Civil War. On February 27 
the battle of the Java Sea resulted in another American naval defeat with the loss of thirteen Allied 
ships.  By  February  the  military  position  of  the  United  States  was  bleak  indeed,  and  reports  of 
battlefield deaths added a painful personal dimension to the war news.143 
It must be stressed, however, that the nearest Japanese airplane to the West Coast were those 
attacking Wake Island, more than 5000 miles West of San Francisco. Surface Vessels and troops were 
even farther away.  Technically,  hit-and-run air  raids  along the West  Coast  were possible.  In  fact, 
several Japanese submarines probed the West Coast.144 However, a large-scale invasion was beyond 
the capacity of the Japanese military. This is not the hindsight of historians; these were the findings of 
the high command of the U.S. Army at that time.145 
As indicated above, the West Coast press had been working steadily to resurrect the image of 
the  Pacific  Coast  Japanese  as  advance  agents  of  the  dreaded  “yellow  peril,”  and  image  that  in 
particular the Hearst syndicate had been fostered for decades by a steady flow of supplements on the 
so-called Oriental menace.146 After Pearl Harbor, virtually the entire West Coast press joined in and 
140 San Francisco Chronicle, February 21, 1942. It is worth noting that the article speaks of the Pearl Harbor “affair.” 
141 Franklin  Odo:  No Sword  to  Bury:  Japanese  Americans  in  Hawai`i  during  World  War  II,  Philadelphia:  Temple 
University Press, 2004, pp. 104-106. 
142 CWRIC: Personal Justice Denied, pp. 51-60. 
143 Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
144 Twice the West Coast was shelled: On February 23, 1942, a Japanese submarine fired shells at a refinery in Southern 
California and damaged one oil well. On June 22, 1942, another submarine bombarded Fort Stevens, Oregon. 
145 General Mark W. Clark of the GHQ admitted that the West Coast defenses were not adequate to prevent the enemy 
from attacking, but at the same time he agreed with the Navy that the chance of an invasion was, as he put it, “nil.” The 
conclusion of the GHQ report on the advisability of mass evacuation is quoted in Daniels: Concentration Camps, pp. 66-
67. The first who exposed the myth of military necessity was U.S. Army’s Chief Military Historian, Stetson Conn: “The 
Decision to Relocate the Japanese from the Pacific Coast,” in Command Decisions, ed. Kent R. Greenfield, New York: 
Harcourt, 1959. For a revised version see Stetson Conn: “Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast,” in The United States 
in  World  War  II:  The  Western  Hemisphere:  Guarding  the  United  States  and  Its  Outposts,  eds.  Stetson  Conn  et  al, 
Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1964. 
146 On the  “yellow peril,” see Daniels:  Concentration Camps, p. 30. In addition to anti-Japanese fiction in the yellow 
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cynically exploited war news, printing indiscriminately rumors and military fantasies about Japanese 
invasion of the West Coast. Listed below are some representative editorial headlines from the  Los 
Angeles Times: 
WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF POISON GAS ATTACKS147
OLSEN SAYS WAR MAY HIT STATE – Shift of Combat to California Possible, Governor 
Declares.148
THE  QUESTION  OF  JAPANESE-AMERICANS:  Perhaps  the  most  difficult  and  delicate 
question that confronts our powers that be is the handling – the safe and proper treatment – of 
our American-born Japanese, our Japanese American citizens by the accident of birth. But who 
are Japanese nevertheless. A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched.149 
LINCOLN WOULD INTERN JAPS. [Mayor] Bowron Says Civil War President Would Move 
Aliens If In Office Today.150
When  on  February  19,  1942,  Roosevelt  issued  Executive  Order  9066  reactions  were 
overwhelmingly  favorable.  The  San  Francisco  Chronicle commented  in  the  prospect  to  exile  all 
persons of Japanese ancestry: 
FACTS  FORCE  AMERICA TO  STOP PUSSYFOOTING –  The  President’s  order  [9066] 
means the removal of Japanese from coastal and other military contacts. 
The  order  specifies  that  persons  removed by  the  Army as  unwanted,  may be  excluded 
regardless of whether they be aliens or citizens. Attorney General Biddle makes it clear that the 
immediate effect will be upon the Japanese. […]
It is a principle that persons of Japanese blood who are loyal to the United States and its 
ideals can show that loyalty by recognizing necessity. This is a fight for survival. In this fight 
we cannot pussyfoot.151
The Palo Alto Times, usually resistant to anti-Japanese agitation, cheered the looming mass exodus, 
calling it “one of the most important details in this war’s strategy, losing nothing in heroic quality by 
its purely preventative character.”152 The Los Angeles Examiner, part of the Hearst syndicate, stated: 
“We are fortunate that the men chosen for the job [i.e.  General Clark who privately opposed the 
evacuation, and General DeWitt] rightly interpreted the American spirit of tolerance and humanity and 
observed it with justice and impartiality.”153
Among those stirring up fifth column worries were Edward R. Murrow, rising liberal star of 
the airwaves, and Walter Lippmann, America’s chief pundit. Lippmann, usually a detached observer, 
and possible outcome of a war with Japan, most notable Walter Pitkin’s  Must we Fight Japan? (1878), Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s  The Influence of Sea Power on History (1890), and In the Interest of America in Sea Power, Past and  
Present (1897), Homer Lea’s The Day of the Saxon (1912), and Hector C. Bywater’s Sea Power in the Pacific (1921). See 
Greg  Robinson:  By  Order  of  the  President:  FDR  and  the  Internment  of  Japanese  Americans,  Cambridge,  Harvard 
University Press, 2001, pp. 11-29.  
147 Los Angeles Times, December 19, 1941. 
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consequences of Executive Order 9066, the  New York Times printed the text of the order under the headline: “Text of 
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merely echoed unfounded warnings. In his essay titled “The Fifth Column on the Coast” he wrote on 
February 12: 
The enemy alien problem on the Pacific Coast,  or  much more accurately,  the fifth  column 
problem, is very serious and it is very special. […] The peculiar danger of the Pacific Coast is in 
a Japanese raid accompanied by enemy action inside American territory. […] It is the fact that 
the Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific Coast more or less continually and for a 
considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the American defenses. It is the fact that 
communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. These are facts 
which we shall  ignore or minimize at our peril. It  is the fact that since the outbreak of the 
Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast. From what we know 
about Hawaii and about the fifth column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a 
sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is 
held back until it can be struck with maximum effect. […] The Pacific Coast is officially a 
combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights 
include the  right  to  reside and do business  on a  battlefield.  And nobody ought to  be on a 
battlefield, who has no good reason for being there.154 
Lippmann’s column was carried in most newspapers and quoted by numerous government 
officials. However, anti-Japanese agitation was not limited to the press. Representing the traditional 
voices of anti-Japanese agitation, interest groups such as the California Joint Immigration Committee 
(a private organization despite its name), the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West and the 
California  Department  of  the  American  Legion  lobbied  local  politicians.  They  were  joined  by 
economic competitors of the Nikkei who saw the war as an opportunity to “kick the Japs out”.155 As in 
the previous decades, it was the educated middle class that expressed its racist views most eloquently: 
When rumor spread that Japanese would be evacuated to El Dorado County (east  of Sacramento) 
without  proper  guard,  the  Placerville  Shakespeare  Club  felt  compelled  to  express  its  views  on 
Japanese Americans in a resolution to General DeWitt: 
El Dorado County has always been free of this oriental menace [and] neither business, industry 
nor farmers have ever found it necessary to employ this class of labor or to cater in any way to 
these foes of our country. We will accept them [if they are put in a guarded camp] but we will 
not  tolerate  them here  of  their  own  free  will,  to  come  and  go  as  they  please  or  to  seek 
employment on our industries and on our farms […]. The Placerville Shakespeare Club […] 
does hereby vigorously protest to the federal government […] the humiliation to our citizens of 
harboring these undesirables, the members of whose race are the enemies of our country, the 
betrayers of our trust who inflicted devastation and death upon our innocent people in Pearl 
Harbor […]; a race who are the murderers of our men and boys […] and the potential saboteurs 
of our spiritual and democratic way of life […].156 
It is worth noting that there is a good chance that not a single of these men had ever met a Japanese 
American, let alone talked to one.157 In general, people lacking contacts with the Nikkei community 
harbored the bitterest feelings, while people who dealt with them on a personal and regular basis – 
church  groups,  university  faculty,  and  people  employing  Japanese  Americans  –  were  far  less 
154 New York Times, February 12, 1942. This and other newspaper extracts are compiled at 
http://www.cr.nps.gov/nR/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/89manzanar/89facts1.htm (consulted 02/01/2007). 
155 CWRIC: Personal Justice Denied, pp. 67-69. 
156 The Placerville Shakespeare Club: A Resolution to the United States Relocation Service and General DeWitt, May 4, 
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157 According to the 1940 census, only a single person of Japanese ancestry (a Nisei) lived in all of El Dorado County. See 
WCCA: Bulletin No. 8, May 2, 1942, p. 6. 
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concerned about alleged dangers emanating from them, or their supposed reluctance to assimilate. In 
short,  ignorance was an integral ingredient of prejudice and hysteria, and much of the resentment 
stemmed from the long fostered anti-Orientalism outlined in chapter 1. Pearl Harbor merely was the 
trigger to reactivate virulent fears of a “yellow peril.” 
While the decision to evacuate all persons of Japanese lineage was overwhelmingly popular 
there were sympathizers who remained unimpressed by the hysteria.158 John Steinbeck was one of 
them,  asserting  forthrightly  the  fierce  loyalty  of  Japanese  Americans  to  the  United  States.159 
Particularly church groups supported the Nikkei by assisting them in their preparations for evacuation. 
A typical  representative  of  this  group  was  Eleanor  Breed  who  worked  as  secretary  at  the  First 
Congregational Church of Berkeley. Like many who sought to relieve the situation for the Japanese 
Americans she risked public scorn. One day she received a phone call: 
“Is this the Congregational Church? Well, will you answer one question for me? Why do we 
have to be so nice to the Japs, feed them lunch, give them tea and hospitality? They aren’t 
treating our boys that way.” I drew a long breath and rose to the challenge, hinting that of 
course we with our higher (we think) standards wouldn’t want to imitate what Japan was doing 
anyway, reminded her that someone once said “Love your enemy,” went on to describe the 
hectic  week  […],  told  of  various  good  and  gentle  Japanese  who  were  as  sensitive  and 
humiliated by this experience as  we would be, etc. “I know,” the voice went on. “There are 
good ones and bad ones, I guess. I get all mixed up.”160  
The Provost of the University of California, Dr. Monroe Deutsch, who actively promoted a policy that 
would allow many Nisei students to leave camps to continue their education at universities outside the 
West Coast, fully supported the church’s actions toward the Japanese Americans: 
Allow me to express my own appreciation for the attitude […] your church has taken with 
reference to the Japanese and the American Japanese who are being evacuated. Your action has 
been one that is proper [and proves that] the ideals which we profess we try to put in practice. 
If  any criticize  you for it,  my only though would be that  they are  not  truly Americans or 
Christians.
People who fail to recall that these people who are being evacuated have no charges against 
them individually; they are not guilty of misconduct. They are being removed because of fear, 
which is gripping the hearts of some people. Personally, I feel that our country will someday 
feel ashamed of its conduct in this entire matter.161 
Surely, such voices represented a tiny minority. And even if there had been more people keeping a 
cool head, it was highly unlikely that they could deter the top military brass in the Western Defense 
Command from making the West Coast a “Jap-free” zone. 
Devising  the  evacuation  were  Lieutenant  General  John  L.  DeWitt,  heading  the  Western  Defense 
Command and Fourth Army, and his  Chief of the Aliens Division,  Major (later  Colonel)  Karl  R. 
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Bendetsen. After Roosevelt had signed Executive Order 9066, they set forth a policy that singled out 
for evacuation all  citizens of Japanese ancestry and their  alien parents.  The following paragraphs 
delineate the development of this policy. 
On March 2, 1942, taking the first open step towards mass evacuation, General DeWitt issued 
Public  Proclamation  No.  1.  The proclamation  designated  two Military  Areas  comprising  a  broad 
coastal strip that included the western halves of Washington, Oregon, California, as well as a southern 
proportion of Arizona. Additionally, it listed ninety-eight prohibited zones surrounding military and 
civilian  installations  that  were  vital  to  the  war  industry.  A press  release  accompanying  Public 
Proclamation No. 1 predicted the eventual exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military 
Area  No  1,  where  107,704  Japanese  Americans  lived,  comprising  85  percent  of  all  Japanese 
Americans  in  the continental  United States  (see Table 4).  Two weeks later,  on March 16,  Public 
Proclamation No. 2 added four more military areas, along with 933 additional restricted zones.162 
Few Japanese took the hint in Public Proclamation No. 1 and moved out from Military Area 
No.  1,  for  several  reasons:  Many  hoped  that  calls  for  evacuation  would  subside.  Moreover,  the 
freezing  of  their  bank accounts  left  most  without  the  financial  resources  that  resettlement  would 
require. Few of them had friends outside the West Coast willing to help in finding jobs and housing, 
and, finally, newspaper reported a growing hostility in the interior areas toward Japanese Americans.163 
By the middle of March, the Western Defense Command realized  that voluntary evacuation 
was unworkable. Since there  were no criminal  sanctions for  noncompliance with military orders, 
unless martial law was declared, the next step was to draft an enforcement statute and which Congress 
had to sign. Colonel Bendetsen himself drafted the bill, which he knew was to be an essential tool to 
enforce evacuation. The bill, known as Public Law 503, was signed into law on March 21 without any 
real debate in Congress. Public Law 503 made violations of subsequent military orders subject of 
criminal prosecution.164 
In  the  meanwhile,  on March 11,  DeWitt  set  up  the  Wartime Civil  Control  Administration 
(WCCA), a branch of the Western Defense Command, to handle the forced mass exodus.165 As director 
he appointed the freshly promoted Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen. Bendetsen, who accurately claimed that 
he “conceived method, formulated details and directed evacuation of 120,000 persons of Japanese 
ancestry  from military  areas,”  became the  architect  of  mass  evacuation.166 However,  the  WCCA 
needed assistance from civilian agencies; it was estimated that it would take about 35,000 military 
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personnel – nearly three combat divisions – to administer and guard all Japanese Americans.167 To 
solve the problem, Roosevelt on March 18, 1942, signed Executive Order No. 9102, establishing the 
War Relocation Authority (WRA), a civilian agency authorized to aid and supervise people emigrating 
from the coast by order of the Army.168 Milton S. Eisenhower, brother of the Army general Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, assumed the position as WRA director.169 
The  WRA was jointly responsible with the WCCA for the evacuation program: The WCCA 
rounded up all persons of Japanese ancestry in western Washington, western Oregon, all of California, 
and the southern part of Arizona, and concentrated them in Assembly Centers. There they were housed 
and fed until the WRA finished building inland Relocation Camps for permanent resettlement. With 
the transfer of the evacuees from Assembly Centers to Relocation Camps – after an average stay of 
three months – the Army handed responsibility to the WRA.170 
Endowed with the authority of Executive Order 9066 and Public Law 503, Bendetsen moved 
quickly to implement the Army’s part of the evacuation. On March 16, he instructed two site-selection 
teams to locate facilities capable of housing 100,000 people. Within four days these teams reported 
back to the Colonel, listing seventeen potential sites. After quick review, DeWitt ordered the Army’s 
Engineer Corps on March 20 to proceed with the construction of fifteen “Assembly Centers” for the 
housing of  evacuees,  and  gave  the  Corps  a  deadline  of  April  21 for  making the  camps ready.171 
Furthermore, to administer the actual evacuation and to aid the evacuees in their preparations, on 
March 17 the WCCA opened forty-eight “Service Centers” on the West Coast.172 
On March 24, Bendetsen, over the signature of his boss, issued Public Proclamation No. 3 
(effective on March 27), that affected the daily lives of Japanese Americans by establishing an 8 p.m. 
to  6  a.m.  curfew  for  all  aliens  and  Japanese  American  citizens.  This  curfew  order  additionally 
restricted the movements of Japanese Americans to a five-mile radius from their homes and places of 
work.173 On the same say, DeWitt issued the first of 108 “Civilian Exclusion Orders” forcing the 55 
Japanese American families living on Bainbridge Island, near Seattle, to leave their homes within six 
days. They were moved to the nearby Assembly Center at the Puyallup Fairgrounds.174 
Voluntary migration ended for good on March 27, when Public Proclamation No. 4 forbade 
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those Japanese Americans within Military Area No. 1 and the Californian part of Military Area No. 2 – 
some 90 percent of those who resided on the West Coast (see Table 4) – from leaving the area without 
permission.  Thus  they  remained  trapped  in  their  homes  and  could  do  nothing  but  wait  for  the 
Exclusion Order that would inform them of the date of their deportation. Until August 7, 1942, the 
WCCA uprooted 110,442 persons  of  Japanese ancestry.  Of these,  18,026 were moved directly  to 
Reception Centers.175 92,193 people were evacuated to Assembly Centers, where they remained for an 
average of about 100 days (see Table 5).176 Some 70 percent were citizens of the United States.177 
Though the first stage of evacuation was everything but a humanitarian feat, as Army records claim, it 
was  not  completely  erratic:  The  WCCA  evacuated  first  areas  close  to  military  installations; 
furthermore, to lessen the discomforts of forced evacuation and incarceration, the Army did not split 
families and moved them, wherever possible, to Assembly Centers close to their homes. 
The first Bay Area Nikkei to be evacuated were those living in the dock areas and waterfront 
of San Francisco.178 Exclusion Order No. 5, posted on April 1, informed them that they would have to 
leave by April 7. These 660 Nikkei were shipped to the Santa Anita Assembly Center, the first to be 
finished. The remainder of the San Francisco community, and most of the Japanese Americans from 
the Bay Area north of San Jose, were moved between April 28 and May 20. They were assigned to 
Tanforan, a racetrack located in San Bruno, just south of San Francisco (see Table 7).179 
The evacuation procedure was the same all  the way down the West Coast:  As soon as an 
Exclusion Order was posted, all Japanese Americans in the respective area had to report to a nearby 
Civil Control Station. In San Francisco, where over 5,000 Japanese Americans resided, three Control 
Stations were set up, one of them in the local JACL office on Bush Street. Two more Control Stations 
were established in Oakland, one in San Mateo, one in Hayward, and one in San Jose. In Berkeley, the 
First Congregational Church extended its service to Uncle Sam (see Table 6). Upon reporting, each 
family was assigned a number and informed what to bring for departure: bedding and linen, toilet 
175 Shortly after Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 the War Department hoped that the Japanese Americans in 
Military Area No. 1 would leave voluntarily. Therefore, the Army deemed it sufficient to set up two “Reception Centers” 
outside Military Area No. 1, each with a capacity of 10,000 persons,  to incarcerate those Nikkei who were unwilling or 
unable to evacuate voluntarily. When in mid-March forced evacuation became the official policy the Army transferred 
responsibility for the two Reception Centers to the WRA, and the WRA used them henceforth as Relocation Camps. Thus 
practically Reception Centers were Relocation Camps, which opened early enough to receive evacuees directly from their 
homes, that is, without being first transferred to an Assembly Center. There were two Reception Centers: Manzanar in 
California, and Poston in Arizona (see Appendix 1). 
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articles, extra clothing, kitchen utensils,  and essential personal objects, but “only what they could 
carry.”180 No pets were permitted. Washing machines, cars, furniture and other heavy items could be 
stored by the Federal Reserve Bank “at the sole risk of the owner.”181 
Many Japanese Americans were surprised when their Exclusion Order instructed everyone to 
leave, regardless of citizenship.182 Even after evacuation was clearly a matter of time many hesitated to 
dispose of their property. One reason was that there were no particular guidelines about disposing of 
their household possessions and real property.183 Not until end of March the Federal Reserve Bank 
opened offices in some West Coast cities to protect Japanese Americans against fraud, forced sales, 
and  unscrupulous  creditors.  However,  the  bank  had  no  legal  enforcement  power  to  assure  fair 
liquidation. Furthermore, its goal to arrange for the speediest possible liquidation contradicted its goal 
to minimize losses. Officially, the FRB had no mandate to property storage. Some offices assisted in 
arranging private storage, however, without taking responsibility for the items thus stored. Likewise, 
the Army eventually offered some warehouse space but refused to give any guarantees. The fears of 
the Nikkei that property would not be secure proved right: an estimated eighty percent of the property 
stored was looted, while local authorities looked the other way.184 
Moreover, feeling that politicians in Washington had sold them off to the Army, evacuees were 
skeptical of the federal government’s assistance, limited as it was. Numerous families panicked and 
sold at giveaway prices the possessions and land for which they had worked so hard. By early April 
the streets of San Francisco’s  Nihonmachi were bare of people except “lines of moving vans […] 
operated by junk dealers.” A reporter interviewed a young Nisei:
Q: Why are they selling this to junk dealers, and not giving it over to the FRB [Federal Reserve 
Bank] custodian?
A: Mainly because they don’t secure the property. They might as well have the money as leave 
it someplace where it might not be safe.
Q: How much are they selling this stuff for? (There was a washing machine, small grand piano, 
three  bed  springs  [sic],  three  inner  spring  mattresses,  a  dresser,  a  cupboard,  some  wicker 
furniture, and other small odds and ends)
A: $100 for all of it.
Q: Did they have it appraised or take the first junk dealer’s offer?
A: They take whatever they are offered.185
Returning ten days later he observed that most stores had “For Lease” signs on them, and notices 
reading like this: “Thank you for your kind patronage. When times are better we shall be back and can 
180 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 20 (or any other), in U.S. Army: Civilian Exclusion and Restrictive Orders.
181 Ibid. 
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meet you, our friends, again.”186 
The  success  of  liquidation  also  varied  depending  on  the  business:  The  fishing  fleet  was 
speedily sold at low prices out of fear the government might confiscate the ships (as happened in Los 
Angeles). Dry cleaners and dyers, in contrast, had little to lose and most regained their business after 
the war. Nikkei in the art goods business suffered heavily as time pressure failed to bring appropriate 
prices, and because most warehouses were vandalized. Likewise, the losses of the nursery owners in 
the Richmond-El Cerrito area were substantial because the Issei had to leave in February already, and 
the Nisei lacked the experience and knowledge to manage the business. The evacuation order reached 
them just before mother’s day, which accounted for one-fifth of the annual flower sale.187 In general, 
evacuation hit hardest those Nikkei who owned or leased land, families whose head had been arrested 
by the FBI, and those who lacked contacts to Caucasian communities (i.e. farming communities and 
residents  of  ethnic  ghettos).  On the  East  Bay,  where  Japanese  were  dispersed  and  regularly  had 
developed ties  to  non-Japanese  neighbors,  many could rely on  Caucasian friends  volunteering  to 
provide for safe storage.188 A study conducted shortly after the war estimated that each adult evacuee 
had a median property loss of $1,000 and an income loss of $2,500 (in 2005 dollars this equals about 
$26,000  and  $65,000  respectively189).  This  adds  up  to  approximately  $77  million,  of  which  the 
government paid $37 million. The claims filed under the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act 
totaled $148 million.190 
Nothing of this bleak reality can be found in the Army’s mendacious Final Report. Indulging 
in  self-praise,  the  WCCA perspective  displays  the  stark  contrast  between  the  experience  of  the 
Japanese Americans and the fallacious perspective of a bureaucratic apparatus: DeWitt credited his 
staff for “unselfish devotion and duty,” but many agents were reportedly ill trained and in some cases 
hostile to evacuees.191 Also, the report claimed that “[u]ltimately satisfactory arrangements were made 
for over 99 per cent of all [agricultural] property,”192 ignoring the fact that Service Centers existed only 
in the urban areas and largely failed to reach the rural farm population. Regarding other property, the 
Army report completely shied numbers, contending that, “evacuee response to the property protection 
services was most gratifying, and clearly indicated their effectiveness.”193 
Another poorly managed part of evacuation was the examination of all evacuees for contagious 
diseases, which was to be conducted in the course of registration by the Civil Control Stations. In a 
confidential  report  the  supervisor  for  the  San  Francisco  Bay  Area  criticized  that  the  quality  of 
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examination varied considerably, that sometimes there were no inspections at all, and that very often 
the County Health Officer had little instruction and did not know that he had to fill out forms. “The 
whole procedure was farcical and wasteful,” the unpublished report concluded.194 
Adding to the evacuees’ strain was the vagueness and indefiniteness of their  situation;  for 
many  Japanese  Americans  this  was  the  worst  condition  to  deal  with.  The  Army kept  upcoming 
Exclusion Orders secret to the last minute, and did not always tell the Nikkei where they would be 
brought to. Thus, the evacuation order was often received with some relief. Yet each order created new 
uncertainties and rumors: 
Most of the Japanese at the Center to whom I talked seemed entirely resigned to the necessity 
of moving, and […] to the manner in which the actual moving was to be done. Their chief 
worries came from the scarcity of information about where and when they were going and what 
was to be done to them once they reached the Reception Center. They were not quite convinced 
that  the  Reception  Center  won’t  be  some  form  of  concentration  camp,  dressed  up,  but 
nonetheless a concentration camp.195 
This report from the San Francisco Control Station at Van Ness Ave, characterizes the typical 
reaction of Japanese Americans.  As the quote indicates, despite all  the worries the overwhelming 
majority  of  Japanese  Americans chose to  comply docilely,  obeying almost  without  complaint  the 
regulations that were destroying their lives. The National Secretary of the JACL, Mike Masaoka, and 
most of the Nisei leadership, argued that by opposing they would merely add to the disloyal stereotype 
that already existed. By cooperating they hoped to mitigate the present circumstances and be in a 
position to negotiate better treatment later. Various individuals criticized the JACL for its practical 
view but, as Roger Daniels pointed out, “it is easier to criticize this accommodationist policy than to 
construct viable alternatives for a responsible leadership to adopt.”196 What caused most friction was 
not the JACL’s subordination, but the fact that it actively collaborated with the FBI, providing names 
of alleged spies. These patriotic activities never uncovered any real sabotage or espionage. Nor did 
collaboration provide the protection the JACL hoped for, because race, not loyalty, was the criterion 
for evacuation.197 But such actions caused hard feelings within the Japanese-American community, 
feelings that came out in Assembly Centers and Relocation Camps where the Japanese-American 
community had ample time to ponder its situation. 
Yet  a  small  number  of  dissenters  defied  the  JACL’s  call  for  meek  compliance.  One  was 
Lincoln Kanai, secretary of the Japanese branch of the YMCA in San Francisco, who violated the 
travel restrictions to visit his family in Wisconsin. After he learned that the Army was searching for 
him he returned to San Francisco to face his trial. In his official statement he explained that for him 
staying true to constitutional principles was more important than obeying “a numbered few” who he 
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deemed fallible: 
I, Lincoln Kanai, make this confession willingly and without duress: – That our democratic 
aims as based on our constitution […] must be preserved, and that whenever discriminatory 
measures without equality for opportunity for civil responsibilities because of race, creed or 
color, and without due process of law for all citizens alike are made by a numbered few, that I 
shall  oppose  such  action,  if  expedient  by  willful  violation  when  it  is  detrimental  to  our 
country’s welfare and injurious to our basic democratic ideals. […]
I am a native American citizen, [and] my pride, loyalty and honor is basic in my being an 
American.198 
All  in  all,  the police arrested ten Japanese Americans  in  the Bay Area  who had failed to 
respond to their Exclusion Order. Most of them pleaded guilty to violations of Public Law 503 and 
were sentenced to short prison terms. Only one, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, a resident of Oakland, 
volunteered as candidate for a test case. He was one of four Nisei whose challenge to the evacuation 
eventually reached the Supreme Court. Originally, he had no intention to challenge DeWitt’s orders – 
his motivation for failing to report for evacuation were personal: He had undergone a facial operation 
and planned to escape with his Italian-American girlfriend to Arizona, where he hoped to marry and 
settle down. The police picked him up on May 30 in San Leandro. After conferring with his friends 
and family in the Tanforan Assembly Center, he decided to fight the case.199 In all four test cases the 
Supreme Court later approved of the constitutionality the evacuation.200 
The majority of Japanese Americans, however, resigned to what seemed to be their fate and 
reported to their Control Station. The scenes that repeated themselves all-around the Bay Area were 
similar regardless of the city: In Berkeley, readers of the local Gazette learned on April 21 that a Civil 
Control Station was being set up in the First Congregational Church on Channing Way. The actual 
Exclusion Order was posted not before Friday, April 24, stating: 
A responsible member of each family, and each individual living alone, living in the above 
described area will report between the hours of 8:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M., Saturday, April 5, 
1942, or during the same hours on Sunday, April 26, 1942, to the Civil Control Station located 
at 2345 Channing Way, Berkeley, California.201
Close to 1,200 Nikkei lived in the described area that included Berkeley, El Cerrito, and the western 
portion of Contra Costa County. The order made clear that everybody would have to leave “by 12:00 
o’clock noon on Friday, May 1” or become subject of criminal persecution. Thus they had a bit more 
than one week to prepare for their evacuation. 
Mine Okubo, an art student at the University of California, reported on Sunday, April 26, to 
register for her younger brother and herself. Her mother had died and her father had been arrested by 
the FBI, which made her the head of a family of two. When she arrived at the Control Station she was 
surprised  finding  soldiers  standing  guard  at  the  entrance  and around the  building,  their  bayonets 
mounted. For the first time she and her fellow evacuees realized that they were considered dangerous. 
198 Pacific Cable, August 26, 1942, JERS: 18:367.
199 Irons: Justice at War, pp. 93-103.
200 Ibid., pp. 104-252.
201 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 19, in U.S. Army: Civilian Exclusion and Restrictive Orders.
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The soldiers who supervised the almost 1,200 Nikkei leaving from Berkeley were merely a token 
contribution of the Army, but they were a graphic reminder that evacuation was not voluntary, and a 
foretaste of an everyday feature of their future confinement. For the time being, however, there was no 
need to apply force. In fact, “the soldiers and their lieutenant were very considerate, […] treating [the 
evacuees] like human beings,”202 as a church secretary, distributing sandwiches and lemonade, noticed. 
There was even some fraternization when one night a group of Nisei students invited three soldiers, 
who  came  from  as  far  as  North  Dakota  and  Arkansas,  to  have  dinner  together  in  downtown 
Berkeley.203 
Each Control Station was staffed with representatives of various civilian agencies,204 which 
registered the evacuees, assisted them in their preparations for evacuation. Okubo noted in her diary: 
The  woman  in  charge  asked  me  many  questions  and  filled  in  several  printed  forms  as  I 
answered. As a result of the interview, my family name was reduced to No. 13660. I was given 
several tags bearing the family number, and was then dismissed. At another desk I made the 
necessary arrangements to have my household property stored by the government.205 
Apart from the civilian staff and the soldiers there were quite a number of Caucasians appearing at the 
Control Station. Some inquired whether Sunday service would be cancelled. Others asked if there 
were any take dogs or cats they could adopt. One elderly lady came to learn what was going to happen 
to her Japanese gardener.206 
Within the next two days the Control Stations posted lists with names, stating day and time of 
evacuation. This left the families three to five days to get ready. The day of departure was a day that 
remained seared into the minds of all evacuees. Soldiers guarded the block around the Control Station 
while Greyhound buses were lined alongside the curb. The first group leaving Berkeley on Tuesday, 
April  28,  represented  the  diversity  of  a  community  whose  only  common denominator  was  their 
ethnicity. The church secretary observed: 
Among the  first  group was  a  pair  of  newlyweds,  arm in  arm,  the  bride  with  a  collegiate 
bandana around her head and a flower in her pompadour, and a big American flag in brilliants 
on her lapel. There were two babies in baskets, a three-week-old little girl, and a six-months-
old boy [sic]. And everyone, young, middling, and old, wore a tag around his neck or hanging 
from his lapel, with name printed on and a number […]. One pert little college girl in slacks 
had her name tag around her neck tied to a chain from which dangled her Phi Beta Kappa key. 
The evacuees went aboard [the bus], waving merrily and cracking jokes with their friends who 
were to follow in the next few days. But as the bus pulled out, Ann Saito was crying.207 
Others faced the tragedy with sarcasm: “Today is the day that we are going to get kicked out of 
Berkeley. It is certainly degrading,”  Charles Kikuchi noted in his diary. Despite his frustration, he 
witnessed how Caucasian volunteers tried to make his degrading experience as bearable as possible: 
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“The church people are handing out free food. I guess this is a major catastrophe so I guess we deserve 
some free concessions. The church people around here seem so nice and full of consideration, saying, 
“Can we store your things?” “Do you need clothes?” “Sank you.” [sic]”208 All in all, the uprooting of 
the Bay Area Nikkei happened without major incidents although a visiting minister from Montana 
remarked that he knew some areas where a church helping out orientals would be “burned to the 
ground.”209 
As the Tanforan racetrack was situated just twenty miles south of San Francisco, the transfer 
was a relatively short one for the Bay Area residents. Yet it marked the crossing into another world, 
from freedom to captivity. A few weeks later, an sixteen-year-old girl recorded from behind barbed 
wire her impressions of that momentous passage: 
The special Greyhound speeded rapidly on the highway towards its destination. The time was 
about ten o’clock in the morning, and there was a little drizzle […]. This bus drip was different 
from the usual one. The passengers were alien and American-born Japanese and a soldier, who 
was an amiable person with a ready smile. With khaki uniform and steady gun he looked very 
much like a hero. [The little children] crowed around him at first timidly, and slowly and the 
boldest little boy touched the gun.210 
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3 – Arrival and Adjustment
Physically, all Assembly Centers were more ideally suited 
for troops than they were for the housing of families. 
– U.S. ARMY: FINAL REPORT211 
There are two things in this camp that people want more  
than anything  else  –  good food and toilet  paper.  With  
these two essentials in stock I think that Toni and I are  
ready  to  join the  ranks  of  the  aristocrats  of  Tanforan.  
Thank you very much.
– TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI212 
The first group of evacuees arrived on April 28, a volunteer contingent of 421 workers to handle the 
primary needs of transforming the Tanforan racetrack into an Assembly Center. In the following days, 
numerous buses unloaded their human cargo from the Bay Area. Three days later over 3,000 Japanese 
Americans had arrived, and by May 10 Tanforan housed 7,496 people (see Table 7). By May 20, with 
the arrival of the last group of evacuees, the population had risen to 7,796 and remained at that level 
for almost four months.213 
As the Greyhound buses approached the compound, the evacuees first noticed the grandstand, 
the dominating feature of the former racetrack, capable of seating 10,000 people. Then, a high barbed 
wire fence, pierced at regular intervals by tall guard towers, came into view. A throng of inmates, 
jammed along the fence, was watching as the newcomers arrived. Scattered over the compound, which 
measured  118  acres  (0.5  km2),  were  rows  of  barracks  in  near-perfect  symmetry.  Everywhere 
construction was going on.214 The baleful contrast of grandstand and barbed wire fence prefigured the 
many paradoxes and incongruities that the evacuees were about to endure. 
The incoming buses stopped in a separated area where the military police were housed and the 
administrative buildings were located. As the evacuees got off the bus, they had to walk between a 
cordon of armed guards to enter the compound proper. William Kochiyama recalled how he became 
overwhelmed  with  bitterness  and  rage  at  the  sight  of  troops  with  rifles  and  fixed  bayonets  and 
“screamed every obscenity I knew at the armed guards daring them to shoot me.”215 While soldiers 
inspected the baggage for contraband – any weapons, straight-edged razors and liquor – the Nikkei 
were directed  to  an area  beneath the  grandstand.  There  a  cursory medical  check  was made.  The 
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evacuees entered a slightly partitioned compartment and were asked to undress. A nurse looked into 
their mouths and checked if the evacuees had been vaccinated for smallpox.216 After filling out a series 
of forms each family was assigned its living quarter.217 Bachelors were sent to the second floor of the 
grandstand, which served as a dormitory for over 500 people. Because housing was scarce smaller 
families had to share one quarter. As the following quote from Mine Okubo’s diary demonstrates, in 
some instances the inmates could influence housing arrangements if they persisted vigorously enough: 
The girl who took the slips said, “Sorry, but we will have to send you and your brother to 
separate bachelor quarters. We are short on rooms for small family units.” I told her that my 
brother and I had come as a family unit of two and that we intended to remain that way. I had to 
argue the point with each of the girls at the desk in turn, but finally they decided to let us 
remain as a family unit.218
Thereafter each evacuee family received an address, such as “barrack 40, apartment 12,” and 
was dismissed. Searching for their quarters, the first arrivals found out that their “barrack” was in fact 
a stable, and their “apartment” a horse stall, “a euphemism so ludicrous it was comical,” as Yoshiko 
Uchida recalls.219 Altogether twenty-six converted horse stables housed about 3,700 people, roughly 
one half of all evacuees. Most stables consisted of fifty stalls, twenty-five facing north, and twenty-
five facing south. Three to six people occupied a stall which had formerly accommodated one horse. 
Each stall was about ten by twenty feet (three by six meters) and empty except for a number of army 
cots. Most stalls had linoleum floors that had been laid over manure-covered boards.220 The smell of 
horses hung in the air, and the whitened corpses of insects still  clung to the hastily white-washed 
walls. Huge spikes and nails stuck out everywhere, while dust, dirt and wood shavings covered the 
floor.221 
Each stall was divided into two sections by a swinging half-door. The front section, used to 
store the fodder, had two small windows on either side of the door. The rear section, dubbed “the 
dungeon” by some evacuees, was windowless. A single electric bulb dangled from the ceiling. The 
walls to the adjoining stalls stopped a foot short of the sloped roof, presumably to provide for better 
ventilation for the horses. This arrangement deprived the occupants of all but visual privacy.222 Sleep 
was not easily won. Okubo noted that 
because the partitions were low and there were many holes in the boards they were made of, 
the crackling of the straw and the noises from the other stalls were incessant. Loud snores, the 
grinding of teeth, the wail of babies, the murmur of conversations – all this could be heard the 
full length of the stable.223 
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It was, as a fellow inmate put it,  “communal living, with semi-private cubicles provided only for 
sleeping.”224 The  camp’s  weekly  newspaper,  the  Tanforan Totalizer,  struck  a  humorous tone – as 
always when reporting on the downsides of incarceration: 
We are especially interested in the control of our omnipresent nocturnal teeth-grinders, whose 
dental virtuosity makes our nights hideous with sounds that run the gamut of mimicry from 
apple-crunching to a bullfrog in full cry.225 
Apart from cots the only things the Army issued were one straw tick and one blanket per person. 
People over sixty years of age received cotton mattresses, and some horse stall residents received 
them, too,  as compensation for  their  inferior  living quarters.226 Most  people spent  the first  nights 
shivering as one blanket was not enough to keep them warm. One could apply for additional blankets, 
but it took several days to get one.227 Some evacuees wrote to the Red Cross to complain about the 
unhealthy conditions, yet without result.228 Summing up her first impressions, a Nisei noted in her 
diary: 
The whole atmosphere around the stables is rather dejecting because everyone has to sit in front 
of their homes since there is not enough room inside – seems almost like slums. F(rances) was 
very disgusted – it made me feel pretty bad too. However, I think parts of this area aren’t so 
bad.229 
Those who arrived during the second half of May were assigned to barracks which were still 
under construction when the first evacuees arrived. By the end of May, some 140 barracks housed 
about 4,000 people. Barracks were uniform in size and appearance, each measuring twenty by one 
hundred feet (six by thirty meters) and comprised either five apartments each for six persons, or ten 
apartments for three persons each. All barracks had plywood partitions, about 8 feet high, leaving an 
open space between each partitioned room so that even subdued conversation disturbed neighboring 
compartments.230 As they were built of green wood, which shrank as it dried, grass grew between the 
boards and the wind swept through unhindered. To keep the living quarters dust-free thus was a task 
worthy of Sisyphus.231 The advantages of barracks over stables were a controversial topic: although 
the barracks  didn’t  smell  like the  stables,  they were badly insulated,  so that  on sunny days  they 
became unbearably hot, and chilly during the nights.232 Tom Shibutani, a graduate student from the 
University of California who later became a distinguished sociologist, wrote to Dr. Thomas about his 
immediate reaction to the degrading conditions:
We are more than ever anxious to get  out of this  dump – and we are not alone. Naj[ima] 
probably got tossed in with some fellows he doesn’t even know and he probably wants to get 
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out right away. Tomi is moaning too. So am I. We’ll cover this mess as best as we can, but we 
want to get out pronto. Sorry to moan so much. I am not ungrateful; just disgusted and want to 
be an escapist.233
The least fortunate were the bachelors who had to move into the grandstand, which served as a 
makeshift dormitory during the first month. The hall, where the pari-mutuel clerks once sold their $2 
tickets,  housed  approximately  500  men,  most  of  them  unmarried  Issei.234 Charles  Kikuchi,  who 
participated in the JERS project, visited the dormitory from time to time to observe how the different 
groups of evacuees coped with their incarceration:
In one corner a sullen Kibei has built himself a little cube so that he can work on his master’s 
thesis. [There are] homemade barber shops [and] clothlines [sic] all around. Issei cluster around 
a radio discussing final Japanese victory. A brave Nisei occasionally opens his mouth and he is 
shouted down. But three American flags continue to hang upon the walls. Other single men 
sprawl out in their beds, smoking or playing Japanese cards. A few sleep with their mouths 
wide open, snoring like mad, which adds to the general confusion. Over in the far corner there 
is a lone but seedy looking minister with a dirty collar, who sits so straight in his bed reading a 
Buddhist prayer book. Flies buzz around him, but he pays no attention. This room is about the 
most colorful place in the camp, but I am afraid that those Issei look to Tokyo rather than to 
Washington, D.C., for salvation.235
As this quote illustrates, the arrivals immediately went about modifying their environment, and in 
accord with this chapter’s heading, I will now shift the focus from arrival to adjustment. 
The  existence  of  evacuees  in  Tanforan  voicing  pro-Japanese  sentiments  was  no  secret; 
references to disgruntled Issei can be found throughout the evacuees’ records. Tentatively estimated, 
perhaps  five  percent  of  the  total  population were  openly  pro-Japanese.236 They  consisted 
predominantly  of unmarried male Issei, most of whom had passed their 50th birthday.237 About 100 
applied for repatriation.238 But what did being “pro-Japan” actually mean for these elderly men? When 
they hailed their motherland most of them had in their mind an idealized image of rural Japan of the 
late Meiji era,  the place of their childhood and youth.  Little did they know about the means and 
motivations of the junta which held imperial Japan in its grip. If they had known, they probably would 
have been less enthusiastic about Japan’s role in the war. But after decades of reading the pro-Japanese 
immigrant  press  most  Issei  were  reluctant  to  reconsider  their  romantic  notions  and  remained 
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convinced of Japanese propaganda slogans. One common belief, for instance, was that “Japan was 
fighting for the equality of races.”239 
In  short,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that,  by  and  large,  the  pro-Japanese  voices  in  Tanforan 
identified with Japan’s language, customs, and history, and not with the fascists who took over Japan 
after they had left for the United States. Furthermore, harboring pro-Japanese sentiments did not mean 
that these Issei went about rioting. Instead, they were content to shout “baka-tare” (fool) when passing 
by the U.S. flag, or to ruminate on possible outcomes of the war, or to rail against their wardens and 
the United States in general, which, considering the life-long hostility and discrimination they had 
endured, let alone their current situation, is not surprising.240 All this made them a nuisance in the eyes 
of the pro-American majority of evacuees but hardly a danger to the peace in Tanforan.241 
Besides,  the  majority  of  Issei,  the  three-quarters  who were married and had children,  had 
different  priorities.  Their  overarching  concern  was  the  welfare  of  their  children.  Naturally,  they 
wanted what was best for their offspring and they asked themselves whether a country that put its 
citizens behind barbed wire – without trial, only for their ancestry – would ever acknowledge the Nisei 
as full-fledged citizens, recognize their abilities, and allow them to prosper. Many Issei also doubted 
that Japan was a better country for their children who had grown up as Americans in heart and mind. 
This inner conflict found expression in the Issei’s highly ambiguous attitude towards their children: 
On one hand, the first generation “glowed over with the wonders of Japan” and liked to point out to 
their  children,  with  a  sense  of  superiority:  “If  America  is  so  wonderful  and  democratic,  if  the 
Caucasians  are  our  true  friends,  then  why  are  you  in  the  concentration  camp  even  if  you  are 
Americans?”242 On the other hand, many Issei  “had tears in their eyes at the flag-raising ceremony 
when their sons and daughters saluted to the American flag,”243 and Charles Kikuchi reported that 
most Issei parents felt “so  sorry for the Nisei because we are in a tough situation.”244 Another  Issei 
stated that his daughter was American while he was Japanese “with a smile and no trace of any bitter 
feelings.”245 In the end, most Issei seemed to resolve that their children had to choose for themselves. 
Interestingly enough, a JERS study stated that the Issei adjusted better than the Nisei, and even 
that “quite often Issei were more American than Nisei.”246 The primary reason why the Issei adjusted 
better – more precisely, why they were less frustrated with the incarceration than the Nisei – was the 
fact  that  it  was easier  for  the Issei  to  make sense of  their  incarceration:  Even though they were 
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prisoners without trial, they knew that due to their status as enemy aliens the government had the legal 
power to intern them. This cannot be said for the Nisei. Forced into idleness they grew painfully aware 
of the injustice of their incarceration. As 19-year-old Ben Iijima observed: 
We couldn’t help but feel we were suffering unjustly. It wasn’t the food, the sleeping quarters, 
the physical  inconveniences (these discomforts were normal in a nation at  war),  rather the 
mental conflict of having been distrusted by our friends to whom we had been loyal, and by 
loyalty we didn’t mean overt acts of flag waving, but a silent faith and conviction that his was 
our country, our way of life, our beginnings and ends.247 
Adding to the Nisei’s distress were reports from outside. On June 19 Charles Kikuchi noted in his 
diary: “Yesterday another statement was made against the ‘Japs’ in the U.S. Day by day these native 
fascists  are getting louder and louder.”248 When General DeWitt  declared on June 29 that he had 
reopened the restricted areas to German and Italian enemy aliens, Kikuchi, a citizen of the United 
States,  was “disgusted as hell.”249 Doris  Hayashi,  after  reading an article on Tanforan in  the  San 
Francisco Chronicle, was disconcerted:  “It seems that some people think we’re having a summer 
vacation in a resort.”250 And when Ben Iijima learned about the renewed efforts of nativist groups to 
deprive the Nisei of their citizenship, anger and disappointment took hold of him: 
[Opening the Chronicle] I saw staring at me right in the face [an article] which said in so many 
pretty disgusting words that Webb, a Native Son of the Golden West, was trying to deprive all 
Americans of Japanese ancestry of their citizenship. The proposal submitted by Webb, who 
[…] desires to be an attorney general of our beloved state, is to make an amendment to the 
constitution making it plain and simple that we are persons without a country […]. Now, I 
realize that the proposal itself is not adequate to be effective, and that an amendment of that 
sort cannot easily [be pushed through]. But the very idea of denying us of our citizenship is 
disgusting. […] The editorial enclosed in a small box was most repulsive, too. It was kind 
enough to say that we should deplore such a proposal […] because we needed the time for 
more important things. It implied when we are less concerned with the war, […] then we shall 
take up the matter. If they do anything like this our document will be called the unconstitution 
of the United States.251 
Further contributing to the Nisei’s predicament was their latent fear that any criticism they 
uttered would be interpreted as an act of disloyalty. Unlike their parents, who from the first day told 
the administration when they deemed something unacceptable, the Nisei  rarely dared to speak up.252 
Instead, they reduced their mental agony by working hard, engaging in vigorous physical activities 
and discussing “gripes” among themselves, secretly, or confiding them to their diaries.253 It was this 
submissiveness to the authorities – though they changed their attitude, as we shall see later – that led 
the  JERS  researchers  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  Issei,  who  freely  expressed  their  convictions, 
demanding  decent  treatment,  were  the  better  Americans.  And  as  long  as  the  Nisei,  stunned  and 
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confused,  struggled with themselves to regain their  voice,  the Issei were,  one might  argue,  better 
Americans indeed.  
The question of how to grapple with the injustice of incarceration was a central concern of the 
penned up community, and we shall return to that issue in the course of the following chapters. For 
now let us turn back to the start of our digression – the situation in the men’s dormitory. After Issei 
bachelors had repeatedly complained about the unsanitary conditions,254 which arose from crowding 
almost 500 men in a single hall  without proper ventilation, finally the San Mateo County Health 
inspectors took on the problem. The inspectors promptly condemned the hall for further dormitory 
use, and by the end of May all singles had been relocated to the barracks. Henceforth the dormitory 
served as makeshift classroom for the high school.255 
One  feature of camp life that the evacuees never got used to was communal feeding in mess halls: 
During the first weeks, the main mess hall beneath the grandstand, capable of holding 500 people, had 
to serve food to over 3,000 people. Yoshiko Uchida vividly remembered what it meant to line up for 
food: 
When we arrived, there were six long weaving lines of people waiting to get into the mess hall. 
[…] Shivering in the cold, we pressed close together trying to shield Mama from the wind. As 
we  stood  in  what  seemed  a  breadline  for  the  destitute,  I  felt  degraded,  humiliated,  and 
overwhelmed with a longing for home. And I saw the unutterable sadness on my mother’s face. 
This was only the first of many lines we were to endure, and we soon discovered that waiting in 
line was as inevitable a part of Tanforan as the north wind that swept in from the bay stirring up 
all the dust and litter of the camp.256
Although with the opening of ten more mess hall the situation was somewhat eased, waiting lines 
continued to constitute an integral part of the evacuees’ lives.257 
The gloomy mess halls were furnished with backless benches and picnic tables that were too 
high for children. The first three days, the Army served A Rations and B Rations.258 The next ten days 
the evacuees were served lima beans,  cold tea,  canned food, stale bread, and occasionally Jell-O. 
Other meals were canned Vienna sausages, potatoes and butterless bread, or chili con carne, corn and 
bread. The menu of the main mess hall during the second week read like this:259
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Breakfast Lunch Dinner
Thursday
May 7
stew (peas, carrots, meat), 
2 slices of bread, tea
2 tablespoons macaroni, ½ 
potato, coffee
Friday
May 8
3 pancakes, mush, 
toast, coffee
green vegetables, ½ 
potato, boiled bread
rice, fish (about 3 mouthful), 2 
slices of bread
Saturday
May 9
3 pancakes, mush, 2 
slices of bread
corned beef and cabbage 
(canned), 2 slices of bread
roast pork (tiny), potato, canned 
beans (string), dried figs
Some Issei expressed their desire for Japanese dishes such as  ocha tsuke (rice soaked in green tea, 
served with pickled vegetables). Some brought along their chopsticks and were eating with them.260 
Others stayed away for two or three meals relying on food sent in from friends.261 
Long lines, bad food, and lack of clean dishes caused many complaints against the kitchen and 
mess hall  staff,  who could not  be faulted for any of these problems.262 Most  of  the dishwashers, 
waiters  and  servers  were  between  16  and  18  years  of  age  and  braved  their  “first  experience  at 
drudgery  work,”  as  one  of  them proudly  observed.263 Constantly  overworked,  some quit  seeking 
“better jobs.”264 On May 4 the cooks went on strike, and the kitchen crew and waiters followed suit.265 
The Caucasian chief cook, whom the evacuee workers fiercely criticized for his incompetence and 
authoritarian style, had to quit. The new Caucasian chief cook was “merely a figure head,” as Earle 
Yusa, one of the mess hall managers stated.266 In practice, the evacuees took over the kitchen and mess 
hall management. Earle Yusa concluded that 
the  Japanese  chefs  resented  any  authority  exercised  by  Caucasian  chefs  above  them  and 
whenever  the  Caucasian  Chefs  tried  to  boss  the  Japanese  Chefs  too  much,  trouble  arose 
because the Japanese Chefs all banded together and presented a united front.267 
Likewise, the first Caucasian steward was fired after complaints piled up. His successor fared better: 
He  worked  closely  with  the  Japanese  chefs  who  planned  the  menus  and  even  took  care  of 
administrative details.268 
As one by one ten more mess halls opened people got more food, and the congestion was 
relieved somewhat. The evacuees helped to reduce the mess hall workers’ burden by bringing their 
own dishes  and washing  them themselves.269 The  administration adopted  a  ticket  system, so that 
people could not eat more than once, and introduced a shift system with designated eating times at 7 
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261 Uchida: Desert Exile, pp. 77 & 84. 
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and  7:30  a.m.,  12  and  12:30  noon,  5  and  5:30  p.m.270 However,  shortcomings  and  deficiencies 
remained, in particular a lack of dairy products and Vitamins A, B, B1,  and C.271 This was hardly 
surprising since the average cost of feeding a person in Tanforan was 37 cents a day (the Army spent 
50 cents a day on active soldiers).272 
When on May 11 Army officials visited the camp to inspect the food and mess hall situation, 
the administration had prepared for the evacuees a special treat: “A large bowl full of ravioli, meat, 
dessert, plenty of rice, bread, a salad, and chocolate drink.”273 Tom Shibutani and his fellow evacuees 
were delighted, but the treat proved to be a one-time favor by their captors. “On the following day,” 
Shibutani wrote sobered, “we went back to the same old stuff.”274 As it turned out, the Army did not 
have much interest either in showing the true face of the conditions in Tanforan: When in mid-June the 
WCCA sent  in  camera  teams  to  shoot  a  documentary,  the  setting  was  carefully  staged.275 What 
embittered the evacuees most was the fact that the Army removed the Japanese cooks and replaced 
them with white cooks. Some were so infuriated by this distortion of circumstances that they refused 
to eat at the mess hall while the films were being made.276 That the Army insisted on images showing 
how white cooks prepared food for the evacuees is emblematic for its paternalistic attitude towards the 
incarcerated.  The  main  purpose  of  these  documentaries  was,  of  course,  to  served  the  Army’s 
propaganda effort. 
In the meanwhile, evacuees made the mess halls more habitable. To lessen the bleakness of the 
buildings, they decorated walls with watercolor paintings and flags. Some mess halls had fresh flowers 
on every other table, at first donated by a Caucasian florist nurseryman, and later from the camp’s own 
nursery.277 Children’s paintings decorated the bleak walls. As an inmate observed: 
It is very interesting to note how everyone loves to use colors and hang bright pictures on the 
wall. I think it is a natural tendency for us who see but the dull colors of the barracks, dust and 
tracks to find delight in simple, bright things. That is why I find the children’s drawings in our 
mess hall so inviting to the eye. The perspective is lopsided, the design is poor, but the colors! 
How bright with red, yellow, and green splotches, spontaneous – undiluted – make the food 
tastier.278 
In addition, mess halls acquired nicknames such as Lakeside Inn, Lettuce Inn, Brass Rail, Coconut 
Grove, Knotty Pine Inn, and Skyroom.279 Every other week the cooks put in extra work to surprise 
their  fellow inmates  with  donuts  for  breakfast  or  cookies  for  dinner.  To show their  appreciation 
towards the cooks and mess hall staff, who put in far more than the required 44 hours week for a 
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meager  wage  of  $8  per  month,  the  evacuees  developed  various  customs.280 For  example,  after 
particularly tasty meals, evacuees would gather and yell, “1, 2, 3, banzai!”281 In another mess hall, the 
evacuees collected $83 to present to the cooks.282 Overall, the tense atmosphere of the first month gave 
way to mutual understanding and solidarity between the mess hall staff and their customers. 
Another striking feature was that mess halls engaged in various competitions. For example, 
there was a competition to determine which mess could operate with the fewest broken dishes.283 In 
late July weekly mess ratings were introduced to determine which kitchen was the cleanest.284 In the 
week from August  16 to  August  22,  six  kitchens  tied  for  the  1st place with 99  percent,  and the 
remaining five kitchens tied for 2nd with 98 percent. Commented the Totalizer: 
The new E banner for ‘excellence’ was flying over Mess 2 this week on its merit for past and 
present records, but mess officials believe that it won’t be there for long at the present rate of 
competition.285 
In Tanforan, the Japanese learned for the first time what free competition meant, that is, competition 
without facing the discrimination of a predominantly white  society.  And just  as Adam Smith had 
posited,  competition overcame the detriment  of  greed,  benefiting the community as a  whole.  Yet 
Smith’s “invisible hand” was ultimately hampered by the conditions of captivity, and the evacuees’ 
struggle for betterment remained within the strict limitations the Army set. 
Industriousness, however, went only as far as it improved the evacuees’ own standing. When in 
May the sugar beet growers of Idaho, Montana and Oregon requested 3,000 workers from the WCCA 
camps,  fewer  than  200 evacuees  (from  all Assembly Centers)  answered  the call.286 To win more 
volunteers, on June 2 a representative of the sugar beet industry visited Tanforan to speak of the 
“opportunities offered.” One of the few questions the inmates raised was “whether there were horse 
stalls too, in Idaho.”287 Whether it was passive resistance or reluctance to leave their families, only 
fourteen evacuees signed up although payment was slightly higher than the professional rate ($16 per 
month) at Tanforan.288 
The sugar beet harvest remained the only case of private employment. Governor Olsen’s plan 
to keep the evacuees in Assembly Centers through fall, to use them as fruit pickers, was flatly rejected 
by the War Department.289 The evacuees saw in Olson’s plan the mendacity of California’s politicians; 
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Henry Tani, the director of Tanforan’s high school, wrote to his Caucasian friends:
[W]e laugh “up our sleeves” when Governor Olson, after lambasting us around and calling us 
names so that all Japanese in the whole state of California are evacuated, now praises us for 
being loyal so that we could be released for farm work. Given the chance, I doubt whether any 
of us would “volunteer” for the farm work that he wants us to do. This may be “unpatriotic” but 
much rather would we hurry to our relocation areas and there develop agricultural areas, and 
produce so much surplus foods that we would embarrass the California farm cliques in a few 
years.290 
Lastly,  the  Army attempted  to  utilize  inmates,  on  a  volunteer  basis,  as  a  workforce  for  the  war 
production.  In  Santa  Anita,  where  evacuees  manufactured  camouflage  nets,  it  proved  to  be 
disappointingly unproductive. In Tanforan such a project never existed. While the Army did consider 
transferring a part of its camouflage net production to Tanforan, it seems highly unlikely, in view of 
the  above,  that  Tanforan’s  inmates  would  have  shown  more  than  lukewarm  support  for  such  a 
project.291 
Let us now return to the starting point of our digression on outside employment – the catering 
for evacuees. An interesting aspect was that evacuees supplemented their mess hall menu through 
official and unofficial channels. Visitors represented one of these channels (see  chapter 5). Another 
source was the center store. Because private enterprises were not allowed in Assembly Centers the 
WCCA laid down that,  “center stores must be prepared to supply the needs of men, women and 
children at  the lowest cost  possible.”292 In Tanforan such a store opened in early May. When the 
administration  refused  any  information  on  where  the  money  went  and  how the  prices  were  put 
together the evacuees became suspicious. Protests mounted because the store was constantly out of 
stock and took cash only, which was a major impediment since Tanforan had no banking facilities.293 
After much pressure, center director Frank Davis agreed to set up a non-profit canteen, announced as a 
“Coming Attraction,” which was opened on May 23 in the north-east corner of the grandstand.294 It 
carried toilet articles, newspapers, cigarettes and groceries such as peanuts, marshmallow bars, animal 
cookies, graham crackers, ginger, chocolate, lemon and vanilla snaps. Much sought-after goods that 
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were seldom available included ice cream, Bireley’s grapeade, tomato juice, and Kleenex. Scrip books 
could be used to pay.295 
Another source of food was provided by “sympathetic Caucasian employees [who] bought a 
lot of foodstuff for the residents and brought them in their autos without the WCCA big shots […] 
finding out about them.”296 After Charles Kikuchi witnessed a soldier passing a Nisei girl a bologna 
sandwich through the fence he noted in his diary: “[They] must hear we are starving over here.”297 
The housing and feeding situation exemplifies on the one hand the Army’s unpreparedness, and on the 
other the evacuees’ doggedness in making the best of it. The same can be said with respect to the 
sanitary facilities. Latrines, showers and laundries were located in separate buildings and in short 
supply.  Each latrine (since the Army ran the camp,  military terminology applied)  contained eight 
toilets, some separated by partitions, some not. By the end of May, after vehement protests, the Army 
installed partitions in all  latrines, but no doors.  Everyone able to do so went to the toilets  in the 
grandstand, where there was more privacy. Men even had the choice between “Gents” and “Colored 
Gents” – by all accounts the evacuees thought both options preferable to the latrines.298 Washrooms 
contained eight showers, partitioned, but again without doors or curtains. Quite regularly, there was no 
hot water. For the Issei, who were used to soaking themselves in deep pine-scented tubs, a ritual they 
brought over from Japan, the showers were virtually impossible to use.  Some evacuees faced the 
discomfort with humor: a Nisei substituted the word “cold” for the word “hot” on the sign, which read 
“Turn the hot water off.”299 In the latrines signs were put up reading, “Our aim is to keep the toilets 
clean; your aim will help!”300 
For  sanitary  reasons,  the Army placed  chlorine  foot  basins  at  the entrance  to  each  of  the 
shower rooms. Mine Okubo recalls that the evacuees “were afraid to use this community foot bath and 
did acrobatic  stunts  to  avoid it.”301 To cope with the muddy shower floors many evacuees  made 
themselves geta, Japanese wooden shoes. Because the demand was so large, a small  geta industry 
sprung up.302 On the whole, the sanitary situation was an embarrassing hardship, especially for the 
elderly people, pregnant women, and the sick.303 
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By the end of May the Army had finished building six laundries. Due to the numerous families 
with children in Tanforan they, too, featured the ubiquitous waiting lines.304 As the hot water usually 
ran out at 9 a.m., many evacuees got up at 3 in the morning to do their washing; Okubo recalls that the 
laundry janitor often had to burn the midnight oil for them.305 Those who arrived too late learned that 
they could run for a washroom that still had hot water and carry bucketfuls of hot water to the laundry. 
Yoshiko Uchida, her sister and her mother had to fall back to this practice regularly and remembered 
that “by the time we had finally hung our laundry on lines […], we were too exhausted to do much 
else for the rest of the day.”306 
Adding to  the  discomforts  of  camp life  were  tiny fleas  that  spread from the horse  stalls: 
“[They] bite like hell [and] they certainly make life miserable,” noted Charles Kikuchi in his diary on 
May 7.307 Mine Okubo laconically stated that, “[w]e had to make friends with the wild creatures in the 
camp, especially the spiders, mice, and rats, because we were outnumbered.”308 Ben Iijima caught 
twelve mice in his  family’s stable within two months.309 A week later  he noted: “Dad caught the 
seventeenth rat. The other trap had a mouse on it, but it was eaten by another rat. It was in such a 
horrible mess that I could hardly look at it.”310 As the San Mateo County Health Department learned 
about these conditions they offered to send in sanitation inspectors to rid mess halls, washrooms, and 
living quarters of pests. However, the WCCA refused to accept the service under the pretext that the 
camp fell under Army jurisdiction.311 
One  organization  with  which  the  WCCA cooperated  was  the  U.S.  Public  Health  Service 
(USPHS),  which inspected Tanforan at  least  twice.  The first  time, two weeks after  induction,  the 
inspectors objected mainly to the conditions of the mess halls, and the lack of latrines and showers; 
three weeks later the number of latrines and showers had been doubled and more hot water boilers 
placed in mess halls.312 Still, in its report from June 2 the Public Health Department stated:
A major problem in all centers has been and continues to be sanitation. That so few epidemics 
have occurred from unsanitary conditions has been due to the heroic efforts of the management 
of the centers, the County Health Departments and the Japanese medical staff.313 
The list of deficiencies is worth quoting in full as it provides a comprehensive summary of the living 
conditions: 
1. Inadequate dishwashing facilities 
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2. Lack of complete screening in barracks, hospitals, infirmaries, toilets and kitchens 
3. Improperly placed, poorly constructed, and insufficient number of toilets 
4. No bathing facilities for babies 
5. Improper garbage storage 
6. Inadequate refrigeration 
7. Floors and walls of barracks, hospitals, infirmaries, kitchens and mess halls that are not fly-tight 
8. Insufficient crockery and dishes 
9. Tin cups with rolled margins which make adequate cleaning impossible 
10. No toilets or hand-washing facilities easily available to the cooks and waiters 
11. Inadequate disposal of laundry and kitchen waste waters314 
The report concluded: 
There is little that the U.S. Public Health Service can do directly about the above unsanitary 
conditions. The undesireable [sic] conditions have been called to the attention of the W.C.C.A. 
and the management of the centers repeatedly. Until they are corrected, epidemics of gastro-
intestinal and other types of diseases must be expected.315 
Thus,  although the  Public  Health  Service  monitored unhygienic  conditions  and eliminated 
some of the gross inadequacies, it was ultimately limited in its actions. The evacuees were essentially 
on their own when it came to make Tanforan a more livable place. This was particularly severe with 
respect  to  the  hospital  situation.  Here,  hard  work  and  ingenuity  –  which  helped  to  improve 
significantly the housing and mess hall situation – could not compensate for the lack of facilities and 
medical support. A JERS study commented on Tanforan’s hospital: 
[T]he least  prepared division is  the medical center.  Tanforan probably has a better  staff  of 
doctors, dentists, optometrists, and nurses than any other Assembly Center, but the facilities are 
so inadequate that the staff cannot possibly give the service that they wish to give. […] Indeed, 
the hospital (or the excuse for the hospital) is a pitiful sight.316
Medical service was free317 but even for a prison health service was inadequate: During the first ten 
days  one  woman  doctor  served  the  needs  of  3,000  evacuees.  Newborn  babies  had  to  be  put  in 
cardboard boxes. Dentists had no tools, not even a chair, and the optometrists could do nothing besides 
conducting eye tests and sending out glasses for repair.318 According to the Tanforan hospital report of 
May 18, many  cases of German measles were coming into camp as new evacuees arrived. When a 
Japanese doctor asked a representative of the Public Health Service to establish a quarantine building, 
he replied: “Well, they all have to get measles some time so let them get it.”319 The main concern of 
the Public Health Service was  to vaccinate the inmates against typhoid, smallpox, and diphtheria. 
After a month working overtime, the evacuee doctors had managed to inoculate the population.320 
Though most  diseases  were  not  critical,  the  inability  to  treat  them properly  added  to  the 
discomfort. Almost all evacuees had a cold most of the time, and due to malnutrition skin problems 
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were wide-spread.321 Digestive problems persisted throughout the five months in which Tanforan was 
in operation, and two or three major outbreaks of diarrhea made the lack of medical support painfully 
evident. As a house manager noted on May 20: 
For the first time last night, we had some cases of vomiting and diarrhea on a wholesale scale. 
In our  area  alone there were 30 and about 400 in  another area.  Most  probable  cause was 
drinking of too much cold water on extremely hot days and the other reason may be a mild 
form of food poisoning. Cold ham was served, and since Mess Halls ran out of ice, food might 
have spoiled. At any rate, the doctors in charge wouldn’t come out to see the patient, but they 
sent  interns.  Patients  wanted  doctors  and  they  “beefed”  saying  doctors  should  come  out. 
Uyeyama is head of staff and he told house managers who went after him that if the patient 
really wanted to see him, the patient ought to come see him at the hospital. So, Doc. Kitagawa 
was pulled out of bed to attend to number of cases. I went around with him, but he couldn’t do 
anything to relieve the patients since he has no medical supplies. There’s absolutely nothing at 
the hospitals. He had more at his home than what we have all together here for 8,000.322 
The military police,  disconcerted by the sudden turmoil,  first  feared a riot.  Upon discovering the 
cause,  they  put  searchlights  on  that  area  to  guide  people  to  and  from  the  latrines.  An  inmate 
remembered: “This proved very embarrassing, tho’ [sic] helpful to the individuals.”323
What further aggravated an efficient health care was the administration’s unwillingness to trust 
the evacuees even in minor matters.  Everything pertaining health had to go through the hospital: 
People with hay fever or asthmatic patients needed a prescription before they could get a mattress; 
people with high blood pressure needed a prescription before they got milk; diabetics received no care 
unless the doctor specified that the individual was diabetic, and so forth.324 Thus the doctors spent 
hours upon hours taking blood samples, sending them out, getting the required information and filling 
out forms for the administration so that in the end some people could get a mattress instead of the 
straw tic. Summarizing the situation, a JERS study stated that the evacuee staff “can be commended 
for their hard and earnest work, but the lack of adequate medical facilities, the lack of drugs and 
medicine, the lack of cooperation on part of the administrative officers is inexcusable.”325 
Eventually,  a  series of  mishaps lead to  what  JERS researchers  called “a  minor  revolution 
against the rule of  the administration.”326 The first  mishap occurred on May 27: A mother of five 
children lay dying in the San Mateo County hospital while members of her family could not see her 
“as they had too much red tape to wade thru.” Although the administration had been informed in time 
of her critical condition, she passed away without seeing any of her relatives.327 The second incident 
happened on June 1: A prematurely born baby died because the hospital manager was unwilling to cut 
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the red tape and transfer the mother to the San Mateo County hospital,  which was only a twenty 
minute ride away from Tanforan.328 Neither of these incidents was a “tragic accident” in the sense that 
it was beyond the power of the administration to prevent them. On the contrary, everything indicated 
that  the  administration  could  have  made  the  difference  by  sticking  to  common sense  instead  of 
bureaucratic procedures. The primary focus of the evacuees’ wrath was the hospital  manager, Mr. 
Woelflen. Convinced of his incompetence and fearing for his safety, the administration eventually 
released  him.329 With  him left  Dr.  Hajime  Uyeyama,  Mr.  Woelflen’s  most  outspoken  critic.  The 
unamendable Japanese doctor was “transferred” to the Tule Lake Relocation Camp.330 
As  mentioned,  these  events  were  important  because  they  had  ramifications  beyond  the 
immediate sphere (albeit “revolution” might be overstated): The house managers “took up the cry,” as 
a JERS study put it,  and pressured the administration to give the evacuees more responsibility in 
organizing everyday matters – with success. Moreover, it was during this “period of revolt” that the 
administration finally affirmed the long-demanded election for an evacuee council, to better serve the 
needs of the inmates (see chapter 8).331 
Mr. Woelflen’s successor, Dr. Don Wilde from San Mateo County Hospital, was not only an 
experienced doctor himself but also successful in pressuring the Army to improve health standards. In 
fact,  he  was much liked  by  the  evacuees.332 Nevertheless,  a  single  person  could  not  remove the 
limitations imposed by the camp’s temporary nature and by the Army’s unwillingness to allocate more 
resources than absolutely necessary.333 Thus the hospital remained a makeshift affair, understaffed and 
ill-equipped.334 
A contrasting view on the health care situation, and on living conditions in general, can be 
found if one examines the Army records. An in-house report pertaining to Tanforan, conducted on July 
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2, found few points to criticize: The inspectors praised the cleanliness, neatness, and frugality and 
contended, somewhat ominously, that “there appeared to be adequate hospital and nursing care.” Only 
dishwashing facilities and diet room conditions were criticized. The report concluded: “The conviction 
after spending one day [in Tanforan] is that a very intelligent job is being done by the Army officers 
and civilian officials in charge of supervision.”335 
The  discrepancy  between  the  Public  Health  Service  report  and  the  WCCA report  can  be 
explained by considering four  facts. First, there was a month between the two inspections, a time 
during which conditions had improved considerably.  Secondly,  the Army’s inspection was only a 
cursory one. Third, the Army was naturally interested to gloss over inadequacies, since any criticism 
meant  self-criticism.  Finally,  in  comparison  to  some  other  Assembly  Centers  Tanforan  appeared 
indeed to be more livable.336 
The present chapter has shown that while the Army provided the basic facilities and maintenance, 
making Tanforan a habitable place largely depended on the evacuees’ initiative and efforts. In other 
words,  it  was  less  because of  the  administration,  but  more  in  spite of  it  that  the  physical  setup 
improved within the narrow frame the Army set. We have also seen that after a month of sluggish 
advances  evacuees  grew  more  and  more  self-reliant  and  simultaneously  dissatisfied  with  the 
administration. We have furthermore gained first insights into dominant themes of evacuee life, among 
them the different strategies of dealing with the adverse conditions and psychological stress, and the 
negotiation of power between prisoners and keepers. The following chapter further elaborates some of 
these points by examining the work of the house managers. 
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4 – The House Managers
It is true, now that we think of it, that our first week of  
adjustment was the hardest. On every hand was cause for  
complaint. Crowded into cramped quarters, lining up for 
meals, the perennial dust and dirt, the lack of privacy and  
the inconvenience  of  going  some distance  to  the  wash  
rooms, laundry rooms, etc. – there are terrific shocks to  
which we have now become quite accustomed […]. 
– HENRY TANI337
For the Japanese Americans in Tanforan the first contact point for everyday needs were the house 
managers. According to Michio Kunitani, this was because 
they  were  in  a  position  to  bring  the  grievances  of  the  people  to  the  attention  of  the 
administration. If a house manager was a good trouble shooter and produced immediate results 
as far as physical comforts were concerned, he could have been mayor of Tanforan as far as the 
people were concerned. […] In their  daily meetings they discussed almost  every aspect  of 
center activity, physical facilities, food, labor problems, morale, education, recreation, housing, 
dissemination  of  information,  guest  visits,  morals,  center  store  and  many  more  such 
problems.338 
Not only did the house managers ameliorate the hardships of camp life; they also formed the primary 
means of communication between prisoners and keepers,  at  least  until the election of an evacuee 
Advisory  Council  on  June  16.339 Mediating  between  the  evacuees’ interests  and  administrative 
authorities,  the work of  the  house  managers  illustrates  how prisoners  and  keepers  communicated 
interests and negotiated power.  Thus the present chapter portrays their achievements in organizing 
everyday life, as well as their endeavors in coordinating evacuee activities with the administration. 
For every 150 people there was one house manager. The appointment of house managers was left to 
the evacuees. The selection procedure was informal: The Caucasian chief of the housing division, who 
commuted  daily  from Berkeley,  accepted  whoever  his  Nisei  assistant  suggested  to  him.340 Camp 
director Frank Davis, disapproving of this laissez faire procedure, reproved the housing chief “for 
doing favors for the residents” but refrained from interfering.341 
JERS researcher Tom Shibutani described the house managers as a “motley group,” including 
all generations, religions and political preferences. What distinguished them was the ability to speak 
both English and Japanese. Thus, Kibei made up a disproportionately large percentage. Also, initially 
young Nisei predominated, but the proportion of Issei increased as many Nisei felt overburdened and 
moved into less laborious jobs in education and recreation. For the same reason few men with young 
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children became house managers because it was a full-time job that left no time for the family. Most 
house mangers did their work out of idealism and were “willing to work all night if the residents got 
into trouble.”342 Not a single house manager resigned when the low wages rate of $12 per month was 
announced, because they considered their work as an obligation to the community and to the common 
good.343 
As mentioned above, their primary task was to improve the living conditions, which included a 
plethora of duties: They took upon them the task of getting brooms, mops, soap, buckets, brushes and 
blankets from the administration. They ensured that the packages left by visitors were delivered by 
volunteer messengers to the respective residents. They organized the roll call. They also took on the 
duty  of  being  responsible  for  a  general  clean-up  of  Tanforan  every  Saturday  at  1:30  p.m.  They 
disseminated information released by the administration,  investigated the need for fresh straw for 
mattresses, and when the electricians’ night shift was withdrawn they assumed the task of replacing 
fuses in emergencies. They pushed for more oil heaters for sick people. They put up signs asking 
residents to take down their washing as soon as dry to free the clotheslines for others. They assisted in 
collecting sugar and phonograph records and in distributing scrip books and paychecks.344 
The house managers also determined house rules and explained them in English and Japanese. 
The most common rules were: All the rooms had to be kept clean at all times; toilets and showers 
adjacent to the barrack were to be cleaned in rotation by every able-bodied individual not engaged in 
full-time work; unnecessary noise was not to be made after 9:30 p.m.; electric plates and heaters were 
to be used at designated times to prevent fuses blowing.345 The JERS researchers noted in their report: 
In regard to [WCCA] regulations it might be said that very few people actually took the trouble 
to read them and consequently they were very seldom followed  in toto. [In contrast], house 
rules,  determined  by  the  House  Managers  and  explained  to  everyone  in  both  English  and 
Japanese, were usually closely observed.346 
In their role as liaison between the evacuees and the administration, the house managers urged 
regular  meetings  with  the  heads  of  the  various  divisions  to  better  coordinate  efforts.347 But  most 
divisional chiefs soon came to resent these meetings, in which they had to face a barrage of questions 
and complaints.  As a  JERS study put  it:  “After  the  […] divisional  heads  had  gone through this 
experience, [some], especially Mr. McDonald the canteen manager, refused to come.”348 Frustrated 
with  persistent  criticism,  the  administration  eventually  threatened  to  blacklist  its  most  outspoken 
critics, whereupon some house managers even pondered an “appeal to the Army for justice.”349 But as 
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the evacuees were in a legal vacuum between civilian and military jurisdiction, this appeal merely 
meant an appeal to the goodwill of the Army; without martial law declared, they could not appeal 
formally to a military court. This was the predicament of the incarcerated. And as the following quote 
indicates, they were well aware of their predicament:
[Blacklisting is] a terrible weapon to hold over the heads of the residents. Since all the residents 
are at the mercy of the administration, they can get away with anything as long as they can 
threaten those who object with blacklisting. Anyone intelligent enough to question the motives 
of someone in the administration can be sent into a prison camp. This is highly undemocratic 
and cannot be justified even under military rule. Even the military has courts, but Tanforan has 
none.350 
The absence of a legal basis for their incarceration, and thus the absence of a legal body to sue 
for their rights, remained a constant impediment as the evacuees struggled to improve their situation. 
Talks between house managers and the administration remained cumbersome and frustrating for both 
sides. Nevertheless, after a month of persistent efforts, most evacuees agreed that the discomforts were 
now bearable, albeit physical hardships remained intense, in particular for the elderly and frail. Having 
physically  adjusted  to  the  discomforts,  however,  evacuees  found  that  emotional  adjustment  to 
captivity proved far more complicated. What it meant for the Nikkei community to be unfree, and how 
they coped with captivity, will be examined in the following chapter. 
Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp: The Tanforan Journals of Charles Kikuchi,  Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1973, p. 105. 
350 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, p. 80, JERS: 16:433. 
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5 – Features of Confinement 
An Assembly Center is a convenient gathering point […] 
where  evacuees  live  temporarily  while  awaiting  the 
opportunity  for  orderly,  planned  movement  to  a 
Relocation Center outside the military area. 
– WARTIME RELOCATION AUTHORITY351 
I know a prison when I see it, and Tanforan was a prison 
with watchtowers and guns.  […] Guards with machine 
guns  stood  at  the  gates.  I  couldn’t  understand  why 
innocent citizens were treated like this. 
– JAMES PURCELL352 
Every day at sunrise Tatsui Ogawa and Guy Uyama, U.S. Army veterans of World War I, unfurled the 
star-spangled banner at  the center flag pole.  On Saturdays and Sundays,  trumpeters  joined in  the 
ceremony with the playing of two official army pieces, “To the Colors” and “Retreat.”353 And every 
time, shortly after the flag had reached the top, the howling of a siren signaled the daily morning 
count, urging them to hurry back to their barracks and horse stalls. 
While the physical strain from the sub-standard living conditions caused considerable discomfort, the 
stigma and psychological strain of living in captivity was more serious and persevering. Although the 
Army tried to downplay the prison-like nature of the camp, the features of confinement were too 
obvious for the evacuees to ignore.  The daily roll  call,  strict  visiting regulations,  the ever-present 
guards and Internal Police, as well as two camp-wide searches – all that reminded the incarcerated that 
freedom, though it seemed just around the corner, was beyond their reach. This chapter looks at the 
everyday features of imprisonment, first, to explore how the evacuees made sense of their captivity, 
and secondly, to examine how wardens and prisoners interacted at the borderline between compound 
and freedom. 
One rule that every evacuee loathed was the daily roll call. While one could avoid looking at 
the sentry towers, nobody could ignore the daily head count. On June 17, the Army ruled that twice a 
day a roll call was to be held, one at 6:40 a.m. and one at 6:25 p.m.354 The camp director, Frank Davis, 
did not think much of the Army’s order.  In a meeting with the freshly elected evacuee Advisory 
Council he confided: “I want to get it over in ten minutes. I can’t tell you when it’s to start. It’s a direct 
order from General DeWitt. What he wants it for, I don’t know.”355 Frank Davis was sensitive enough 
351 War  Relocation  Authority:  The War  Relocation  Work  Corps.  A Circular  of  Information  for  Enlistees  and  Their  
Families, Washington, D.C., 1942, p. 2. The WRA distributed this booklet in Tanforan to inform evacuees of the setup 
regarding work in WRA Relocation camps. 
352 Interview with James Purcell. As cited by Irons: Justice at War, pp. 101-102. James Purcell visited Tanforan several 
times to interview Mitsuye Endo and other incarcerated state workers in order to file a writ of habeas corpus petition on 
their behalf. This request for a writ became the landmark Supreme Court case Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
353 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 15, August 15, 1942, p. 9. 
354 Information Bulletin No. 5, June 13, 1942, JERS: 14:194; Information Bulletin No. 7, June 15, 1942, JERS: 14:177; 
Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 5, June 13, 1942, p. 3. 
355 Protocol, Advisory Council Meeting, June 17, 1942, JERS: 14:375. 
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to transfer the responsibility of the daily count to the evacuees. Thus, every house manager appointed 
several house captains to take care of the task. In the morning the house captains counted the residents 
as they entered the mess hall.356 In the evening a siren call sent everybody scurrying home; then the 
house captains checked each stall and apartment to see if all residents were present, and after about ten 
minutes they blew a whistle to signal that the evacuees were allowed to leave their rooms.357 The task 
was  undertaken  with  varying  degrees  of  thoroughness,  all  in  all  being  rather  lax.358 Most  house 
captains despised what they did, but they preferred to do it themselves rather than let their wardens do 
it. A house manager commented: 
We can’t get out even if we wanted to with barbed-wire fence and armed sentries every 50 feet 
and watch tower guards, but we must be counted twice daily. If this isn’t a form of putting salt 
on wounds, and getting used to the concentration methods of other countries, I don’t know 
what it is.359 
Charles Kikuchi wrote in his diary: “Don’t see the necessity [for a roll call] here, but there must be a 
reason.”360 Ben Iijima noted: “It’s a terrific nuisance and silly and makes me feel more as though I 
were in a concentration camp. It  hurts one’s pride to be counted each morning and afternoon.”361 
Another evacuee wrote to a friend outside: “[I]t’s asinine, but it’s army’s orders. Imagine making such 
a count when we are enclosed within barbed wire fence and guards walking every 50 feet and sentries 
in watch towers every 100 yards with guns ready to kill.”362 
Fences and watchtowers, “to prevent unauthorized departure of evacuees,” as the Army put it, 
precluded any attempts to escape.363 There were a couple of instances when older people who had poor 
memories tried to get past the gate while they wandered about disoriented during the night, and the 
guards were not always gentle  in reminding them that they could not leave.364 There is only one 
recorded case of an inmate who managed to get out. According to the  San Francisco Chronicle of 
May 13, 1942, twenty-one-year-old Clarence Sadamune, who had a Caucasian mother and whose two 
brothers  served  in  the  Army,  escaped from Tanforan  to  volunteer  to  the  Army.  He  was  refused, 
apprehended  and  brought  back  to  Tanforan.365 Shortly  after  he  was  transferred  to  the  Poston 
356 Because not everybody got up for breakfast, some house captains conducted the count at the barracks before the 
residents left for breakfast. 
357 Diary, Ben Iijima, August 2, 1942, JERS: 17:440; Okubo: Citizen 13660, p. 59. 
358 Diary, anonymous, pp. 11-12, June 17, 1942, JERS: 16:179-180;  Discussions, Doris Hayashi, JERS: 16:248; John 
Modell (ed.):  The Kikuchi Diary: Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp: The Tanforan Journals of Charles 
Kikuchi, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973, p. 147; Yoshiko Uchida: Desert Exile. The Uprooting of a Japanese  
American Family, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1982, p. 93; The Tanforan Totalizer informed the 
evacuees on July 4 that “the administration has ordered the house captains to be stricter in taking the daily roll calls, and no 
one should be seen wandering about the grounds at 6:45 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.” Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 8, July 4, 1942, p. 2. 
359 Political Activities, anonymous, JERS: 16:351. 
360 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 120. 
361 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 12, 1942, JERS: 17:418. 
362 Letter, Fred Hoshiyama to Lincoln Kanai, June 16, 1942, JERS: 18:135. 
363 Memorandum: Functions of Military Police Units at Centers for Japanese Evacuees,  WCCA to the Commanding 
Generals of the Western Defense Command, JERS: 12:131. 
364 Some guards  hit  those inmates  on the head. See  Tanforan Hospital  Report,  May 18,  1942, University  Research 
Library, UCLA. As cited by Michi Weglyn: Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps, New 
York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks Inc., 1976, p. 71. 
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Relocation Camp in Arizona. In Tanforan he became a sort of urban legend, and people mused that he 
would escape from Poston, too.366 Although there was only this one documented attempt, there was an 
abundance of rumors of escape.367 These stories express a persevering desire to regain freedom even 
though nobody seriously considered breaking out. 
Security  regulations  required  evacuees  to  stay  at  least  ten  feet  away  from  the  fence,  a 
regulation that they willingly followed, for the fence was a painful reminder of their imprisonment.368 
Those who came too close to the fence, like Kay and Yoshiko Uchida who wanted to greet their 
former neighbors,  learned quickly that the guards took their  duties seriously.369 Yet some inmates 
could not resist teasing their wardens: fourteen-year-old Albert Nabeshima waited for a moment in 
which the guards were not paying attention, then rushed to the fence, poked his fingers outside the 
steel fence and exclaimed: “Gee I want to touch free air. This is free air!”370 
The  majority  refrained  from  such  provocations,  but  they  could  not  escape  the  prison 
atmosphere. Every time Charles Kikuchi caught sight of a watch tower he felt a sting of bitterness: “I 
saw a soldier in a tall guardhouse near the barbed wire fence and did not like it because it reminds me 
of  a  concentration  camp.”371 Doris  Hayashi,  too,  became aware  of  the  disconcerting  reality  after 
witnessing  the  elaborate  security  procedure  at  the  front  gate.372 However,  she  reacted  differently, 
noting in her diary: “It seemed so like a concentration camp when that happened, that we all laughed 
embarrassingly.”373 This embarrassing laugh illustrates, in a nutshell, that most evacuees refused to 
acknowledge their captivity and at the same time painfully realized it. 
In  spite  of  the Army’s rule  that  guards were not  allowed to  speak to  evacuees  except  on 
business,374 there were a few instances when some friendly words were exchanged. Some evacuees 
even pitied the soldiers, musing that they were merely “young, nice kids.”375 Wrote Charles Kikuchi: 
The armed soldier, some lonely boy from the middle west, paces back and forth up the main 
gate.  In the sentry boxes,  the soldiers look bored.  They probably are more bored than the 
residents here.376 
While the fence represented the border between freedom and captivity, there were windows 
366 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, p. 70, JERS: 14:428. 
367 Ibid., p. 77, JERS: 16:432; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 86-87. 
368 Center Regulations, WCCA, p. 18, JERS: 12:323; Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 12, July 25, 1942, p. 2. 
369 Uchida: Desert Exile, p. 99. 
370 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 7, 1942, JERS: 17:405. 
371 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 54. 
372 The event that conjured up concentration camp images was the departure of an Army truck shipping evacuees to the 
Manzanar Relocation Camp: A soldier counted the evacuees as they entered the closed deck.  After the truck passed the 
gate, it was stopped and a soldier opened the door to do a second count. See Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 208, July 27, 1942, 
JERS: 17:194.
373 Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 208, July 27, 1942, JERS: 17:194. 
374 “Evacuees are prohibited to contact […] any military police personnel […] except for official business, and then only 
when  such  contact  is  initiated  by  military  personnel.”  And:  “Fraternization  between evacuees  and  Interior  Police  is 
prohibited.”  See  Center  Regulations,  WCCA,  pp.  18-20,  JERS:  12:323-324;  see  also  Wartime  Civil  Control 
Administration:  Concentration  Camp U.S.A.  Regulations.  July  18,  1942,  San  Mateo:  Japanese  American  Curriculum 
Project, 1973, p. 12 (WCCA: Operation Manual, Section XXV). 
375 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 107. 
376 Ibid., pp. 156-157. 
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through which the evacuees kept in touch with their former lives in freedom. The most common way 
to make contact with the outside world was to come to the reception hall in the grandstand, where the 
inmates were allowed to receive visitors. People who came to see the evacuees included Japanese with 
special permits to work outside: Dr. Yanaga and Prof. Nahanura, both teaching Japanese to Navy men; 
Mari Okazaki who worked in the WCCA headquarters in San Francisco, Chiyo Nao who worked as 
translator  for  the  CBS.  The  majority  of  visitors,  however,  were  former  employers  of  Japanese 
Americans,  fellow  students  and  colleagues  from  university,  and  friends  from  the  YMCA and 
YWCA.377 Among the prominent  visitors  was Peter  Ray from Duke Ellington’s  band,  and  Helen 
Gahagan Douglas, a noted California Liberal.378 In particular the Nisei utilized the visiting privilege 
extensively, for a variety of reasons. As a JERS study put it:
Having Caucasian friends became a vogue after a few weeks passed, partly because lack of 
facilities (mostly food is brought, but also ironing boards, brooms, wash tubs, toilet paper, coca 
cola, soap), partly because out of pride and prestige.379 
Others, like Ben Iijima, went to the grandstand in order to escape the gloomy mood in the camp and to 
get a sense of contact with the outside world. Occasionally he was able to relish blissful scenes: 
There was a naval officer visiting [and a] Filipino who was embracing his wife; both were in 
tears. A prominent lady with a fur coat was looking around for her former cook. Her arms were 
filled with bags of pastries and fresh fruits.380 
Iijima  resolved  that  the  majority  of  visitors  were  “sincerely  concerned  and  interested”  in  the 
evacuees.381 Other evacuees perceived this  very interest  as rather humiliating. As Charles Kikuchi 
noted:  “Lots of visitors as usual. Many of them probably came out of  curiosity to look at us in the 
camp. Makes one feel like being either in a zoo or a prison.382 To “feel like” in a prison was quite a 
common  sensation.  But  rarely  did  Kikuchi  –  like  the  vast  majority  of  his  fellow  incarcerees  – 
rationalize imprisonment, for it still was a too painful reality to acknowledge openly. 
While  the  WCCA  set  forth  the  basic  rules  pertaining  to  visitors,  camp  directors  had 
considerable freedom as to when and under which conditions visitors could be seen, and what they 
were allowed to bring in.383 Visiting times were from ten to twelve in the morning, and from one to 
four in the afternoon.384 In the beginning, visitors could bring anything except contraband.385 Any 
package was either opened or got stuck through with long needles.  The visitors  themselves were 
377 Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 19, May 31, 1942, JERS: 17:098; Uchida: Desert Exile, pp. 84-85; First Month, Shibutani, 
Najima, Shibutani, p. 44, JERS: 16:415. 
378 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 126, 184. 
379 Report on Social Morphology, JERS: 16:147. 
380 Diary, Ben Iijima, May 22, 1942, JERS: 17:395. 
381 Ibid., June 6, 1942, JERS: 17:368. 
382 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 141.
383 WCCA: Concentration Camp U.S.A. Regulations, pp. 9-10 (WCCA: Operation Manual, Section XXVII).
384 Information Bulletin No. 6: Regulations for Visiting, May 14, 1942, JERS: 14:181; Okubo: Citizen 13660, p. 79; First  
Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, pp. 35-36, JERS: 16:411. 
385 The list of contraband included tools that could be used as a weapon, Japanese literature, alcoholic beverages, short-
wave radios, and cameras. See  WCCA:  Concentration Camp U.S.A. Regulations, pp. 3-4 (WCCA:  Operation Manual, 
Section XVII).
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casually  searched  and  forbidden  to  enter  the  compound  proper.386 In  the  first  weeks,  however, 
enforcement was so lax that, as Charles Kikuchi noted on May 6, “[it] is possible to sneak visitors off 
to the stable (under some pretext).”387 A week later he wrote: 
Alice and Jack have cultivated Sergeant Boyd Horton to such a point that he gives our visitors 
special privileges. [Sergeant Horton] expects to be sent overseas at any moment. He has a heart 
and does not turn his men in if they talk to the Nisei through the fence.388 
The Internal Police chief tried to abolish such practices, but when the evacuees protested and the camp 
director refused to back up stricter enforcement, he resigned.389
Between May 14 and May 24, 1,135 visitors came to Tanforan, and as the number increased 
steadily, the administration saw itself compelled to introduce more restrictive regulations.390 Beginning 
on July 1, visitors had to fill in an application and received blue badges before they were allowed to 
enter the compound.391 Waiting time averaged at 45 minutes, and the visitors standing in line had to 
put up with being called “Jap lovers” by people driving by in cars.392 The evacuees, too, complained 
about  the  maltreatment  of  their  visitors,393 who,  in  spite  of  it  all,  were  not  deterred.  Evacuees 
continued to rely on supplies from the outside, as this account illustrates: 
[Our] visitors brought a sewing machine, clothes and books, etc. from home, and cookies and 
jams, as well as magazines: Time, Collier’s, Life, Esquire. It took [our] visitor a long time to 
get in today, because they asked questions – name, address, employment, and purpose of visit, 
as well as searched for contraband, etc. – 3 copies, each made out individually. This took 15 
minutes for each visitor, so they had to wait 30 minutes in line. It was feared that the food 
wouldn’t reach the barrack, but it did.394
On July 1, Charles Kikuchi, while running errands in the Service Division, spotted a notice on 
the wall prescribing that, “all Negro visitors [are to] be checked closely and their slips be kept in a 
separate file.” His explanation: “Evidently they think that there is  a great danger of the Japanese 
stirring  up  the  Negroes.”395 Whatever  its  original  purpose,  the  administration  utilized  the  new 
registration system to blacklist and, eventually, to exclude unwanted visitors. Among the first on the 
list  were Morton Grodzins and Bob Spencer from the University of California,  both of the JERS 
project staff.396 The cause for their blacklisting was a trifle: when Kikuchi passed to Grodzins a folder 
with bulletins and diary notes, the supervisor of the Service Division, George Greene, stepped in and 
told them that the study was not authorized and that no written material could go about the camp. 
Asked whether he intended to censor the mail, Greene replied “Absolutely not! We are only acting for 
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the best interest of the people and if the wrong information gets out, it will hurt them.”397 Grodzins 
reassured Greene that nothing secret was done and that officials in charge had approved the study. 
Nevertheless, after this incident the administration put the JERS staff, including Dr. Thomas, on the 
blacklist. Kikuchi vented his anger in his diary: 
Greene acted as if a crime has been done. There are no such things as freedom of the press or 
speech around here. Everything has to have the “approval” of the Administration. I realize that 
they have a heavy responsibility,  but why can’t they start from the assumption that we are 
average Americans and give us a decent chance instead of being suspicious about everything 
we do.398 
On August 11, the Army allowed Dr. Thomas and Morton Grodzins to enter the camp again, but from 
then on the Internal Police supervised all meetings, and any papers passed were inspected.399 
On August 8, following an Army directive, the administration once more tightened security:  
From today, the ruling about the division of visitors and residents went into effect. There were 
mess tables spread the length of the hall [to separate visitors and evacuees]. Moreover, there 
were internal police and J[apanese] guards roaming in the hall regularly to make sure that no 
one passed any contraband over the table. The visitors were again delayed and asked the many 
questions, so had to wait for ¾ of an hour. Moreover, they brought some food, and the guards 
took it without telling them that it wouldn’t be delivered, which made the residents very bitter 
[…].400 
No vegetables, staple food products or perishable products brought by visitors were allowed, with the 
exception of fresh citrus or deciduous seasonal fruits such as apples,  oranges,  lemons and plums, 
supposedly because of the persistent vitamin deficiency in mess hall food.401 The new prison-like setup 
forced even the positive-minded evacuees to acknowledge the disconcerting reality. As Doris Hayashi 
noted:
I was feeling very dejected because the regulation that the visitors must sit on one side of the 
table while we sit on the other […]. It reminded me of a prison. On top of all this, there was the 
abolition of council and congress this week, which made me feel bluer yet. I really was in no 
mood for visitors but I did have one. The chairman of race relations groups at the YWCA. She 
came with a number of the YWCA fellows and we “wept on their shoulders” telling them all of 
our problems and the new regulations.402 
Observing how the inmates reacted to the new setup, a JERS researcher noted that three out of four 
evacuees  were  “pretty  burned  up.”  People  asked:  “What  the  hell  they  think  we  are,  a  bunch  of 
prisoners?” “What kind of prison is this?” “All they need is to put a screen in now.”403 Evidently, the 
administration had crossed an invisible line. Sensing the growth of a rebellious mood, one week later 
the director of Tanforan had the prison setup abolished and returned to a more informal arrangement, 
which allowed visitors and evacuees to mingle,  though under the constant watch of their  guards. 
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Restrictions pertaining to incoming goods and visitor passes remained and were strictly enforced.404 
Visiting policy is a fine example for the predicament the camp administration faced. On one 
hand, they wanted to monitor the inmates as closely as possible, fearing that leniency and diffidence 
would make the incarcerated too self-confident. On the other side, whenever the administration cut 
down on the little freedom that was left,  there was the danger that the evacuees would revolt.  In 
several  instances –  be it  the dismissal  of incompetent  staff,  the improvement of the sanitary and 
housing situation,  or  the  visitor  regulations  –  they revolted  with  success.  Draconian rules,  rarely 
imposed, were almost never enforced: On May 21, for example, the Internal Police ruled that stealing 
lumber would lead to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of $2,000. Still the evacuees continued to 
snatch away lumber under their guard’s noses, and nobody was held responsible.405 
To placate the evacuees the administration even disregarded Army orders, such as the curfew. 
While  the  WCCA ruled that  from 10:00 p.m.  to  6:00  a.m.  “all  evacuees  shall  be  in  their  living 
quarters,”406 the Internal Police chief at Tanforan, Jerry Easterbrooks, convinced Frank Davis not to 
enforce a curfew “unless necessary.”407 In a meeting with the Advisory Council, Davis confided to the 
evacuee councilmen: “I’m not in favor of a curfew. You fellows could handle the internal problem. I 
don’t think it’s necessary.”408 In fact, the administration did not have the means to manage internal 
security  without  the help  of  evacuees:  There  were  only four  Caucasian policemen to  each 1,000 
detainees, leaving the wardens no choice but to cooperate with the inmates.409 
The evacuees took considerable pride in the fact that there was no curfew in Tanforan. Doris 
Hayashi noted in her diary: “It seems that this is the only camp without curfew. [Our radios need to 
be] off at 9, but I believe it is coast-wide, not only our camp. We don’t have to shut off lights at a 
certain time.”410 It was common that evacuees compared Tanforan with other camps – often believing 
the wildest rumors about them – to assure themselves of their extraordinary (i.e. fortunate) situation.411 
The bottom line was always the same: Their situation was bad, but there were others who were worse 
off. 
On August 15, the Army officially declared that Assembly Centers could decide individually 
whether a curfew was necessary or not.412 As mentioned, Tanforan’s administrators saw no need for it. 
The only restriction was that lights had to be turned out at 10:30 p.m., as mandated in a bulletin from 
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July 27.413 The absence of a curfew allowed for nightly activities and led to constant debates between 
parents and children as to when they should be home at night.414 After a thirteen-year-old girl became 
pregnant,  church  groups  and  Issei  parents  actually  petitioned  the  administration  to  introduce  a 
curfew.415 
Although the camp administration waived application of a curfew and let the evacuees do the 
roll  call  themselves,  the Internal  Police was still  present  twenty-four  hours  a  day,  reminding  the 
evacuees that they were under surveillance.416 Four men were on patrol at any one time, and every 
point in the camp was covered every half hour. The Issei were content with this regulation as long as 
the Caucasian officers did not talk to their wives. The Nisei objected to it, claiming that they could 
handle the situation themselves.417 
Besides maintaining order  within the compound,  the Internal Police had to  ensure that  no 
contraband would enter Tanforan.418 In order to achieve this, they checked all visitors and incoming 
parcels. In addition, the Internal Police were “authorized, without warrant, to enter all buildings and 
evacuee quarters at any time of the day or night.”419 Though this privilege was rarely exercised, the 
evacuees naturally detested it and protested in several instances.420 
This privilege also allowed Tanforan’s keepers to conduct two camp-wide searches. The first 
search, conducted by the Internal Police, happened on June 22 and June 23 by order of the WCCA 
headquarters  in  San  Francisco,  which  suspected  that  contraband  had  been  smuggled  in  at  the 
induction.421 Contraband  included  Japanese  literature,  curved  handsaws,  kitchen  knives,  rubbing 
alcohol, large scissors, baseball bats, short-wave radios, flashlights beyond a certain power and a few 
other articles.422 Some inmates promptly hid their knives, tools and valued books upon learning about 
the search.423 The evacuee Advisory Council urged the camp director to let the Issei keep at least 
translations of Western fiction, but Davis remained adamant. Thus, a translated Victor Hugo, if found, 
was confiscated as contraband.424 Many Nisei empathized with their parents who had “nothing left to 
read, except their bibles and religious books.”425 
413 Diary, anonymous, p. 59, July 27, 1942, JERS: 16:205. 
414 Diary, B., p. 9, June 14, 1942, JERS: 16:179; Diary, Ben Iijima, July 8, 1942, JERS: 17:412. 
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uniformed Military Police patrolled the border fences. See U.S. Army: Final Report, pp. 215-218.
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suspicion that gambling was going on.” Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 196. 
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The search was conducted with varying degrees of thoroughness as the following account 
illustrates: 
The [officer] who happened to come [to our family] was very friendly and felt sorry that he was 
compelled to make searches – he merely asked if there was any contraband, and then chatted 
with [my] mother and father in a very friendly manner. With this attitude, [my] family didn’t 
feel  cynical  at  all.  […] The only Japanese matter  [in our home] was a  dictionary,  but  the 
inspector said that wasn’t contraband. Some of the other areas were not as fortunate for the 
inspectors concerned searched the house thoroughly, even under the mattress, etc., taking small 
scissors, toy saws, even dictionaries and Bibles, saying they couldn’t tell if it were a Bible or 
not.”426 
Towards the end, an evacuee noted,  the inspectors “mainly knocked and asked if  there were any 
contraband articles in the stable.”427 
The second search, on September 5, was conducted under Army supervision and was more 
thorough.428 With the transfer to inland Relocation Camps approaching, the WCCA wanted to ensure 
that  no  contraband would  be  smuggled  to  the  WRA camps.  The  camp was  divided  into  several 
sections. Then a cordon of soldiers sealed each section and nobody could leave or enter the area for 
the duration of the search. Each inspection team comprised two soldiers and one evacuee from the 
Internal Police who usually did the search. While a majority seemed to be “rather disgusted” with the 
whole procedure,429 Ben Iijima took it easy: 
The first thing the man did was to look thru the hymnal on the table, then he looked thru the 
trunk which I’ve got filled with books. “School books, huh?” he said. Yep, I told him. Then he 
went into the back stall, and lifted up a heavy book, “Emily Post,” he said, “Too deep for me.” 
Then he went quickly thru the trunks. […] When the internal policeman returned, he asked me 
a few questions just before he left. Have you phonograph records? A phonograph? Books in 
Japanese print? Then he asked if there was any alcohol. I told him we had rubbing alcohol. 
“You can drink that,” he said laughingly and the both left. It was all very quickly done.430  
Having  hitherto  provided  the  perspective  of  the  inmates,  I  will  now consider  briefly  the 
viewpoint of the authorities. Thus far I demonstrated that the administration interpreted the Army’s 
regulations leniently, avoided being too intrusive, and adopted a benevolent attitude. Moreover, both 
the  administration  and  the  Army  repeatedly  emphasized  the  “Normalcy”  of  incarceration.  The 
following announcement, which was read to the house managers by a representative of the WCCA 
headquarters, is a fine example of official rhetoric. It is worth quoting in full because it explains from 
the Army’s perspective how evacuees ought to cope with life in bondage: 
We recognize the hardships that have been placed upon you people and have tried to make 
things as pleasant as possible. We also recognize the fact that among Japanese people the large 
majority are 100% American citizens, and yet as you all realize that some of you are not. This 
is true of any race. Therefore, good or bad, this policing problem is something that has to be 
worked out. I want you people to understand that the situation here is exactly the same as on 
the outside, that is, our officers are acting in the same capacity as the patrolmen where you 
lived. You are to call the police officer at any time and tell them what is wrong; that is what we 
426 Diary, anonymous, p. 15, June 22, 1942, JERS: 16:182. 
427 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 146.
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want to hear. We want the cooperation of the people if we are to achieve any degree of success. 
There are 4 men to each 1,000 people. If you have a problem you want to get cleared up 
through the police, come to them, no injustice will be done. […] However, you will have to 
realize you will have to abide by the same law as on the outside. […] Get this over to the 
people […].431
The speech begins with the assurance of sympathy and goes on to appeal to the pragmatism of the 
inmates: “[G]ood or bad, this policing problem is something to be worked out.” The Army seeks to 
cajole the evacuees into cooperation, yet it fails to resolve the exceptional character, the unlawfulness, 
of the incarceration. It falsely states that the evacuees had to “abide by the same law as in the outside.” 
And while admitting that “the large majority are 100% American citizens,” which “is true of any 
race,” the speech omits the logical conclusion, that there was no more reason to concentrate Japanese 
Americans without due process of law, than, say, German Americans. 
Finally,  this  document  aptly  illustrates  the  Army’s  attitude  vis-à-vis  the  evacuees;  mild 
authoritarianism mixed with a good dose of paternalism. The evacuees’ records confirm the prevailing 
paternalistic attitude. In particular camp director Frank Davis and George Greene, head of the Service 
Division, repeatedly stated that the incarceration was only in the best interest of the evacuees. Very 
few, like Frank Kilpatrick, the director of the education program, and the previously mentioned chief 
of police, Jerry Easterbrooks, treated the Nisei as equal, full-fledged Americans, not as “young punks 
just out of college […].”432 
To sum up, then, the inmates – consciously or half-consciously – daily faced the disconcerting 
truth of being incarcerated under prison-like conditions. We have seen that they developed various 
strategies to face a reality they naturally felt as an insult: They cooperated to make administration less 
intrusive.  They tried to get as much self-determination as  possible in matters  of policing.  And if 
regulations  became  too  oppressive  they  voiced  their  discontent,  sometimes  even  compelling  the 
administration to revoke their measures. That the inmates managed to assert a certain level of freedom 
and autonomy is remarkable because technically the Army had total power over them. But since the 
Army wanted to uphold the impression of a benevolent rule, it could not fully exert its power. 
431 Minutes of the House Managers’ Meeting, June 27, 1942, JERS: 14:501. 
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6 – Life Behind Barbed Wire
For months have passed
And at last I learn
To call this horse stall
My family’s home.
– YUKARI UCHIDA433
Nothing has  occurred yet,  but  this  does  not  mean that  
nothing  will  happen.  Discontent  is  seething  under  the  
surface and something is bound to happen before long.
– TAMOTSU SHIBUTANI434 
The previous chapters demonstrated that never during its existence was Tanforan a normal community. 
Yet  while  Tanforan  featured  all  the  characteristics  of  a  concentration  camp,  everyday  life  was 
ambiguous and there were many semblances of normality. Once the evacuees had eliminated the worst 
discomforts and transformed Tanforan into a halfway livable habitat, they turned to the spiritual and 
intellectual  needs  of  the  incarcerated  people.  The present  chapter,  therefore,  examines  education, 
recreation, and religion in Tanforan. In other words, I will pursue the question what people did in their 
spare time. 
The main part of this chapter outlines how the inmates organized these activities on their own 
initiative.  While  the  main  purpose  was  to  bolster  their  morale,  these  activities  have  also  deeper 
implications, allowing us to take up discourses from preceding chapters: We will continue to track the 
development of the community spirit, further investigate the changing attitudes regarding cooperation 
and resistance, and explore by which means the administration tried to control the inmates. However, 
before we begin our examination we need to take a brief look at Tanforan’s administrative setup, more 
specifically  the  employment  situation,  which  provides  the  institutional  frame  for  the  following 
observations and offers initial illuminating insights into the above discourses. 
Tanforan’s administrative  setup was clear-cut:  Civilian personnel  –  procured mainly by the Work 
Projects Administration (WPA), but also by hospitals, schools, and the police – administered the camp 
while soldiers of the U.S. Army guarded the compound.435 Tanforan’s administration was divided into 
five divisions: (1) The “Administrative Division” acted as liaison to the WCCA headquarters in San 
Francisco which prescribed the basic regulations for all Assembly Centers. Heading the division was 
first camp director William Lawson, who was succeeded in June by Frank Davis.436 The camp director 
433 Yoshiko Uchida:  Desert Exile. The Uprooting of a Japanese American Family,  Seattle: University of Washington 
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was responsible for communication within the camp and for its orderly conduct. He employed a small 
staff  of  Caucasian  and  Nisei  stenographers  and  receptionists.  (2)  The  “Works  and  Maintenance 
Division” maintained all  physical facilities of the camp, from repairs to electric, water and sewer 
system, to buildings and mess hall tables. (3) The “Mess and Lodging Division” was responsible for 
housing and feeding, as well as policing, cleaning and furnishing supplies for laundries, showers and 
latrines. Like all divisions it was headed by a Caucasian while the actual work was done by Japanese-
American employees. (4) The “Finance and Record Division” kept all accounts and records. (5) The 
“Service Division” was the one with the closest contacts to the evacuees. It headed the recreation and 
education  program,  supervised  employment  and  was  responsible  for  issuing  paychecks  and  scrip 
books.437 
As  indicated  above,  the  Army determined  “to  employ  evacuees  […]  to  the  fullest  extent 
practicable.”438 The WCCA expected several advantages from this policy. First of all, it decreased the 
costs of running the camps. Second, by keeping evacuees busy the Army hoped to dissuade them from 
pondering their situation and having second thoughts about their compliant attitude. Thirdly, it was 
hoped that work would raise the evacuees’ self-esteem and make Assembly Centers look more like 
self-sustaining communes than concentration camps, in short, more respectable. We will see later in 
this chapter to what degree these goals were achieved. 
In  practice,  Japanese  Americans,  both  U.S.  citizens  and  aliens,  ran  the  camp.  In  some 
departments an evacuee foreman took over and the Caucasian chief was only chief in name.439 But in 
most  cases there was a  clear  division between Caucasian supervisors  and evacuee staff.  In  some 
divisions conflicts were the order of the day, such as in the  employment department. It’s chief, Mr. 
Gunder,  was  notorious  for  losing  his  temper  and  threatening  to  send  disobedient  staff  into  a 
concentration  camp.440 While  his  paradoxical  announcements  typically  failed  to  impress  his 
employees, his choleric temper earned him nicknames such as “Mr. Thunder” or “Mr. Blunder.”441 
Observed his secretary: 
Mr. Gunder was talking to someone about the insolence of one of the workers who talked back 
to the officials. He is always harping on the insubordination of the Nisei here. He emphasizes 
the position of officials as true superiors to the inhabitants of the camp – almost to the military 
extreme. It is really aggravating to hear such talk.442 
the term “manager.” 
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By contrast,  evacuees were full  of praise for police chief Jerry Easterbrooks, because, as Charles 
Kikuchi put it, “he understands […] that most Nisei are just like him, and he won’t allow his men to 
spy or put on a superior attitude while in camp.”443 Likewise, chief steward John Fogarty was popular 
because he “took a very genuine interest in the welfare of the residents.”444 Despite occasional clashes, 
Caucasian staff and evacuee employees cooperated efficiently, not at least because the camp director 
disbanded incompetent  staff  or  those  who misbehaved grossly,  such as  the  head of  the receiving 
department who was dismissed after he had been caught drunk on the premises.445 
The evacuees,  then,  were not  per se  opposed to  authority.  They only opposed what  Erich 
Fromm called  “irrational  authority,”  because  irrational  authority  works  against  the  interest  of  its 
subjects (a typical example of irrational authority would be the master’s attitude to his slave). Applied 
to Tanforan this explains why incompetent administrators and those whose sole interest was to enforce 
Army directives frequently came into conflict with the inmates. Incompetent staff were of little help 
for the incarcerated when it came to improve living standards, and narrow-minded bureaucrats refused 
to grant more autonomy to the inmates than absolutely necessary. Yet these were the main goals of the 
prison community. The interest of a “rational authority,” in contrast, lies in the same direction as that 
of his subjects. The chief of the Internal Police, Easterbrooks, for instance, sought to guarantee the 
incarcerated the largest possible degree of autonomy which was in their  own interest.  He was an 
authority that the inmates could accept without submitting.446 
Apart  from  varying  relations  to  individual  supervisors,  evacuees  frequently  made 
generalizations about the administration, which were almost always negative. The administration was 
not only held responsible for all the mishaps they caused but it became the scapegoat for injustices 
that  lay  far  beyond  its  power  to  influence.  While  the  incompetence  and arrogance  of  individual 
supervisors was reason enough to trigger the evacuees’ scorn, its harshness can only be explained by 
the  underlying  frustration  caused  by  their  confinement,  with  its  consequential  humiliation  and 
deprivation. In their personal records the inmates constantly demonize the administration as “the main 
source  of  evil”447 and  ridicule  them  as  “third-rate  W.P.A.  men”448 although  even  the  most  able 
administrators could not have changed the Spartan setup that the Army provisioned. Unfair as some of 
these accusations were,  the  idea of an arbitrary and incompetent administration was an important 
means to cope with the shameful experience of incarceration; further, it  welded the victims together 
and served as an important outlet to vent their frustration. 
By June 1 1,767 evacuees were employed, and the number went up to almost 2,500 by the end 
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of August.449 Persons assigned to jobs worked on a 44-hour per week basis and were classified as 
unskilled, skilled or professional at monthly wage rates of $8, $12, and $16 respectively (equaling 
about 15 percent of the average American salary).450 No evacuee was required to work, but once he 
accepted a job, he was expected to carry it out except in case of illness. To quit, a 48-hour notice of 
intent was required.451 While in Tanforan there was never a scarcity of people willing to work, there 
were plenty of cases when evacuees returned to the employment office to  “throw back the work 
sheets.”452 
Notwithstanding recurring frictions between Caucasian supervisors and evacuee employees, 
the inmates never dodged work if they saw that it benefited their community. This has been illustrated 
in chapters 3 and 4, in the example of dishwashers and cooks, nurses and doctors, as well as house 
managers. The same went for those employees who worked for the intellectual and spiritual welfare of 
their fellow detainees, in education, recreation, and religion. Because the Army had devised Assembly 
Centers solely for the “maintenance” of the evacuees, it provided “no formal system of education or 
recreation.”453 Nevertheless,  due  to  the  inmates’  initiative  and  outside  support  from  private 
organizations, schools, and churches, a comprehensive program for education and recreation sprung 
up in Tanforan, receiving due commendation for its exemplary character in the Army’s Final Report.454 
The education program was divided into three branches: academic (kindergarten, elementary school, 
high  school,  and  adult  education),  cultural  (art,  music,  flower  arranging),  and  extra-curricular 
(cooperative education, first aid, town hall debates).  In the absence of a formal education program, 
resident teachers staffed all schools.455 By the end of June, about 40 percent of all inmates either taught 
or attended classes (see Table 10).456 The educational department was headed by Frank Kilpatrick, a 
graduate of  Berkeley’s  Boalt  Hall  law school. A district  supervisor  of  education of  Alameda and 
Contra Costa  County,  his  personal  experience with Japanese Americans  came from four  years  of 
teaching at  the Berkeley evening high school,  a  period that had left  him with a highly favorable 
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total of $6,817 (Issue 9, July 11, 1942, p. 1); from May 22 to June 21 2,013 persons were employed (1337 unskilled, 502 
skilled, 174 professional), receiving $16,200 (Issue 9, July 11, 1942, p. 1); from June 22 to July 21 the number rose to 
2,370 (1,144 unskilled, 951 skilled, 275 professional), receiving $21,000; 2,427 workers were on the fourth payroll for the 
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opinion of the Nisei.457 
Let us start our synopsis of the education program by looking at the setup of the elementary 
and high school. Since the evacuation forced the students to interrupt school before the end of the 
school year, the most pressing need was to advance them to the next grade. 90 percent of the pupils 
achieved this  goal.458 As the efforts  under  which this  was  achieved are far  more telling than the 
numbers denoting its success, we shall dwell awhile on its implementation. 
Registration, which was voluntary, started on Monday, May 25. Already on that day 75 percent 
of the approximately 1,700 students between the ages of six and eighteen registered, approaching 100 
percent within days. The next day four classes for children between the ages of six through eight were 
begun at four unused mess halls.459 The furnishing was provisional. Blackboards were made from 
painted plywood. The mess hall benches and tables were far too high for the children and there were 
virtually no supplies. However, three-fourths of the children brought their own pencils, pads, school 
records and textbooks, and due to supplies from schools outside, only a lack of textbooks remained. 
Notwithstanding makeshift conditions, the Nisei director of the elementary school proudly noted the 
patriotism and good-will of the children: 
Children  could  sing  God  Bless  America,  Star-Spangled  Banner,  and  America better  than 
Twinkle, Twinkle Little Star, [and] the willingness to participate in volunteer activities,  like 
leading songs, was much greater than expected.460 
High school classes started on June 15 with about 700 students registered. Classes continued 
for thirteen full weeks until September 11. The high school was staffed with twenty teachers, all with 
college degree but only three with previous teaching experience. The largest problem for the high 
school proved to be the venue. After the bachelors had been moved out of the grandstand, the former 
dormitory was turned into the high school.461 As its director put it, “where formerly horse-race fans did 
their betting and drinking while they watched the results being posted on the board, school soon was 
under way.”462 Charles Kikuchi, too, was struck by the bizarre setting:
A painted sign “Tanforan High School” sticks up from the mutual windows and a girl stands behind it 
giving out information instead of selling mutual racing tickets. The unerased race results high in the air 
lend a further racing touch.463 
Eighty mess-tables, seating eight at each table, lined up in groups of eight. Classes were from 
8-12 every weekday and consisted of five periods, each forty-five minutes.464 The result of teaching 
ten classes simultaneously in one big hall without partitions can be easily imagined. There was a vast 
hubbub of voices, occasionally derailing into a pandemonium.465 A loud laugh disturbed all ten classes 
457 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 8, July 4, 1942, p. 5; Administrative Personalities, anonymous, p. 14, JERS: 16:335. 
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in session.  The students  complained that  the  smell  of  food distracted them (the kitchen was just 
underneath), whereas the cooks in the kitchen complained about the dust that came through the ceiling 
“because the kids run all over the place up here.”466 The teachers, most of whom had just graduated 
from university and lacked teaching experience, coped with varying degrees of success. Henry Tani, 
director of the high school, noted that the lack of discipline was a serious problem because “a Nisei as 
a teacher was an unknown thing.”467 Many teachers had younger siblings in their classes. While some 
had difficulties controlling unruly students, others managed the situation by adopting unconventional 
measures: One teacher taught standing on the table, from where she commanded the attention not only 
of her own class but also that of neighboring classes.468 Despite these difficulties, Frank Kilpatrick 
concluded that, “a feeling of accomplishment prevails, due to the cooperation and earnest endeavor of 
all concerned.”469 
In addition to elementary school and high school, several nursery schools were created for 
children aged two to five. The first kindergarten opened on May 18, and three more soon followed. 
Out of 372 children in pre-school age, 287 registered.470 Opened from Monday through Saturday 9:00 
to 11:30 a.m., the kindergarten took over the task “to free the mother without taking her place,” as the 
Totalizer advertised.471 Again the physical setup was marked by inadequacies: Initially there were no 
chairs, tables, toys, towels, dishes or toilets.472 A nursery teacher remembered: “The first few days […] 
were sheer bedlam. Nearly all twenty children present were crying, some lost their breakfast, some 
wet their pants, and others ran into the yard screaming for their mamas.”473 Young children were quick 
to change the concept of home: 
Whenever the children played house, they always stood in line to eat at make-believe mess 
halls rather than cooking and setting tables as they would have done at home.474 
Due to support from Mills College, the Oakland Federal Emergency Nursery School, the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation and other organizations, the nursery schools greatly improved their services and 
soon enjoyed the confidence of many mothers.475 
The college-aged Nisei had the most difficulties to carry on with their education. To get them 
back to school, a group of Californian educators, most prominently Robert Gordon Sproul, president 
of the University of California, mounted the first successful program that provided exemptions to the 
policy of mass exclusion. Working closely with the National Student Relocation Council  (NSRC) 
Robert Sproul eventually convinced the War Department that the continuation of higher education was 
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a desirable step. On May 18, Roosevelt promised that Nisei students would be able to continue their 
education in inland institutions. Until the end of the war, some 4,300 students left Assembly Centers 
and Relocation Camps to attend college.476 
In Tanforan there were an estimated 250 college graduates and 250 college students.477 Because 
the NSRC’s program was still  in its beginnings only  about ten students left  Tanforan  to continue 
higher education outside the Western Defense Command.478 Nativist protests forced at least two Nisei 
to return to Tanforan.479 In addition, three Kibei volunteered to go to the University of Colorado, at 
Boulder, to teach Japanese to Navy men, looking forward to “return to civilization,” as one of them 
put it.480 
Complementing nursery school,  elementary school,  and high school classes,  a program for 
adults was set up, including Americanization classes in English, civics, and history. During the first 
week over 225 Issei and Kibei signed in for English classes scheduled twice a week, and eventually 
some 500 participated. Classes were limited to ten students each, stress being on English conversation. 
The Totalizer wrote on the adult education program: 
Students are learning songs like “Old Black Joe” and “Long, Long Ago.” Being presented also 
are  simplified  condensation  of  American  historical  events  such  as  the  signing  of  the 
Declaration of Independence and Paul Revere’s ride. The lives of outstanding men in U.S. 
history, like Benjamin Franklin and Abraham Lincoln, are being studied.481 
Americanization  classes  were  counterbalanced with  flower  arranging  (ikebana)  and paper  folding 
(origami)  classes  that  allowed  the  residents  to  practice  traditional  Japanese  arts.482 In  addition, 
Professor Chiura Obata from the University of California gave weekly lectures on the fine arts which 
476 Roger Daniels: Concentration Camps: North America. Japanese in the United States and Canada during World War  
II, Malabar: Krieger Publishing Company, 41993, pp. 97-101. The issue has been well-researched, resulting in three major 
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and World War II, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999; Allan W. Austin: From Concentration Camp to Campus:  
Japanese American Students and World War II, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004. 
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were hugely popular among all  age groups.483 Most teachers in the adult  education program were 
bilingual and had taught Japanese before the evacuation (adult  classes were the only meetings in 
which Japanese language was allowed).484 The adult education program was appreciated in particular 
by Issei women, many of whom for the first time in their lives found the leisure to pursue interests 
beyond the sphere of family duties. Issei men found it more difficult to enjoy their newly won leisure; 
many  grieved  over  the  loss  of  their  role  as  provider  and  detested  depending  on  the  federal 
government.485 
Apart from the academic program the educational department organized weekly “town hall” 
discussions.  A regular Wednesday night feature,  town hall  meetings provided the evacuees with a 
platform to debate various issues related to their current situation. For example, the first town hall 
meeting, held from 7:30 to 9:00 p.m. on May 27, featured the topic “How may we better cooperate to 
improve Tanforan.” Other topics included “The advisability of marrying in a relocation center,” “The 
role of religion in the relocation center,” and “Relocation: stagnation or rehabilitation?”486 Town hall 
meetings were organized by Nisei and also chiefly attended by them.
Most topics addressed innocuous issues, most often living conditions and the improvement 
thereof. Twice, however, the question put forward touched broader issues. One of these questions, 
posed  on  June  3,  asked  what  ought  to  be  the  “proper  attitude”  towards  the  evacuation;  this 
predicament, which had been largely ignored in the general confusion and upheaval of evacuation, 
was  now openly  discussed  by  a  majority  of  the  Nisei.487 It  was  a  controversial  topic  because  it 
questioned  the  basic  assumption  of  the  evacuation:  that  it  was  necessary  and  justified.  Also,  it 
prompted the Nisei to reconsider their nostrum of unconditional submission to Army authorities. 
The second question that will concern us is related to the generational gap. It is the question to 
what extent the Issei, as leaders of the pre-war communities, were to be included in the organization of 
Tanforan. These two questions address issues the evacuees were genuinely interested in. Moreover, 
both questions explicate central issues of this study: how did the inmates cope with their captivity, and 
how did the dominance of the administration affect the generational gap. 
Let  us begin with the first  question,  put  forward in  the second town hall  meeting:  “What 
should the Nisei attitude be toward the evacuation?” The various contributions revealed a wide range 
483 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 3, May 30, 1942, p. 3. 
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of opinions. The first speaker  argued that Japanese Americans were “victims of circumstance” and 
should accept “the golden mean of voluntary cooperation.” He denied the evacuees “free will,” and 
said they had no choice but to comply with everything that the government required them to do. This 
standpoint, reflecting the JACL’s policy of unconditional cooperation and subservience, was echoed 
by the second speaker, a Protestant minister, who added a religious dimension by pointing out that 
Christianity was a religion of suffering and forbearance, and that a good Christian should accept the 
situation and must trust in God.488 
The three following speakers agreed that the inmates must cooperate, but they varied insofar as 
they advocated speaking out against pressure groups which they considered the prime cause of their 
imprisonment. The speakers lent further force to their argument by quoting nativist groups who were 
seeking to disenfranchise and expropriate the incarcerated Nisei.  The last contributor was also the 
most outspoken. He demanded that although the Nisei were incarcerated they should still stand for 
free elections and self-determination, proclaiming that  “we should fight for what was ours and we 
would if we really felt like Americans and believed in the democratic principles.”489 Citing from the 
plethora of racist statements in the  Tolan Committee report,490 he argued that the inmates had few 
supporters outside, and that the best they could do as American citizens was to keep alive democratic 
principles within their community. 
Far from posing a consensus,  this  town hall  meeting rather expressed the Nisei’s growing 
awareness of their unjust treatment, together with a rising realization that meek compliance was an 
approach that only encouraged further injustices. These were no sudden insights, but this meeting 
represented a landmark in a shift in attitude that was to have a lasting effect on the Nisei’s stance vis-
à-vis their custodians. After spending a month behind barbed wire, reflecting on their situation, more 
and more Nisei became convinced that they owed their incarceration to persons whose judgment was 
veiled by fear and prejudice. Seeing that, many Nisei reasoned that they might prove their loyalty best 
by  upholding  the  principles  of  freedom  and  democracy  instead  of  following  blindly  erroneous 
authorities. Clearly, nobody intended to overthrow the camp administration, but there was a growing 
sentiment  among  the  second  generation  to  follow their  patents’ example  and  protest  to  arbitrary 
treatment, and to demand more self-determination. 
Moreover, this town hall meeting illustrates how the administration cut back on freedom of 
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expression when statements critical of evacuation policies were voiced: A column in the weekly camp 
newspaper, featuring the gist of the town hall discussion, was promptly censored. After the official 
Army censor had given his consent, George Greene, head of the Service Division, decided that it was 
“absolutely out.” The phrase he objected to ran: 
Dave  Tatsuno  […]  advocated  fighting  against  certain  pressure  groups  that  had  pushed 
evacuation, but counseled voluntary cooperation with the Federal program of evacuation.
The item appeared in the Tanforan Totalizer of June 6 as follows: 
Dave Tatsuno counseled voluntary cooperation with the Federal program of evacuation.
The other sentence changed was, “Warren Tsuneishi spoke of the forces of fascism and democracy and 
their relationship to evacuation.” This was changed to “Warren Tsuneishi urged continued faith in 
democracy in meeting the problems of evacuation.”491 Although these were minor changes, they make 
clear that the administration suppressed anything they deemed even remotely controversial. 
Let us now turn to the town hall discussion on the generational gap. The issue was raised 
during the fifth meeting, on June 24, featuring the topic “Coordinating the interests of the Issei and 
Nisei  for  the  welfare  of  the  Japanese  in  America.”492 It  was  a  controversial  issue  because  the 
administration tended to favor the Nisei; be it self-government, work, or recreation, there were very 
few opportunities for Issei to take an active part in camp life. The problem was compounded by the 
fact that some Nisei collaborated with the administration in excluding the Issei from camp life, which 
further increased frictions within the penned-up community.493 
The speakers were all second-generation Japanese Americans. Kiyo Nobe opened the meeting 
with a conciliatory statement: “The one thing needed right now is unity.” She explained frictions as a 
result of lack of understanding due to different upbringing, and due to the lack of time the Issei spent 
with children: “Under this difficult and strenuous life very little energy was left to become pals to their 
sons and daughters.” A Nisei herself, she posited that some Nisei “formed a misguided view of liberty 
and freedom” and felt unjustly superior to their parents who were barred from U.S. citizenship by law. 
She urged the Nisei to respect the age and experience of the Issei: “The Nisei would be wise to include 
the  Issei  in  all  activities  and  profit  by  their  wisdom.”  In  her  conclusion  she  addressed  both 
generations: the Nisei ought to be more respectful of their parents while the Issei might consider the 
enforced idleness  as  an opportunity  to  spent  more time with their  children.  Finally,  she opted to 
include the Issei in the formation of self-government.494 
The next speaker,  Ernest  Iiyama,  echoed the call  for mutual  respect  and added a political 
dimension, arguing that inmates had a democratic obligation to let the parent generation participate in 
491 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, pp. 2-3, JERS: 16:453-454. 
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all aspects of life: 
Rights of all people should be recognized equally. […] In this war, democratic principles are 
involved.  If  we  are  fighting  for  democratic  principles  those  principles  should  be  used  in 
camp.495 
Furthermore, Iiyama warned his fellow inmates not to be intimidated by unfavorable outside opinion. 
He said he knew that some Nisei hoped to “save themselves” by turning against their parents, but this 
egoism was the wrong answer. He finished by expressing his conviction that the best remedy in these 
difficult  times was to adhere to democratic principles and to show solidarity towards all  inmates, 
regardless of citizenship status.496 
The  final  speaker,  the  Reverend  Taro  Goto,  used  the  family  metaphor  and  the  notion  of 
brotherly love to urge the community to do away with factionalism. In the second part of his speech he 
gave meaning to the evacuees’ situation by suggested that Tanforan was a microcosm of the United 
States:  “These  problems  we  face  in  assembly  centers  and  relocation  centers  are  not  Japanese 
problems, they are fundamentally American problems,” implying that the evacuees needed to defend 
freedom and democracy against administrative rule, just like the United States defended these values 
against fascist states. While not everybody might have grasped the implication of Goto’s comparison, 
it is a remarkable statement on its own. Expressing his optimism he concluded that ”[w]e are going to 
build a great America out of this conflagration.”497 The meeting was favorably received. Commented a 
listener: 
[T]he controversial attitudes expressed throughout the whole evening was a healthy sign. There 
will be a ban on further use of the Japanese language in any open meetings, so that the Issei 
feel rather hindered and limited in their freedom. This seems rather unjust to most of us, even 
the Nisei […].498 
As mentioned above, the question of Issei participation was discussed not only in this town 
hall  meeting;  it  was  a  dominating  discourse  in  camp  life,  and  it  remained  topical  throughout 
Tanforan’s existence. While the issue reappears later in this chapter and is also elaborated in chapter 8, 
it  may  be  stated  tentatively  here  that  these  discussions  reflect  a  surge  in  filial  piety  and  ethnic 
solidarity,  the  same trend  that  post-colonial  historians  have  diagnosed  with  respect  to  Relocation 
Camps. Since filial piety is a seminal trait of Japanese culture, in which the family, not the individual, 
is the principal unit of society, this tendency clearly has a cultural dimension, too. In short, although 
most Nisei deliberately distanced themselves from the cultural heritage of their patents, they hesitated 
to cut the generational ties. On the contrary, captivity made many the second generation realize the 
value of the family and communal solidarity. 
Despite the great efforts put into the education program, there was still plenty of leisure time left to 
495 Ibid., JERS: 16:013.
496 Ibid., JERS: 16:013. 
497 Ibid., JERS: 16:014. 
498 Diary, anonymous, p. 17, JERS: 16:183. 
90
fill. With close to 2,500 workers registered, the majority of evacuees was without regular employment, 
which  posed  a  major  problem  for  people  unaccustomed  to  sitting  idly.  Moreover,  almost  2,000 
detainees were sixteen and under, and many of those children grew restless and disruptive once classes 
were finished.499 The daunting task of filling the spare time of these people was taken up by the 
recreation department, which organized sports as well as entertainment and cultural events. 
Immediately after their arrival,  the inmates set  about to remodel barracks and parts  of the 
infield  into  makeshift  gyms,  basketball  courts,  and  baseball  diamonds.  Schools  and  churches 
generously donated equipment.500 After about two months, inmates had organized several baseball and 
basketball leagues. Other sports evacuees could engage in were football, tennis, table tennis, softball, 
boxing, or judo, as well as  go and  shogi.501 Wandering about Tanforan on a sunny Sunday in mid-
August, Charles Kikuchi witnessed an abundance of activities: 
I could see about five baseball games in progress. Near the barbershop in the infield a lot of 
fellows were pitching horseshoes […]. Next to them […] the Sumo wrestlers were occupied. 
About 100 persons were sailing boats on the lake. Great crowds stand around the edge of the 
lake looking on, especially at the man who gives rides to kids in the boat he has built. The 
builder of the big sailboat is a former captain of a fishing schooner. Henry Fujita, the national 
fly-casting  champion,  and  his  son  usually  come  out  to  the  lake  on  Sunday  afternoons  to 
practice. The new lake is more a scenic spot where couples go strolling over the bridge or sit on 
the benches under the transplanted row of trees around the edge of the lake. A fire tower is 
being constructed […] near one end of this lake for the firemen to practice on […]. Sunday is 
also a big day for tennis, two courts have been laid out on the tracks up by the post office, and 
there are always lots of golfers going around the miniature 9-hole golf course on the infield. 
For those who prefer milder activity, there are the weekly bridge tournaments. The rest of the 
people go visiting each other or else have visitors in the grandstand.502 
To  foster  the  impression  of  normalcy,  the  camp  newspaper  dedicated  more  space  to  recreation 
activities than to any other single topic. At least two full pages featured league news and reviews that 
rivaled Sports Illustrated. Headlines like NORTH SOFTBALLERS TRIM SOUTHERNERS BY 5-2 
COUNT were followed by succinct analyses:  
The North-South softball tilt had all the earmarks of a terrific battle, but when the fury of hits 
and  runs  had  subsided,  the  North,  aided  by  the  sterling  2  hit  performance  of  Sus  Ota, 
vanquished the boys from the other side of the tracks.503 
Although American sports predominated, sumo was more popular than some Nisei liked to 
admit.  Once  a  Nisei  tried  to  stop  the  sumo  matches,  supposedly  because  he  deemed  them  un-
American, by claiming the administration forbade them. As no such rule was known, the sumo people 
asked their Advisory Council to clarify the issue with the administration. As it turned out, the camp 
director knew nothing about a ban on sumo matches, stating that he had no objections.504 Even the 
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Tanforan Totalizer, which avoided showing any sympathy for Japanese traditions, announced in late 
August: “Shorn of all its ceremonial trimmings, sumo, one of the oldest sports in the world, made its 
debut to 2,000 spectators last Sunday.”505 
Sumo matches were popular primarily with Issei, Kibei, and small children (Sansei).  Nisei 
usually shunned them because they thought them “too Japanesy.”506 Ben Iijima, witnessing a sumo 
contest for the first time in his life, noted with some bewilderment: “The object of sumo seems to be to 
push the opponents out of the ring or throw him down. The referee has a fan-like object in his hand, 
which he uses to designate the winner.” What Iijima found most objectionable was the clothing, or 
rather the lack of it: “The contestants were attired with only a heavy cloth wrapped around their waist. 
[…] Personally, I don’t think that was any place for girls to go to.”507 Despite his moral concerns there 
were young Nisei women who, although likewise puzzled, enjoyed the show: 
It was all Greek to us, but after a while we got excited during the final elimination bouts. There 
are lots of ritualistic forms to follow in this game and the costumes they use are very crude 
(practically nothing). It seems that height and build have very little bearing on ability because 
coordination,  speed,  and ability  to  stay on the  ground are  very important.  There  are  three 
rounds, and the person who wins two out of three wins. […] I noticed that the type of people 
present  were rather heterogeneous,  with the  Issei  predominating (mostly  men).  There were 
about one-third young people present, especially Buddhists, but they were of all ages, from ten 
years old to college graduates. Some people came and went in a few minutes, but most of them 
stayed quite a while. It is fun to watch if you catch on to the purpose of it. (It is similar to 
wrestling.)508 
This episode is worth mentioning for two reasons: First, it demonstrates how thoroughly most Nisei 
were Americanized and how little they knew of Japanese culture.509 Secondly, the matches reveal two 
kinds of reactions typical of Nisei: One was to shun contact with anything Japanese,  heeding the 
administration’s  mantra:  “You  Nisei  have  a  large  task  ahead  of  you  to  keep  the  young  ones 
Americanized and fall not under the first generation influence. The Issei are hopeless.”510 In short, 
fearing  to  appear  un-American,  some Nisei  categorically  denied  any sympathy  towards  Japanese 
sports. Another kind of reaction was forthright curiosity. Those who watched the matches unbiased 
often found them fascinating and thus developed common ground with their parents.511 
The recreation department also organized weekly dancing classes. While Kibei where more 
inclined  to  folk  dancing  Nisei  favored  the  Jitterbug,  just  as  they  embraced  everything  that  was 
uniquely American.512 The Jitterbug was also popular as being an antipode of typical Japanese forms 
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of  expressions,  such  as  kabuki.  Furthermore,  the  Jitterbug,  with  its  fast  and  violent  movements, 
expressed the Nisei’s irrepressible zest for life and their self-image as avant-garde Americans. Finally, 
the Jitterbug – like all recreational activities – served as an outlet of energies in a repressive climate, 
providing  a  momentary  escape  from  concentration  camp  life  with  its  unresolved  tensions, 
uncertainties and senselessness. The following quote is taken from an evacuee letter, addressed to 
friends at the Santa Anita Assembly Center: 
I learned how to jitterbug and you ought to see me and Nish and Tommie cut the capers at our 
weekly Saturday night dance. We just about break our necks trying to get dates though. I went 
to all the dances since I got here which includes about 14 of them and I’ve taken different girls 
every time, except twice. I’m running out of girls that I can ask, but I keep trying. Maybe I’ll 
start from the beginning all over again.513 
Charles Kikuchi realized that a variety of activities fully occupied his leisure-time: 
Sunday  night:  party;  Monday:  folk  dancing;  tonight:  precinct  meeting  for  nomination  of 
Congressmen; Wednesday: Town Hall; Thursday: lecture; Friday: invited to party held by the 
file clerk girls or work on paper; Saturday: dance; Sunday, invited to party.514 
Thus time passed quickly: 
Three months in a concentration camp! Life goes smoothly on. I should be more dissatisfied 
and rebellious, but much against my will I’m forced to admit that I’m getting adjusted to this 
restricted life and falling into a smooth and regular rut.515 
This was a common feeling, once the excitement had passed. Some inmates literally felt guilty of 
escaping from reality, reasoning that such distractions were meaningless, unreal, a waste of time. They 
feared that all those activities distracted from the real issues, yet they could not do away with them.516 
However, there was no danger in losing oneself permanently in shallow joys. The hours of felicity 
were rare; every morning the Jitterbuggers faced anew the stark reality of camp life. Light-hearted 
social gatherings were first and foremost a temporary escape from the oppressiveness of camp life, 
keeping the emotional climate at Tanforan balanced. 
In order to counterbalance these light activities the recreation department also hosted a cultural 
program. Weekly talent shows, quiz shows, variety shows, and kite contests attracted mainly Nisei, 
while Issei preferred classical concerts, featuring works by Schumann, Streabbog, Bach, McDowell, 
Strauss, Tchaikovsky, Puccini, and Gershwin.517 Serving as a magnet for all generations were baby 
contests, beauty contests, and a “Playhouse Petite” featuring a comedy, a drama, a pantomime farce 
and several piano, violin and dance numbers. There was even a dance band in Tanforan, consisting of 
two alto sax, one tenor sax, three trumpets, one trombone, one baritone, piano, drums, and a guitar.518 
West Coast, in Oakland and Los Angeles. Starting as an avant-garde subculture it quickly became a trend-setting way of 
expression for young Americans.  
513 Letter, Fred Hoshiyama to Deki, July 22, 1942, JERS: 18:143. 
514 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 187. 
515 Ibid., p. 200.
516 Visit to Tanforan with Dr. Thomas and Mrs. Knight, anonymous, July 28, 1942, JERS: 16:098;  Diary, Ben Iijima, 
August 12, 1942, JERS: 17:452-453; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 234. 
517 Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 262, August 23, 1942, JERS: 17:220; ibid., pp. 59-61, June 11, 1942, JERS: 17:118-119. 
518 Tanforan Totalizer, various issues. 
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A group of inmates interested in vaudeville shows organized a satire on camp life, including a 
few sideswipes at the administration. Some paragraphs were promptly censored but there were still 
enough clever jokes left to delight the audience.519 A spectator noted in her diary after seeing the play 
(titled “Horse Stall, and that Ain’t All”):   
It was a satire on camp life [and] very novel – in that it was original and slammed at the apathy 
of the employment office, the poor service in the mess halls, and the noise of the neighbors, the 
frequency of diarrhea, to mention a few.520 
Movie nights, too, fell under the responsibility of the recreation department. A 16-mm movie 
projector, sound equipment and several educational films were loaned by the San Mateo Tuberculosis 
and Health Association. Each evacuee was allowed to visit one of the three shows per week. Movie 
nights had some particular features and consisted of much more than just the motion picture. Doris 
Hayashi provides us with a vivid description of the experience: 
Tonight I went to the movie with S.P. We went right after roll call and ran most of the way. Still 
we were about 100 yards from the beginning. There were three lines (three mess halls) and still 
there was a large crowd. At about 7:00 PM the people were beyond the post office. We stood 
around for an hour till opening time. Many girls knitted on socks and sweaters. Some fellows 
brought radios to listen to outside. Others sat on stools (which they brought for the show) and 
played bridge. Some students brought books to study for next day’s lesson. The age group 
ranged from about 3 years to 55 years with the young people (school kids) predominating. 
There were about 1,500 present tonight. 
The arrangement inside was the front half of the room for those on cushions and the last 
half for those on chairs. The disadvantage for the latter was that floor was level so everyone 
had to crane his neck to see. On the other hand, those on the floor could look up and weren’t 
hindered in their view, although they were probably uncomfortable in their position. The house 
managers and fire department acted as ushers and collected tickets, guided traffic, and warned 
the people not to take in newspapers or food. Of course, since these men are human and have 
friends, they were persuaded to not see a box of cheez-its here, and some newspapers there. 
[…]
The three-reel film (including the main film “spring parade”[…], a colored cartoon, and a 
travelogue) required three intermissions. Also the sound mechanism went out  of  order two 
times and was too loud at spots, but in general, it was satisfactory for the first time. Of course, 
the acoustics were rather poor since the room wasn’t built for films […]. It was paid for by 
donations by individuals (a committee of five) and the residents in general.521 
In short, it was a mixed blessing. Charles Kikuchi wrote that “seeing a show is a form of self-torture,” 
and Earle Yusa noted in her diary that she was “[g]lad it was over when it was.”522 
Travelogues,  slapstick  comedies,  musicals,  sport  shows  and  cartoons  dominated  the 
program.523 When  the  movie  committee  scheduled  Orson  Welles’  Citizen  Kane the  Caucasian 
519 Discussions, Doris Hayashi, p. 9, JERS: 16:247. 
520 Diary, Doris Hayashi, July 17, 1942, p. 167, JERS: 17:173. 
521 Discussions, Doris Hayashi, JERS: 16:271. 
522 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 230; Diary, Earle Yusa, August 10, 1942, JERS: 17:535. See also Diary, Ben Iijima, 
August 11, 1942, JERS: 17:450; Diary, B., p. 22, June 28, 1942, JERS: 16:185; Ibid., p. 65, July 31, 1942, JERS: 16:208; 
Okubo:  Citizen 13660, pp. 87-88. All accounts have in common that motion picture showings were far from a regular 
cinematic experience but that in particular children and Issei, possibly because they cared less about physical discomforts, 
were eager to see them nevertheless. 
523 Movies presented included slapstick comedies like Bud Abbott and Lou Costello’s  Hold that Ghost,  and The Boys 
from Syracuse, a Broadway musical. The Devil and Miss Jones with Jean Arthur, a Hollywood classic that was nominated 
for two Oscars, was more serious, as was the drama Hoosier Schoolboy with Mickey Rooney, and the Tim McCoy Western 
Gun Code. Cartoons and the principal plays of the 1941 football season complemented the program. 
94
recreation director objected, claiming it would be “too deep for 80% of the audience.” He advised the 
movie committee to show only comedies.524 However, the movies’ intellectual value didn’t mean much 
to the evacuees anyway. It was the event, an echo of normality, that made hundreds of people put up 
with the discomforts week after week.525 
Not all activities were formally organized. Those who simply wanted to escape the hustle and 
bustle of the racetrack could be found at the grandstand. It was a popular place for inmates who 
favored more relaxed “activities:” 
People came to bask in the sun in the wind-protected privacy of the grandstand booths; others 
came for a private dice game. Some came to meditate,  and there were those who came to 
sleep.526
Knitting was a popular pastime for women and even taken up by some of the young men.527 Issei 
fathers occasionally helped their wives with the housework but otherwise spent a good deal of time 
smoking,  meditating,  and building  sailboats.528 The  enthusiasm of  Tanforan’s  shipbuilders  was so 
tremendous that they asked the camp director for permission to order lead from the outside.529 In 
victory gardens evacuees grew turnips, cucumbers, lettuce, string beans and sugar peas to supplement 
their camp diet.530 A professionally run community nursery provided the mess halls with bouquets and 
even sent  flowers to  the Governor  of  California  at  his  birthday.531 In addition,  two hobby shows 
presented  the  work  of  artists  and  craftsmen,  including  paintings,  knitted  garments,  needlecraft, 
wooden handicraft  articles,  miniature  house  models,  jewelry,  sailboats,  home-made candy,  flower 
arrangement displays – all attesting to an impressive outlet of creative energies.532 
The last part of this chapter deals with religious activities in Tanforan. In comparison to the education 
and  recreation  program,  religious  activities  enjoyed  even  greater  freedom  from  administrative 
influence. As a JERS study pointed out, “Religion is the one institution in Tanforan which apparently 
is  not  censored.”533 In  fact,  by  exempting  church  services  from  the  ban  on  Japanese  language, 
Tanforan’s administration stretched WCCA rules to the limit.534 
524 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 230. 
525 The question how much entertainment was appropriate eventually lead to arguments between recreation and education 
department. For example, Charles Kikuchi complained “The Rec guys believe that problems are solved if people don’t 
think about them.” Modell (ed.):  Kikuchi Diary, p. 191. See also  Visit to Tanforan with Dr. Thomas and Mrs. Knight, 
anonymous, July 28, 1942, JERS: 16:098.
526 Okubo: Citizen 13660, p. 101. 
527 Ibid., p. 103. 
528 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 5, 1942, JERS: 17:403; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 116, 135. 
529 Frank Davis granted permission. Minutes of the Advisory Council, p. 6, July 7, 1942, JERS: 14:400. 
530 Diary, Ben Iijima, June 6, 1942, JERS: 17:368; Uchida: Desert Exile, p. 87. 
531 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 18, September 5, 1942, p. 2. 
532 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 17, August 29, 1942, p. 5; Diary, B., p. 68, August 2, 1942, JERS: 16:209. 
533 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, p. 51, JERS: 16:419. 
534 WCCA regulations required evacuees to obtain a special permission to conduct services in Japanese. As a JERS study 
put it: “That Japanese language services were permitted seemed to be a great concession, for everything else in the camp 
was  strictly  censored.”  First  Month,  Shibutani,  Najima,  Shibutani,  p.  51,  JERS:  16:419.  For  regulations  pertaining 
religious services see WCCA: Concentration Camp U.S.A. Regulations, pp. 1-3 (WCCA: Operation Manual, Section X-D-
5).
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Most people dressed up when they attended Sunday school and church services; a majority of 
the inmates wore better clothing than everyday wear, and girls could be found wearing silk stockings 
and high heels. On May 3, the first Sunday after Tanforan’s induction, Protestants and Catholics held 
their  first  service  in  two  vacant  mess  halls.  Two  weeks  later,  Buddhists  and  the  Seventh  Day 
Adventists held their first service. The need for spiritual sustenance was so overwhelming that at the 
first few Sundays “there was standing room only at both the Japanese and the English service.”535 
However, the interest in religion waned towards the end of August, as many young people “developed 
other interests – [such] as badminton, strolling around the track, bridge sessions, just informal chats 
and visits.”536 
As for the venue, all denominations convened in decidedly puritanical surroundings. Only the 
Catholic mess hall featured benches, which some evacuees related to the fact the Caucasian director of 
the service division was Catholic.537 Protestants and Buddhists together made up 90 percent of the 
camp population, comprising 60 and 30 percent of the population respectively.538 Both cooperated on 
various occasions. The mother’s day program, for example, was initiated by a Methodist minister, but 
during the program several Buddhist and Catholic priests spoke. A JERS study noted that in contrast to 
pre-evacuation cliquishness among religious  groups “people were  willing in  overt  fashion to  pull 
together and combine for the good of all.”539 
While  Protestants  frequently  invited  ministers  from their  home parishes  –  they  were  only 
allowed to stay for the duration of the service540 – Buddhists were even more dependent on religious 
workers from the outside because Buddhists priests, considered pro-Japanese and subversive, had been 
summarily  interned prior  to  evacuation.  Hence,  a  Caucasian priest,  Frank Boden Udale  who was 
ordained as a Buddhist  priest  under the name of Shaku Kyosen, came from San Francisco every 
Sunday to conduct the service. Challenging prejudices, he remarked that he did not care why people 
came  to  his  service  “but  if  they  come,  we  shall  try  to  make  them  good  Buddhists  and  good 
Americans.”541 The San Francisco Buddhist temple also donated an organ, piano and public speaking 
system, gifts which all denominations shared.542 
Despite the initial assertion that inmates enjoyed considerable autonomy regarding religious 
activities, the toleration of the administration had its limits. For example, Frank Davis cancelled a 
535 Uchida: Desert Exile, p. 86.  
536 Religion, JERS: 16:299.  Buddhist reacted to the new surroundings by announcing special dancing classes for their 
members. See Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 128. 
537 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 220-221. 
538 Population and Composition, JERS: 16:327. This ratio is due to the fact that many Buddhists but almost no Christians 
had been interned by the Justice Department. See chapter 2.
539 Religion, JERS: 16:278. 
540 House majority leader John W. McCormack (D-MA) proposed to allow priests to reside with the Catholic people in 
Assembly  Centers  but  his  suggestion  never  materialized.  See  Letter,  Congressman  McCormack  to  Secretary  of  War 
Stimson, June 20, 1942, (and Stimson’s reply from June 30) in Daniels (ed.): American Concentration Camps, Vol. 6. 
541 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, pp. 51-52, JERS: 16:419.
542 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 17, August 29, 1942, p. 3.
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meeting on the topic “Our moral responsibility,” jointly organized by the Protestant and Buddhist 
Church.543 As  reason  Davis  quoted  the  resignation  of  the  main  speaker,  police  chief  Jerry 
Easterbrooks. Since there were five more speakers scheduled, the evacuees immediately suspected that 
Easterbrooks’ drop out was merely a pretext. In truth, it was said, Davis was afraid of large gatherings 
in which evacuees could freely voice their opinions. In fact, the WCCA’s Operation Manual explicitly 
warned camp directors that religious activities were “not [to be] used as a vehicle to propagandize or 
incite [the evacuees].”544 It is doubtful that a discussion of moral responsibilities would have incited 
the evacuees, but Davis’ cancellation followed a pattern. His actions consistently show that he held the 
evacuees under general suspicion of plotting against peace or of planning to overthrow camp rule once 
left to their own resources. His fears, unfounded as they were, betrayed the widespread misconception 
of the Japanese as inherently alien and inscrutable people, a misconception that had been fostered over 
decades of anti-Oriental agitation. In any case, the evacuees were irritated by the cancellation because 
they  had  submitted  three  speeches  in  Japanese  for  translation  and  approval  by  the  WCCA 
headquarters,  and  despite  going  through the  complicated  procedures  they  were  forbidden to  hold 
them.545 
All in all, church services with their prayers, singing and meditation helped many evacuees to 
cope with anxieties and to make sense of their situation. Both Buddhism and Christianity contained 
the notion of suffering at the core of their teachings: Christianity, with its emphasis on forbearance and 
suffering,  provided  a  forceful  role  model  for  inmates  to  relate  to.  Buddhism  even  presupposes 
suffering as the natural state of human existence.546 Yet there is ample evidence that only a very small 
proportion of Tanforan’s population applied these principles to their everyday lives.547 Most Japanese 
were used to rely on hard work rather than prayers. They were fundamentally pragmatic, down-to-
earth people. Remarked Ben Iijima after his parents returned from Sunday service: “Mother and father 
both enjoyed the  sermon.  Dad said the  speaker  was an old trouper  of  eighty-four  and liked him 
because he didn’t speak too much about god.”548 
Be it religion, recreation, or education, the administration recognized the importance of keeping its 
subjects as occupied and “happy” as possible, displaying a great deal of tolerance and stretching the 
543 Technically, WCCA regulations forbid mass meetings, but evacuees found out that Army rules could be sidestepped by 
declaring the meeting as a religious event. 
544 WCCA: Concentration Camp U.S.A. Regulations, p. 1 (WCCA: Operation Manual, Section X-D-5). 
545 Religion, JERS: 16:276-277. 
546 With respect to Relocation Camps Gary Okihiro noted a return to Buddhism, which he interpreted as a form of cultural 
resistance to the WRA’s Americanization efforts and as a way to preserve the ethnic identity. As regards Tanforan I found 
no indicators for a revival of Buddhism but certainly substantial toleration of Buddhism. See Gary Okihiro: “Religion and 
Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps,” Phylon Vol. 45 (1984), pp. 220-233. 
547 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 75 & 241; Diary, B., p. 9, June 14, 1942, JERS: 16:178; ibid., p. 28, July 5, 1942, 
JERS: 16:189; Religion, JERS: 16:299; Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 6, May 17, 1942, JERS: 17:091; ibid., p. 37, June 7, 1942, 
JERS: 17:107; ibid., p. 77, June 21, 1942, JERS: 17:127; ibid., p. 225, August 9, 1942, JERS: 17:204. 
548 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 12, 1942, JERS: 17:417. 
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rules the Army had laid down. This strategy, one might argue, paid off. The inmates neither lapsed into 
apathy nor used their energy to do mischief, as the administration feared. Instead they organized on 
their own initiative a plethora of activities which occupied them most of the time, provided an outlet 
for their energies, and contributed to a greater sense of togetherness. At the same time it has been 
demonstrated that being occupied did not imply that the inmates gave themselves over to the illusion 
of a holiday camp, as fostered by the administration. On the contrary, they grew more aware of the 
larger issues, particularly the injustice of their incarceration. The administration’s efforts to quell any 
attempts at critical thinking merely caused the opposite. That the keepers of Tanforan nevertheless 
tried to manipulate the inmates’ perception of their imprisonment is a central theme of the following 
chapter, which will deal with Tanforan’s weekly newspaper, the Tanforan Totalizer. 
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7 – The Camp Press
Let us with the mature minds do your thinking for you.  
You people are in a tough spot and the administration  
here has been picked because we know a little more about  
life than you do.
– GEORGE A. GREENE, HEAD OF SERVICE DIVISION549
We took a poll this afternoon, and all of us honestly believe that 
we put out the best paper, followed by Santa Anita… After we  
got  through rating the papers,  we decided that we were too  
conceited, and that all of the papers were the same – all lousy,  
because we could not print what was really going on and that it  
presented a false picture of things by only mimeographing the 
bright side of things. We felt that we could have done a lot more 
if  we  were  allowed  to  have  more  freedom  in  constructive 
criticism. 
– CHARLES KIKUCHI550 
The Tanforan Totalizer has been quoted throughout this work because this weekly newspaper filtered 
the whole spectrum of the Assembly Center experience. But it was far more than “a weekly bulletin 
reporting on what is going on in camp – about a week late,” as a JERS study claimed.551 The Totalizer 
was a powerful tool, utilized by both prisoners and keepers, to shape the way evacuees perceived their 
incarceration. By analyzing what was reported and how it was reported, it becomes apparent that apart 
from disseminating information, the promulgation of normality and the improvement of morale were 
the  central  concerns  of  the  Totalizer.  A closer  reading  reveals,  however,  that  despite  an  overtly 
accommodationist  tone,  the  Totalizer contained  ambiguous  passages  that  can  be  read  as  subtle 
criticism. Another conspicuous feature that merits discussion is censorship. Although there never was 
an official censorship policy, the administration and a representative of the Army strictly supervised 
the  Totalizer, forestalling any critical discussion of politics and camp affairs. The chapter’s closing 
remarks seek to determine to what degree censorship influenced the Totalizer’s overall agenda. I argue 
that self-censorship was far more critical than administrative censorship in perpetuating the illusion of 
a normal community. 
By way of introduction, let me delineate the institutional framework under which Assembly 
Center newspapers operated. Fifteen of the sixteen Assembly Centers had a mimeographed newspaper 
although the Army never devised a newspaper policy.552 Recognizing, however, “the necessity for 
some means of presenting the activities of the centers to the evacuees,” the Army let the Assembly 
549 From a conversation with Charles Kikuchi, August 7, 1942. See John Modell (ed.): The Kikuchi Diary. Chronicle from 
an American Concentration Camp: The Tanforan Journals of Charles Kikuchi, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973, 
p. 212. 
550 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, p. 1, JERS: 16:459. 
551 The First Month at Tanforan. A Preliminary Report,  Tamotsu Shibutani, Haruo Najima, Tomiko Shibutani, p. 20, 
JERS: 14:403. 
552 For an overview of the Assembly Center newspapers see Takeya Mizuno: “Journalism under Military Guards and 
Searchlights: Newspaper Censorship at Japanese American Assembly Camps during World War II,”  Journalism History 
Vol. 29 (2003), pp. 98-106. 
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Center authorities decide if and under which framework a newspaper was to be published. The Army 
merely provided a Press Relation Representative (i.e. censor) “who saw that news items were confined 
to  those  of  actual  interest  to  the  evacuees.”553 We shall  see  later  in  this  chapter  that  Army and 
administration had a very narrow conception of what was of “actual interest.”
Much of what was put in practice in Assembly Centers was later absorbed into the WRA’s 
official newspaper policy, which promulgated the axiom that the camp press was to operate “free but 
under  supervision.”554 In  practice,  the  freedom of  the  Assembly  Center  press  was reduced to  the 
freedom  to  publish  what  the  administration  and  the  Army’s  censor  agreed  with.  Consequently, 
depending on the degree of self-censorship of the evacuees on one side, and the degree of tolerance of 
the authorities on the other, censorship was exercised more or less routinely. Furthermore, the Army as 
well  as  the WRA incorporated the “free” camp press in the domestic and foreign propaganda by 
suggesting that First Amendment rights were upheld, and by emphasizing the humane nature of mass 
incarceration.555 
Before turning to the  Totalizer’s agenda let us consider some basic statistics. The first issue, 
consisting of four pages, was published on Saturday, May 15. The following 18 weeks each of the 
2,800 family units in Tanforan received a copy of the  Totalizer delivered free of charge to its stall 
door.556 By issue 8 the volume was increased to ten pages, averaging at that number for subsequent 
issues.  The final  issue,  published  on  September  12,  comprised  26  pages.  About  twelve  evacuees 
worked for the newspaper, six of whom were paid.557 Following Army regulations, the Totalizer was 
553 U.S. Army, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army: Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast,  
1942, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943, p. 213; Mizuno: Journalism under Military Guards, p. 
100. 
554 Takeya Mizuno: “The Creation of the ‘Free’ Press in Japanese-American Camps: The War Relocation Authority’s 
Planning and Making of the Camp Newspaper Policy,” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly Vol. 78 (2001), 
pp.  503-518;  Lauren  Kessler:  “Fettered  Freedoms:  The  Journalism  of  World  War  II  Japanese  Internment  Camps,” 
Journalism History Vol. 15 (1988), pp. 70-79. 
555 To explore in how far the  Tanforan Totalizer succeeded in influencing outside opinion requires a separate study: 
Officially no copies were sent outside except one to the Library of Congress and one to the library of the University of 
California. However, some evacuees sent their copies to friends outside, and the San Francisco Chronicle as well as the 
Berkeley Gazette quoted infrequently from the Totalizer. Charles Kikuchi received a dollar by an unknown visitor who told 
him to send the Totalizer to interested people outside so the public sees “how American your group really are.” (Modell 
(ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 156.) The downside of spreading a varnished picture was, “that some people think we’re having a 
summer vacation in a resort,” as Doris Hayashi realized after reading an article in the San Francisco Chronicle of August 
18. (Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 245, August 19, 1942, JERS: 17:214.) A study on the WCCA’s public relations would need to 
include the analysis of the Army’s documentary (parts of it are used in the 1995 documentary Tanforan: Race Track to  
Assembly Center, published by CrossCurrent Media (see bibliography)) and the WCCA’s photograph publishing policy. 
For the latter see, Telegram, Edwin Bates (WCCA Information Service Division) to John Bird (WRA Information Division), 
May 26, 1942, JERS: 13:527;  Memorandum “Clearance of Pictures and Negatives”, Norman Beasley (WCCA Public 
Relation Division) to Edwin Bates (WCCA Information Service Division), June 9, 1942, JERS: 13:528; and the Dorothea 
Lange Papers Relating to the Japanese-American Relocation, 1942-1974, stored at the Bancroft Library, University of 
California. The Dorothea Lange Papers were not available in 2006, pending the microfilming of the collection in 2007. 
556 There were 2,200 family heads and 600 bachelors in Tanforan. See Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 275, August 28, 1942, 
JERS: 17:226. 
557 The Totalizer staff comprised Taro Katayama (editor-in-chief), Bob Tsuda, Jim Yamada, Charles Kikuchi (associate 
editors), Bill Hata (sports), Ben Iijima (recreation), Alex Yorichi (kitchen), Lillian Ota (women), Albert Nabeshima (copy 
boy), Yuki Shiozawa, Sam Yanagisawa, Marguerite Nose, Emiko Kikuchi, Yuri Oshima (technical staff), Bennie Nobori, 
Nobuo Kitagaaki (art), Alex Yorichi (circulation). See Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 2. Sketches of 
various staff members can be found in Diary, Ben Iijima, August 11, 1942, JERS: 17:450.
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published exclusively in English. Its statement of purpose was put forward in the opening editorial: 
The Tanforan Totalizer is intended to be this center’s paper in every way. Its interests are those 
of all the residents here. It is not the organ of any self-seeking group and will not play any 
politics. It will seek to promote a democratic and cooperative spirit within the community as 
the basis of all action whether individual or collective.
That the paper may be truly representative of the whole community, it will be open to 
every sort  of  suggestion from its  readers  for  improving it  […].  All  those interested in the 
venture are invited to take active part in the publication. 
The present temporary staff has taken the initiative in starting the paper in the belief that 
the common good would be served thereby.558 
Printed below, the camp director’s announcement stressed cooperation and urged compliance with 
rules: 
I  would like to  impress upon every resident  the importance of  accepting his  full  share  of 
responsibility in the operation of the Center. […] There is a big job to be done and everyone 
must do his or her part. 
It  will  be the policy of the management to make this community as self-governing as 
possible. The success of this policy and the happiness and welfare of everyone will depend on 
the cooperation of all concerned.
Only such rules and regulations will be made by the management as are necessary for the 
health, welfare and best interests of all concerned. Strict compliance with those regulations is 
essential.559 
Administrative announcements such as the above usually filled the first  two of the  Totalizer’s ten 
pages. They pertained to visiting policies, roll call regulations, clarifications on scrip book allowances, 
absentee voting information for the state primaries, and disclaimers of persistent rumors, such as the 
pregnancy of 700 women.560 
The greater part of the paper listed succinctly annotated schedules of daily activities. About 
two pages were dedicated to sports and other leisure activities. Recreation and entertainment took up 
another two pages,  minimum, featuring lists on intramural leagues,  movies,  dances,  talent  shows, 
variety shows, and classical concerts. The education section, which took up about one page, included 
announcement on adult classes and the gist of the weekly town hall discussion. Furthermore, each 
issue contained information on central services, such as the opening hours of the hospital, the post 
office, the lost and found bureau, the library, and the schedules of the various church services. 
Apart  from these  essentials,  the  Totalizer featured  miscellaneous  announcements,  such  as 
recent births. (Deaths were not to be reported, the administration explained, because death did not 
“represent  progress.”561)  Some announcements had no information value at  all,  merely serving to 
create a cheerful atmosphere. For instance, the Totalizer reported about a resident who jumped into the 
lake catching duck to win a bet, or about “the spectacle of mothers using adjoining laundry tubs to 
bath  their  shower-shy  but  otherwise  unembarrassed  younger  children,”  or  about  the  “Infield 
558 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 1, May 15, 1942, p. 1. 
559 Ibid., p. 1. 
560 As evacuees worked in all departments, information leaks occurred frequently and served as a basis for rumors. In this 
example, the actual number of pregnancies was 70 instead of 700. 
561 Censorship,  Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, p. 2, JERS: 16:453. There were 64 births and 22 deaths, see 
WCCA: Bulletin No. 12, March 15, 1943, pp. 100-102, or Table 8. 
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Odysseys” of men who got lost after escorting home their girlfriends, or about teary reunions between 
evacuees and their pets.562 
More meaningful were short columns that reflected on camp life. “With the Womenfolk” was 
such a column, giving practical advice on “womanly” issues, for example, how to treat dry skin, how 
to protect against the sun, how to get greasy dishes clean, and how to fight the all-present dust. A 
similar column was “Tips of the Week,” which contains advice of more general nature. Almost all 
these columns follow the same pattern: First, they state the inconveniency of a particular situation. 
Second, selected evacuees tell how they deal with the situation. Third, it is resolved that the situation 
does not really pose a problem. To illustrate this pattern let us look at the article “Problem Children.” 
This  installment  of  “Tips  of  the  Week”  cites  mothers  who  told  from their  experience  of  raising 
children to set an example for other mothers. 
Mrs.  Kiyoshi  Furuzawa  (Issei),  57-5,  Berkeley,  declares  that  the  center’s  recreational  and 
educational programs “keep the children out of mischief.”
Mrs. Giichi Yoshioka, (Nisei), 89-1, Hayward, has a 4-year-old son. Her greatest concern 
is to teach him good manners. Though the boy at first asked many questions about “the paper 
houses with no bathrooms and kitchens,” he seems quite contended now. 
Mrs. Tad Fujita, (Nisei), 2-16, Berkeley, considers bathing her 18-months-old child the 
biggest problem. She declares that there’s not much difference between raising a small child in 
an assembly center and at home.563 
Most polls dealing with Tanforan’s living conditions fit this mold. Their value was less the practical 
advice, which was often missing, than the underlying message: that the problem was not acute and that 
there were many evacuees sharing the very same difficulties. 
Another recurring message, or leitmotif, was betterment: The notion that conditions might be 
bad but that they had improved significantly since induction pervades the weekly “Your Opinion” 
columns as well as any other story on Tanforan’s setup. (Stories about progress were credible because 
living  conditions  had  indeed  improved.)  The  following  article,  titled  “Tanforan  –  a  poor  man’s 
Shangri-la,” illustrates this point. It is worth quoting in full because it is emblematic of the Totalizer’s 
tenor: 
Although there never was any weeping or wailing, it was with some consternation that we took 
at first the muddy roads, the bean diet, the horse stables, and the enforced idleness. 
The situation has changed since then. The roads have been repaired with gravel. The food 
has been improved so much that many are saying it’s better than what they used to eat before 
evacuation. The barracks have become more habitable as the horsey [sic] odor disappeared and 
apartments have been furnished with homemade furniture and curtains.
Then we no longer have the rent and the gas bills to harass us. Neither do we have to meet 
the high wartime living costs. A monthly allowance of scrip books and clothes are provided by 
the Government. 
Little excuse for idleness is afforded by the educational and recreational programs and the 
various available jobs. 
However, the residents do not want to get so much for nothing, and on many occasions has 
a member of the Administration staff commended our willingness to cooperate. In turn, the 
562 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 4, June 6, 1942 p. 3; ibid., Issue 2, May 23, 1942, p. 1; ibid., Issue 6, June 20, 1942, p. 7; 
ibid., Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 3. 
563 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 5, June 13, 1942, p. 7. 
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residents here are given less restrictions than are those in the other centers.564 
Apart from improvements of facilities and food, three more arguments can be discerned supporting the 
author’s  central  claim – a  hyperbole with a  touch of  irony – that  Tanforan resembled an earthly 
paradise. First, the advantage of getting free food and accommodation is emphasized (while keeping 
quiet about the gross inadequacies of housing and feeding). Second, the availability of work is stressed 
(while widespread forced inactivity and low wages are gloss over). Third, evacuees and custodians are 
depicted as equal bargainers (to de-emphasize the roles of prisoners and keepers). It must be added, 
though, that all these statements were essentially true. Even the allegory of equal bargainers quite 
accurately  reflects  the  way  prisoners  and  keepers  interacted  in  everyday  life.  However,  as  the 
parenthesized comments indicate, the editors highlighted only one half of the picture while omitting 
the other. 
What  also  strikes  the  reader  is  the  selection  of  topics  (“agenda  setting”  in  the  jargon  of 
journalism). Issues under discussion range from “Should Nisei girls smoke?”, “Should women marry 
younger men?”, “Should we dress up on Sundays?”, to “What is the Japanese American conception of 
America?”,  “Should  we  open  up  a  second  front  in  Europe  now?”,  “What  qualities  should  a 
wife/husband have?”565 There is not a single question on the evacuation and related issues although 
these topics were ardently argued in private, and even in the public town hall discussions. Since the 
absence of controversial issues stands in contrast to the vivid interest in them, the limited range of 
topics clearly points to self-censorship. 
Also absent in the  Totalizer were accounts of conflicts between prisoners and wardens. The 
only act of rebellion reported was the case of a 17-year-old Nisei who threw a rock against a sentry 
tower.566 The incidence was kept secret for over a week, but eventually the administration was forced 
to let the Totalizer report the case because rumors spread that the Military Police had imprisoned the 
teenager, whereupon a great many of the evacuees grew agitated and demanded the release of their 
fellow inmate. The article cleared up the incident, stating that the boy had apologized immediately and 
had been reprimanded but not punished. Although there occurred a number of similar incidents, none 
of them found entry into the Totalizer.567 
In addition to the promulgation of harmony and normality, the Totalizer featured a number of 
articles that purely served the purpose of raising the evacuees’ morale. Taking up about one page, the 
employment section was such a morale builder. Each column in this section was designed to support 
564 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 9, July 11, 1942, p. 8. 
565 Tanforan Totalizer, Issues 6-11, June 20-July 15, 1942.
566 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 7, June 27, 1942, p. 2. 
567 A second incident – an evacuee threw a stone through a window of an administration building – caused less upheaval. 
The administration asked the house managers to discuss the issue discreetly within their blocks and published a uniform 
announcement to deter evacuees from similar actions. See  Minutes of House Managers’ Meeting,  July 4, 1942, JERS: 
14:510. In addition, there were at least two escape attempts that went by unreported (see Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 
86-87, and chapter 3 of this work). Those exceptions aside, I found no spectacular acts of rebellion. Dissatisfaction was 
normally expressed in strikes and everyday acts of resistance. 
103
evacuee workers by stressing their indispensable value for the common good. It contained statements 
of gratitude addressing residents who labored beyond the call of duty for the community welfare (such 
as daily cleaning the latrines), and interviews with employees, particularly menial workers, who toiled 
away for a meager $8 a month. In addition, each week one professional group was introduced and 
their work routine described. On June 13, for example, inmates read under the heading “Working Girl. 
The Waitress Rises at Dawn:” 
Rising with the cold gray dawn, the waitress dashes down to the mess hall. The time-keeper 
gives her the inevitable greeting, “Look what time it is.” Serving time – she dashes madly 
about with a heavy pitcher in  one hand and a wet  rag in the  other.  The irate  cries of  the 
“customers” assail her from all sides.
“Where is the coffee?”
“What, no sugar?”
“Oh, this again!”
The crowd leaves and she sighs in relief. But that isn’t all. Salad dishes have to be washed. 
She moans woefully as she thinks what the Clorox and the hot water might do to her hands. 
Moreover, the silverware must be polished. 
The same hectic routine goes on 3 times a day, every day. The hard-working girls of the 
mess halls aren’t complaining, but they would appreciate a little more consideration from the 
center residents.568 
Providing rare glimpses into the tense atmosphere of everyday life, the above quotation illustrates the 
need  for  commending those  who worked hard  for  the  community,  as  well  as  the  need  to  foster 
empathy.  The  Totalizer staff  recognized  these  needs,  and  columns such  as  the  above doubtlessly 
played a crucial role in reducing many of the undercurrent tensions.569 It is worth noting that these 
columns took an existing narrative pattern in American society which had become widespread during 
the Depression years of the 1930s: enduring hardship with collective effort to overcome it.570 This 
narrative theme was transposed to the camp experience, though those who promoted it elided, by 
omission, the idea that the camp hardship was created by a prejudiced and frightened society, and that 
it was, as many felt but did not pronounce openly, unnecessary. 
To  further  bolster  the  morale  the  Totalizer featured  short  biographies  of  outstanding 
individuals. A typical example is John Izumi, who worked in Tanforan as principal of the junior high 
school. A mathematics graduate from the University of California he had “temporarily shelved his 
ambitions to be an aircraft designer.”571 Further on we read that John Izumi worked as a free-lance 
automobile salesman, bus-boy captain, waiter, and houseboy. “His best bet now, he thinks, is to return 
568 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 5, June 13, 1942, p. 7. 
569 Confined  to  narrow  space  with  much  time  to  spare,  factionalism,  misunderstandings,  and  petty  conflicts  were 
widespread. This can be inferred from announcements such as: “The police ask that all softball players and spectators try 
to keep their partisan enthusiasm from becoming too heated,” see Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 11, July 18, 1942, p. 2. Another 
article advised male Nisei singles to be respectful to their date’s parents: “Too many Nisei forget this little courtesy,” see 
ibid., Issue 15, August 15, 1942, p. 8. In addition, evacuee diaries are replete with examples of everyday conflicts. See, for 
example, Modell (ed.), Kikuchi Diary, pp. 60, 72, 89, 95, 105, 110-111, 116, 119-120, 133, 139-140, 243-244, Diary, Ben 
Iijima, June 25, 1942, JERS: 17:386-387, ibid., July 8, 1942, JERS: 17:412, Diary, B., July 5, 1942, JERS: 16:189, First  
Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, p. 39, JERS: 16:413, Yoshiko Uchida:  Desert Exile. The Uprooting of a Japanese 
American Family, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1982, p. 96. 
570 See, for example, It Happened One Night (1934), My Man Godfrey (1936), The Grapes of Wrath (1940) or Meet John 
Doe (1941). 
571 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 5. 
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to Hawaii and help his brother to manage a supermarket.”572 Izumi’s vita was emblematic for second 
generation Japanese Americans, being highly qualified but barred from better jobs by the economic 
depression and racial prejudice. (In fact, people like Izumi were in great demand during World War II.) 
Stories such as Izumi’s allowed for identification and raised community pride. Simultaneously, his 
prospect of working in a supermarket betrays his skepticism that after the war his country would be 
more amenable to highly skilled immigrant children of Japanese ethnicity. 
Other biographical sketches have a decidedly patriotic overtone: 
Tatsu J. Ogawa, 46, fought with the famous 91st “Wild West” Division in the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive of World War I. Veteran Ogawa, a sergeant-at-arms of the 91st division association, is 
a member of the American Legion. With him fought Kaytaro Tsukamoto. About 20 legionnaires 
in all are in Tanforan, meeting informally and serving the center in various ways. They are all 
citizens, by birth or through grant of Congress for services rendered in World War I.573 
In  fact,  the display of  patriotism to the United States  was a  major  cornerstone of  the  Totalizer’s 
agenda:  Patriotic  ceremonies  such  as  a  camp-wide  flag  raising  ceremony  on  May  26  and  the 
celebration on Independence Day were covered at length.574 And when 21-year-old Bill Kochiyama 
used a $2,000 inheritance to purchase $1,900 worth of war bonds, “to do my part in the war effort,” as 
he put it, he received due commendation on the Totalizer’s front page.575 Other patriotic acts included 
acclamations for volunteer blood donors,  reports on the collecting of tin cans,  and the storage of 
grease for the production of nitroglycerin – always pointing out that “the Center had an oar in the 
national war effort.”576 
However, some of these patriotic gestures had an ironic overtone. When the government called 
upon American citizens to invest part of their salary in war bonds, several evacuees promptly sent in 
their  paychecks.  The  San  Francisco  Chronicle,  learning  about  paychecks  coming  from the  local 
concentration camp, decided to publish one of the accompanying letters by an evacuee from Tanforan. 
In  a  tit-for-tat  response  the  Totalizer staff  reprinted  the  evacuee’s  letter  from the  San  Francisco 
Chronicle in its section “Quote of the Week.” It ran as follows: 
Dear Mr. Rowell, 
Although 100 per cent of my $3.17 paycheck isn’t very much compared to the 100 per cent of others, 
please enroll me as a member in the “10 Per Cent War Savings Plan” with my first pay check as a  
kitchen worker at the Tanforan Assembly Center. 
572 Ibid., p. 5. 
573 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 6, June 20, 1942, p. 6. 
574 More than half of the evacuees were attracted by these events. Reactions varied. An 18-year-old girl wrote: “As the 
flag was raised […] all the people gathered by the Tanforan Lake were very quiet. A lump came up my throat. The flag 
reached the top of the pole, and after a few seconds of pausing there, it was lowered to stop at half-mast. […] The National 
Anthem was sung by an Oakland girl; and as she sang I watched the Flag. The wind that constantly blows at this center 
furled the Flag and played with it. […] One speaker’s words were very impressive to me, and I shall remember them for a 
long time to come. He reminded us of the soldiers fighting for us at some foreign battle front […] and said that we should 
be grateful to be able to live in the United States, although we are not able to live in our own home.” (Impressions of an 
Evacuee, JERS: 17:340-341.) When the center director addressed the crowd, however, Doris Hayashi noted that, “some 
people gave Davis the raspberry.” Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 11, May 26, 1942, JERS: 17:094. 
575 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 7, June 27, 1942, p. 1. The story was reprinted in the Berkeley Gazette. After Davis learned 
about it, he agreed to increase the page number from six to ten. See Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 156, 167-168. 
576 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 4, June 6, 1942; ibid., Issue 6, June 20, 1942, p. 2; ibid., Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 8. 
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With an unshakable faith in America and its great leaders, I remain, 
Very truly yours, 
George Ishida.
P.S. Please send me my savings stamps and especially my membership button.577  
The Chronicle editorial noted: “Enclosed was a U.S. Treasury check for $3.17. Mr. Ishida’s stamps 
and button should reach him today.”578 Albeit Ishida’s letter was probably meant sincerely, parts of it 
must have sounded rather ironic to his contemporaries; in particular his praise of the “great leaders” 
who, after all, thought it safest to put him behind barbed wire. 
The  column  “The  Copy  Boy  Ses” poses  another  instance  of  ambiguity  which  can  be 
interpreted as subtle criticism of conditions in Tanforan. “The Copy Boy Ses” was a regular feature, 
starting with issue 8. The column was written by Nobby (the pen name of the 14-year-old Albert 
Nabeshima) to whom the editors had given a “carte blanche to comment on anything and anybody in 
the center.”579 As we shall  see later,  the censors  made sure  that  nothing negative  was written on 
Tanforan’s setup. However, the editors reasoned that the censors would consider the comments of a 
14-year-old as naïve and harmless, therefore scrutinize them less closely. Indeed, Nobby’s columns 
escaped expurgation although he frequently alluded to Tanforan’s downsides and shortcomings: 
[On the camp store:] Four out of ten times they haven’t got what I want. […] Now that free 
scrip books have been issued it  is worse. I  calmly wait about 15 minutes to get up to the 
counter and I wait another 15 minutes waiting for my turn. Then when my turn does come, I 
ask him politely what I want. He answers, “Sorry, we are sold out.” Then I silently step out, 
muttering under my breath every swear word I know. But, can you blame me?580 
[On the library:] [The librarians] are all doing a swell job. […] One of the faults of the library 
is too many pictures torn out of the magazines, especially the Esquires. So, fellow Tanforaners, 
remember not to tear any of those […] pictures out of the Esquires. […] And try to return your 
books in time […].581 
[On the mess halls:] One of the things I do every day is to go to the mess hall and eat, or rather 
nibble. The food will last longer. Can you imagine, I got second helpings on beans. How about 
that!! But on the whole, we get very good food.582 
Pointing  with  poignant  humor  at  Tanforan’s  inadequate  setup  became  the  leitmotif  of  Nobby’s 
columns. Moreover, even his fellow inmates were not safe from his pointed – but always merry – 
observations: 
The majority  of  the  waitresses  and waiters  are  very  polite,  but  a  few act  as  if  they  were 
members of Schickelgruber’s storm troopers.583 Fer instance, [sic] last week, I said to a waitress 
(the standard type with a low center of gravity; you know, the kind that if you pushed over 
would bob right up again), “May I have some tea?” (that’s a Japanese chaser). No answer. I 
asked her again. Still no answer. Being a patient man, I screamed at her, “CAN I HAVE SOME 
TEA?” She came up to me and asked, “What can I do for you?” I don’t know what kept me 
from moidering [sic] the gal. 
577 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 11, July 18, 1942, p.6. 
578 San Francisco Chronicle, July 14, 1942. 
579 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 8, July 4, 1942, p. 7. 
580 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 11, July 18, 1942, p. 7. 
581 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 7. 
582 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 12, July 25, 1942, p. 7. 
583 An allusion to Hitler: Adolf Hitler’s father had been baptized as Aloys Schickelgruber.  A bastard of Maria Anna 
Schickelgruber he had his name changed to Hitler, after his stepfather, Johann Georg Hiedler, had died. 
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People should take care of their manners at the table. Fer instance, [sic] there’s a fella in 
one of the mess halls, who rushes in, sits down, grabs the food, gobbles it down, belches and 
rushes out. All that in about 7 minutes. We have given him the name of “Vacuum Cleaner.”584
Not everybody viewed kindly Nobby’s ruminations on the unpleasant aspects of imprisonment, 
notwithstanding his humorous tone. In the following issue the Totalizer reprinted a letter, undersigned 
“some griped readers:” 
A mere 14-year child has no right to tell the girls how and what to wear. What business is it of 
his to comment and insult other people’s figures? Recently, he criticized the mess hall workers. 
After all, they are trying to please everyone. Furthermore, if he doesn’t like beans, he can keep 
it to himself because he is not the only one who doesn’t like beans. Since he has the privilege to 
write a column he should write about more pleasant things. Reading his column leaves a very 
disagreeable taste in our mouth. For the benefit of the paper, the public, and himself, it is our 
wish that he will wise up soon.585 (emphasis added) 
This reaction reveals how tense and sensitive some evacuees were as they tried to put a good face on 
things.  To conjure  up  the  “disagreeable”  reality  struck  them as  unconstructive,  even  cruel.  They 
demanded that  the  daily  deprivations  remained untold,  advocating  self-censorship  as  a  protective 
measure against the harsh reality. 
Despite this, the unruly teenage-editor Nobby decided to steer the course by reverting to irony. 
“Wised up,” apparently, he retorted in the subsequent issue: 
I am sorry to hear there are certain individuals who dislike my analysis of things and people in 
the center, so hereafter I will try not to be so destructive as I have been in the past, for the 
benefit of such sensitive souls.586 
When it came to review a movie, he spread optimism in such a forced manner that he undermined his 
own credibility, mimicking his message: 
I was planning to write about the movie “Spring Parade” that was shown last week. Such as it 
was, the first  showing had many faults such as the seating arrangement,  sound effects and 
lightning. But I am sure they have eliminated those faults. Movies are good for the Center’s 
morale.587 
To sum up, then, mirth pervading the Totalizer served a twofold purpose. On one hand it kept 
morale from ebbing and promoted normality. But it also served as a disguise and a vehicle for subtle 
criticism, allowing the Totalizer staff to report a more truthful picture and to hint at Tanforan’s bleak 
aspects, while bypassing the administration’s censorship. 
In  spite  of  rigorous  self-censorship,  there  were  numerous  instances  when  the  administration  still 
thought it necessary to wield the red pen. All in all, the Totalizer staff recorded 16 “main instances” of 
censorship,588 some of which have been mentioned already in previous chapters. To make sure that the 
paper conformed to the view of Tanforan’s keepers, every article had to go through a longwinded 
procedure of checking and re-checking before it was published: 
584 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 12, July 25, 1942, p. 7. 
585 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 6. 
586 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 14, August 8, 1942, p. 7.
587 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 16, August 22, 1942, p. 7. 
588 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, pp. 1-13, JERS: 16:453-459. 
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Here is how our copy goes now: I get the data (say from Finance Department) and write it up. 
Then it goes to McQueen [the official Army censor] for his O.K. Then it goes to Davis for his 
O.K. Then it goes to the head of the department for his O.K. Then the dummy is set and it gets 
an O.K., again from Davis. Then the stencil is cut and sent up to Davis again for his O.K. Then 
it is sent to the supply room and it sits on the desk of the chief until he gets around to give it the 
final approval and checks to see if it has Davis’ signature on it.589 
The most momentous instance of censorship occurred on Independence Day and resulted in the 
recall  of  more  than  2,000  copies.  Triggering  the  recall  were  statistical  figures  on  Tanforan’s 
employment situation that had been used without knowledge of the employment manager.590 When the 
employment manager found out about the leak, he immediately reported to the camp director. It turned 
out that Frank Davis could not care less about the employment figures (they were included in the re-
released  issue)  but  when  he  took  the  opportunity  to  have  a  closer  read,  he  found  out  that  two 
corrections he made had not been implemented. These two changes were trifles, too: one was a wrong 
date for the issuance of scrip books, and the other minor changes to the wording of the constitution.591 
Nevertheless, the camp manager got “madder than the devil” and had the evacuee editors lined 
up in his office, ordering them to immediately collect all copies of the Totalizer, without stating any 
reason.592 After enduring the harangue the staff rushed off, and with the help of the house captains 
managed to collect 2,400 of the 2,800 copies. As news of the recall spread, everybody hastily read the 
paper to find out what was wrong.593 
The next day Frank Davis came to the Totalizer’s office and apologized: “I’m sorry I blew my 
head off yesterday. You fellows in the newspaper office are doing a swell job.” The  Totalizer staff 
watched puzzled, as both Taro Katayama and Frank Davis ”kept saying they were sorry.”594 Later that 
day the camp director appeared again, being “very condescending and soft spoken,” and asked the 
editors whether they needed anything, whereupon Katayama pointed out that,  speaking of it,  they 
needed a new box to make their heads on the stencil. Again later the head of the service division 
dropped by to help the newspaper staff unstapling the returned issues.595 
After this episode Taro Katayama told his crew that nobody was to tell anybody about the 
589 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 78, 160-161. 
590 The Totalizer staff had liaisons with the different departments which were all staffed by evacuees. Hence, it was easy 
to get  almost any information about the camp. The problem was to get  it  published. In this case the editor  (Charles 
Kikuchi) admitted that he had obtained the information by “devious methods.“ He even anticipated that “Mr. Gunder will 
throw a fit since he doesn’t want to release anything until after completion [of the survey].” The information was ordinary 
enough to pass unnoticed by the Army censor and by the administration’s censors. The employment figures appeared 
unchanged in the censored edition. See Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, p. 5, JERS: 16:455.
591 As it turned out it was by accident, not by intention, that they had not been implemented: The two censors, McQueen 
and Greene, used a black pen to make their corrections. When the Totalizer staff picked up the corrected copy, they found 
that somebody with an unknown handwriting had made some red marks. As the red remarks were somewhat irritating the 
editors thought somebody had just made  “funny red marks.” They observed only the black corrections and went ahead 
publishing the issue. See Diary, Ben Iijima, July 5, 1942, JERS: 17:401. 
592 Diary,  Ben Iijima, July 4, 1942, JERS:  17:397.  George Greene, who was present through the grilling, was more 
sympathetic: He invited Taro Katayama to take a seat and even defended him in spots.
593 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 160.
594 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 5, 1942, JERS: 17:401. 
595 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, pp. 5-8, JERS: 16:455-456; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 160. 
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incident, in particular the fact that Davis had apologized.596 He knew that the director had no intention 
to make his change of heart public, and that rumors of his remorse would undercut his authority and 
most probably put an end to his goodwill. And goodwill, Katayama knew, was all they could hope for 
in their situation.  While the incident demonstrates that the administration took its responsibility as 
press “supervisors” very seriously,  it  also proves  that  the administration was keenly interested in 
keeping the newspaper running, in spite of misunderstandings.
Let  us  now  examine  more  closely  the  causes  of  censorship.  The  absence  of  subversive 
thoughts in the  Totalizer seemed, if anything, to fuel the censors’ suspicion and sensitivity towards 
anything controversial. The most frequent cause calling forth the censors’ intervention was any hint of 
criticism  regarding  the  evacuation.  When  editor-in-chief  Taro  Katayama  urged  his  readers  in  an 
editorial 
not speculate idly and fruitlessly on the special constraints and hardships – and, in many cases, 
the injustices – which the fortunes of the present war have laid on us, 
George Greene put in “seeming” in front of “injustice.” 597 The Totalizer staff tried to get Katayama to 
put quotes around “seeming,” but he argued that this would only make their work more difficult.598 A 
similar  example  can  be  found  in  the  editorial  of  the  next  issue,  in  which  Katayama quoted  the 
following paragraph from the JACL’s Pacific Citizen:599 
What happened to citizen Suzuki and 70,000 other American-born Japanese in the first year of 
America’s war for world freedom is already a chapter in American history. The facts are all 
there.  […]  Only  the  human  side  of  the  picture  remains  to  be  filled  in.  Historians  need 
documentation. The men who will write the human picture of the greatest forced movement of 
people in American history will do so from the personal records of the people themselves. […] 
We hope that citizen Suzuki is keeping record of his experience and his times. 
McQueen, the Army’s censor, crossed out the prophetic editorial and wrote next to it: “Do not use 
this.”600 Since  inmates  were  able  to  read  up  on  U.S.  and  wartime news in  regular  newspapers  – 
Tanforan’s center store carried the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Francisco Examiner, as well as 
the Oakland Tribune – the absence of politics in the Totalizer was not considered a drawback by its 
readership.601 
However,  the  administration’s  suppression  of  information  was  not  confined  to  political 
statements. One article reported about Tanforan’s North Lake which evacuees had transformed from a 
muddy pool into a miniature aquatic park, complete with green lawn and shrubbery, a foot bridge, 
islands, three rock gardens, sand pits, promenades and benches.602 Davis censored parts of the story 
596 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 5, 1942, JERS: 17:402.
597 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 8, July 4, 1942, p. 1. 
598 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, p. 4, JERS: 16:454. 
599 The Pacific Citizen, a bi-weekly newspaper, was established in 1929 by the Japanese American Citizen League. After 
the outbreak of the war it moved its operation from San Francisco to Salt Lake City. 
600 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, pp. 9-10, JERS: 16:457. 
601 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 4, June 6, 1942, p. 5; Diary, Earle T. Yusa, JERS: 17:523-17:530.
602 Mine Okubo: Citizen 13660, New York: Columbia University Press, 31983, pp. 98-100; Diary, Ben Iijima, August 2, 
1942, JERS: 17:433; ibid., JERS: 17:441; Diary, B., p. 68, August 2, 1942, JERS: 16:209.
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because they contained “too many figures.”603 The underlying reason was, presumably, that the camp 
director feared getting accused of wasting Army resources. Although the  Totalizer staff resented the 
abridgement of their First Amendment rights, one editor cogently argued that in this case censorship 
might even be to the advantage of the inmates because it foreclosed denunciations by outside pressure 
groups,  which  would  frown  upon  anything  that  comforted  the  incarcerated.  As  he  put  it:  “The 
information in the hands of some perverted party on the outside might mean not only the finale of this 
lake, but of all such creations of diversion in the future.”604
While the above examples reflect  the administration’s concerns with the internal situation, 
political issues, and outside opinion, some instances of censorship were outright Orwellian: When a 
girl, asked what her prospective husband should be like, stated that she didn’t “mind if he runs around 
a little,” George Greene censored the line because “this is bad for morals.”605 Another time Greene 
made the Totalizer staff eliminate Kotex from the center store items list because “it was not in good 
taste.”606 In the same issue, Greene deleted a statement concerning work in the sugar beet fields (“It’s 
better for us to work hard than to stay here and be idle”) because he “didn’t like the idea that people 
were idle here.” The editors concluded: “We just couldn’t say anything.”607 
Finally,  the  camp  administrators  exercised  censorship  to  minimize  reference  to  Japanese 
culture in the Totalizer. A fine example for this is Charles Kikuchi’s article on the pros and cons of 
kifo.  George Greene, to whom the article was first submitted, inquired about the meaning of  kifo. 
Kikuchi explained that  kifo referred to the Japanese customs of honoring certain working groups by 
collecting cash donations for them. After consulting his boss, Greene stated that the word was not to 
be used because it was Japanese, adding that from now on no Japanese terms were to be used in the 
paper. Kikuchi insisted that certain words had no literal translation but it was to no avail. He noted in 
his diary: “They [are] gradually reaching the point of silliness in the censorship of the camp paper. 
This means we can’t use ‘Nisei’ any more!”608 
The rule that no Japanese words were to be used was the only rule the administration clearly 
stated. The Totalizer staff repeatedly tried to make Frank Davis lay down what he deemed permissible, 
and what not, because the editors preferred a clear-cut censorship policy to arbitrary censorship. The 
issue was brought up during a meeting with the evacuee Advisory Council but Davis made clear that 
there was to be only one rule: “Every information you want to issue you should write it out and have it 
signed by me.”609 In short, Davis rejected a bilateral agreement that would curb his authority. For some 
time the Totalizer staff sent old articles for re-checking to make the censors tired of proof-reading, but 
603 Censorship, Taro Katayama, Charles Kikuchi, et al, p. 12, JERS: 16:458. 
604 Ibid., pp. 12-13, JERS: 16:458-459. 
605 Ibid., p. 3, JERS: 16:454. 
606 Ibid., p. 2, JERS: 16:453. 
607 Ibid., p. 4, JERS: 16:454. 
608 Ibid., p. 10, JERS: 16:457. 
609 Minutes of the Advisory Council, p. 4, July 7, 1942, JERS: 14:399.
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as that delayed the clearance of needed material, they gave up the practice.610 Ultimately, however, the 
administration’s tight grip on the Totalizer did little, if anything, to prevent the evacuees from having 
dissenting thoughts, and from discussing them. Tanforan’s setup – a small compound cramped with 
people  –  made  face-to-face  communication  the  primary  mode  of  disseminating  information  and 
exchanging opinions. Hence, the Totalizer is less a “mirror [of the] whole community life,”611 as the 
Army claimed, but rather a document that explains how the inmates made sense of their captivity. 
Despite numerous clashes with the administration, the evacuee editors did not give up on the Totalizer 
although they contemplated to suspend the paper more than once during its nineteen issues. In the end 
they  agreed that the benefit for their community outweighed their frustrations about administrative 
arbitrariness. That there were still numerous instances of censorship is remarkable because the editors 
exercised rigorous self-censorship. As we have seen, the Totalizer staff avoided topics that could stir 
up arguments, stressed patriotism to the United States, and gave only little space to Japanese activities 
such  as  Bon  Odori and  Sumo.612 As  an  editor  admitted,  “we  paint  a  bright  picture  of  things 
inadvertently.”613 
Surely,  part  of  this  editorial  restraint  must  be  contributed  to  the  administration’s  arbitrary 
censorship. Very often censorship was exercised with no apparent reason, which made the editors 
always feel uneasy about the prospect of their stories. In addition, the editors were well aware that the 
administration would cut down anything controversial.  For example, when during one night shots 
were heard and rumors about an escape spread, the Totalizer staff “did not even attempt to bring the 
story because it would be censored.”614 
However, the editors also actively participated in what Raymond Okamura termed a “semantic 
conspiracy”  of  the  authorities.615 That  is,  evacuees  willingly  perpetuated  the  distortions  of  their 
keepers and repeatedly added their own euphemisms.616 The earlier mentioned letter demanding to 
“write more about pleasant things” points towards the editors’ predicament. On the one hand they did 
not like “the idea [of] putting out a paper all ‘sweet coated’ as if everything is running smoothly.”617 
On the other hand they acknowledged that the Totalizer “does serve a certain purpose in the morale-
610 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 173. 
611 U.S. Army: Final Report, p. 213.
612 The Bon Odori festival for example, which was a major event in camp, received scant attention because the most of 
the Totalizer editors agreed that it was “not a good time to stress Japanese culture,” fearing that Japanese activities would 
fuel the prejudice that they were unassimable. See Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 182. 
613 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 156.
614 Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
615 Raymond  Y.  Okamura:  “The  American  Concentration  Camps:  A Cover-up  Through  Euphemistic  Terminology,” 
Journal of Ethnic Studies Vol. 10 (1982), p. 101.
616 The term “Shangri-la,” for example, was a euphemism introduced in issue 9, p. 8. In fact,  Totalizer columns used a 
more euphemistic vocabulary than administrative announcements. For example, the editors almost always wrote about the 
residents of Tanforan while the administration used evacuees in its bulletins. 
617 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 132.
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building.”618 In  the  end,  the  Totalizer staff  decided  to  portray  a  normal  community because they 
realized that the illusion of normality provided a protective façade that extenuated the harshness of a 
bleak reality. 
Hence, prisoners and keepers shared the goal of promulgating normality and keeping morale 
high. Furthermore, both sides recognized the crucial role of the paper in disseminating information 
and decreasing misunderstandings. Both sides wanted Tanforan to run smoothly, to keep mischief, 
rumors and disorder at the lowest possible level. For many evacuees the orderly conduct was a matter 
of patriotism, for others it  was simply a matter  of dignity.  The administration,  on the other side, 
understood  that  the  evacuees  could  be  administrated  best  when  they  were  content.  Tanforan’s 
custodians had no interest  to “let  ‘em be pinched, hurt,  hungry and dead up against  it,”  as some 
tribunes of popular opinion demanded.619 They knew that a happy camp, even the illusion thereof, was 
a critical means of control. 
618 Ibid., p. 156. 
619 San Francisco Examiner, January 29, 1942. 
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8 – The Struggle for Self-Government
There  is  quite  a  bit  of  undercurrent  restlessness  and 
discontent which might flare up at any moment if given 
half  a  chance.  The recent  election  showed that  people  
were really wanting a chance to open their mouth and 
shoot the works. 
– ANONYMOUS JERS RESEARCHER620 
Ghandi was arrested yesterday in India and T.S. said that  
J.H.  should  lead  the  movement  for  passive  resistance 
here.
– CHARLES KIKUCHI621
Like  almost  every  feature  of  Tanforan,  self-government  was  a  highly  ambiguous  matter.  This 
ambiguity was rooted in the very nature of the evacuation program: The WCCA (and later the WRA) 
deemed some self-governing experience necessary because the premise of relocation was couched in 
terms of “teaching democracy” to these allegedly alien people.622 To introduce some form of self-
government was also feasible because participation by the inmates would make running the camps 
easier, and because the promulgation of self-government served the propaganda effort.  In spite of 
these apparent benefits, however, the Army never authorized real self-government out of fear to lose 
control of the camps. This chapter traces the development of self-government in Tanforan in order to 
elucidate patterns of interaction between custodians and inmates, to discuss factional conflicts, and to 
account for the rise of a community identity. 
Initially, the Army left the issue completely to the Assembly Centers’ discretion; the WCCA’s 
Operation  Manual for  Assembly  Centers  contained  no  regulations  whatsoever  regarding  self-
government.623 In Tanforan, this loophole set the path for a liberal policy: William Lawson, Tanforan’s 
first camp director, declared in the first  Totalizer issue: “It will be the policy of the management to 
make this community as self-governing as possible.”624 On May 5, Lawson invited the house managers 
into his  office and explained that he wanted a  feedback from each part  of the camp. He divided 
Tanforan into five precincts  and asked the house managers to assign one evacuee per district  for 
regular meetings with the administration. Following an informal election among the house managers, 
each precinct determined one representative. Together they formed a temporary council.625 
620 Religion, JERS: 16:277. 
621 John Modell (ed.): The Kikuchi Diary. Chronicle from an American Concentration Camp: The Tanforan Journals of  
Charles Kikuchi, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973, p. 218. 
622 Sandra C. Taylor:  Jewel of the Desert: Japanese American Internment at Topaz, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993, p. 77. 
623 There are some indirect references, though. It is stated, for instance, that the Internal Police was to attend all meetings 
concerned with self-government. See  Wartime Civil  Control Administration:  Concentration Camp U.S.A. Regulations.  
July 18, 1942, San Mateo: Japanese American Curriculum Project, 1973, p. 14 (WCCA: Operation Manual, XXXV). 
624 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 1, May 15, 1942, p. 1. 
625 Selection of the Temporary Council, Earle T. Yusa, JERS: 16:496; Politics, Michio Kunitani, JERS: 16:375. The five 
councilmen were Tad Fujita, Henry Takahashi, Michio Nakajima, Aki Moriwaki, and Kenji Fujii. 
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However, the evacuees disliked the temporary council from the very beginning. A JERS study 
described it as “passive,” and complained that the councilmen “seldom had the nerve to stand up for 
their rights.”626 After one week two members resigned, and the others were under constant criticism 
because they could not bring about results quickly enough. Furthermore, the evacuees objected to the 
arrangement  because  the  temporary  councilmen  had  not  been  directly  elected  by  the  entire 
population.627 
Lawson understood that a representative body was necessary to stabilize relations between the 
administration and the incarcerated.  Therefore,  he asked the evacuees to work out regulations for 
general elections, suggesting that Issei and Nisei should be eligible to vote, while only U.S. citizens 
could be allowed to hold an office.628 
However, after five weeks in office William Lawson was called back to his former position as 
State Administrator of the WPA of Northern California. His resignation as camp director postponed 
the elections because it took over a week until his successor was made known. Finally, on June 4, it 
was announced that his assistant, Frank Davis, was to take his post. The departure of Lawson marked 
a drastic change in leadership. A majority of evacuees regretted to see Lawson go because he had been 
overwhelmingly popular. Those who worked under him described him as a charismatic, practical and 
tactful politician, “mild mannered,  […] with a willing ear to suggestions which made him well-liked 
by both Caucasian and evacuee employees.”629 Frank Davis, in contrast, had the reputation of being a 
“gruff  individual  with  no  showmanship,  nor  desire  for  popularity.”630 Already  as  assistant  camp 
director  he  got  criticized  for  his  uncooperative  attitude  and  for  his  indifference  towards  the 
evacuees.631 Charles Kikuchi called Davis “a poor choice because everyone remarks that he is curt and 
sort of sneers down on the Japanese.”632Another inmate noted after an encounter with Davis: 
He’s about five feet and ten or eleven inches, ruddy and red cheeks, light brown hair, blue eyes, 
fairly rotund around the waist, and was dressed in a tan suit. He had a very amiable face, a very 
tender one – as though he had been born with a silver spoon in his mouth.633
Although Frank Davis temporized the election of a representative Advisory Council, he finally 
agreed to the election regulations which the evacuees and Lawson had already set. On June 6 the 
Tanforan Totalizer announced that on June 16 there was to be the general election of a five-member 
Advisory Council. The right to vote was conferred to all evacuees who were at least 21 years of age, 
while councilmen had to be 25 years of age and citizens of the United States.634
626 The First Month at Tanforan. A Preliminary Report,  Tamotsu Shibutani, Haruo Najima, Tomiko Shibutani, p. 54, 
JERS: 16:420.
627 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 105; Selection of the Temporary Council, Earle T. Yusa, JERS: 16:497-498. 
628 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, pp. 54-55, JERS: 16:420-421; Taylor: Jewel of the Desert, pp. 77-78.
629 While Lawson held one staff meeting every weekday, Davis held only one in his four months as camp director. See 
Administrative Personalities, p. 9, JERS: 16:332. 
630 Administrative Personalities, p. 10, JERS: 16:333. 
631 Ibid., p. 10, JERS: 16:333. 
632 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 107. 
633 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 4, 1942, JERS: 17:402. 
634 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 4, June 6, 1942, p. 1; Politics, Michio Kunitani, JERS: 16:376. 
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No information was given pertaining to the powers of the Advisory Council, but nonetheless 
there  was  widespread  enthusiasm  when  the  definite  date  for  the  general  election  was  finally 
announced. For the Issei this was the first opportunity to vote in the United States, while the Nisei 
could  for  the  first  time  compete  for  positions  of  prestige.  Moreover,  the  majority  of  evacuees 
considered  elections  as  an  opportunity  to  lend  more  authority  to  their  demands.  As  elections 
approached, a JERS study noted that there was a feeling “that the residents ought to fight for their 
rights  and  stop  boot-licking  the  administration  and  begin  demanding  things  that  are  rightfully 
theirs.”635 In this tensed and emotional atmosphere, political and religious groups realigned themselves 
along  issues that were of immediate concern to the incarcerated.636 With some abstraction we can 
distinguish two main currents that emerged in the weeks preceding the election.
One current was headed by a cadre of JACL members. This inner circle of JACLers promoted 
the JACL “party line,” issued by the their headquarters in Salt Lake City, advocating a policy of 
cooperation at all costs and demanding unquestioned subordination to Army authorities. Furthermore, 
they disavowed Japanese culture, including its evidently apolitical customs. Lastly, like the majority of 
Nisei they were super patriotic.637 
By sheer numbers of membership the JACL formed the largest single body in the camp, with 
almost  every  full-aged  Nisei  claiming  membership.638 However  not  everybody who was  a  JACL 
member actively promoted the JACL’s policies. What antagonized many inmates was the JACLers’ 
elitism, particularly their habit to meet secretly among themselves, which lead to the accusation that 
“as  far  as  their  own  practices  go,  there  is  no  semblance  of  democratic  rule  in  the  group.”639 
Furthermore,  an increasing number of Nisei – while sharing the JACLers’ super patriotism to the 
United States and their rejection of Japanese traditions – felt increasingly estranged by the JACL’s 
policy of submissiveness. The following quote is characteristic of the preoccupations many Nisei had 
with the JACL’s hardliners: 
They are still yelping, “We will cooperate,” and they don’t think that the Young Demos or any 
individuals should make an issue over civil  rights at a time like this.  This is an extremely 
shortsighted approach if ever there was one. […] The JACL will probably proclaim “we are 
loyal” and wave the flag and let is go at that.640 
Since  most of the JERS researchers belonged to the leftist faction, almost all sources on the JACL 
leadership are biased, that is, dismissive and disdainful in tone. However, the above-mentioned points 
of criticism were brought up by inmates regardless of political affiliation. 
The  other  main  current  might  be  called,  as  Roger  Daniels  suggested,  the  “left-wing” 
635 Ibid., p. 57, JERS: 16:422.
636 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, pp. 42-44, JERS: 16:414-415. 
637 However, during incarceration their patriotism “consisted largely of supporting flag raising ceremonies and advocating 
the singing of national anthems.” First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, pp. 59-61, JERS: 16:423-424. 
638 Following  the  attack  at  Pearl  Harbor  almost  all  Nisei  that  had  not  registered  so  far  signed  in,  raising  JACL 
membership number to roughly 60,000. 
639 Report on Social Morphology, JERS: 16:149. 
640 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 88.
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opposition.641 Frequently just titled “radicals,” they comprised the whole gamut of non-conservative 
factions, from socialists to progressives and from anarchists to liberals. Politically most active in this 
spectrum were the Young Democrats.642 Though the Young Democrats were not numerous, counting 
maybe fifteen members, they had an influence far beyond their numbers.643 Most were acquainted with 
the writings of Marx and Lenin, but usually they used Marxian concepts to make fun of each other. 
Only a few of the Young Democrats had been Communist Party members, and they were inactive 
because the Party had expelled them for their ethnicity. The diversity of the left opposition group is 
reflected by the newspapers they read:  The New Republic was the most popular text among Young 
Democrats, whereas others preferred  The New Masses or the San Francisco progressive newspaper 
People's World.644 
While the JACL hardliners were seclusive, elitist and homogeneous, the left opposition was 
diverse, including former JACL leaders who were ostracized for speaking up against evacuation. The 
radicals welcomed everybody in their meetings and showered newcomers with attention in order to 
covert them. In at least one respect the leftist faction and JACLers shared common ground: Both were 
pathetically eager to show their loyalty to the United States. However, radicals considered World War 
II not merely as a military struggle between Axis and Allies nations, but as a conflict between fascist 
and democratic powers that existed also within the United States. Consequently, radicals claimed that 
those who had promoted their incarceration adhered to the same principles as Mussolini and his fascist 
followers. Moreover, the left opposition distinguished itself from the JACLers by considering it to be 
their  right  and duty to  question the judgment of Caucasian authorities  whenever they felt  treated 
unjustly.645 
The most  active  members  of  both  groups  were  Nisei,  but  we  shall  see  later  that  the  left 
opposition opened up to political participation by the first generation. What made the first generation 
critical in the election was their numerical superiority: eligible Issei outvoted eligible Nisei 3:1.646 This 
constellation complicated electioneering for both the JACLers and the left opposition because the Issei 
were biased towards both groups. Particularly the left opposition faced prejudices from their parent 
generation: Anti-communist propaganda belonged to the staple of the Japanese immigrant press since 
the Russo-Japanese War, and although the radicals were not communist, some sympathized with leftist 
ideas which made them prone to redbaiting.647 Furthermore, Issei were at odds with the liberals’ life 
style  such  as  their  open-mindedness  on  the  questions  of  sex  relations.  Most  Issei  felt  somewhat 
641 Roger Daniels: Concentration Camps: North America. Japanese in the United States and Canada during World War  
II, Malabar: Krieger Publishing Company, 41993, p. 107. 
642 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 161.
643 While the Young Democrats were founded in Oakland, at least half their members were graduates from the University 
of California at Berkeley. See Taylor: Jewel of the Desert, pp. 76-77. 
644 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, p. 64, JERS: 16:425.
645 Ibid., pp. 61-65, JERS: 16:424-426. 
646 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 6, June 20, 1942, p. 1. 
647 In addition, many Issei felt affiliated to Germany because Prussian culture was popular in Meiji Japan. 
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disconcerted that the leftist faction included women in their ranks.648 In all these respects Issei felt 
stronger affiliated to the more conservative and sedate JACLers. Yet neither was the first generation 
kindly disposed toward the JACL. The Issei had not forgotten the JACL’s complicity with the FBI in 
Issei  arrests  and  suspected  that  the  cooperation  continued in  Tanforan.  Moreover,  the  JACL was 
reserved for U.S. citizens and sought to minimize cultural links with Japan, while Issei remained 
strongly affiliated to the country of their birth and youth. 
Much of the election’s entanglements and turbulence was rooted in the overlapping lines of 
conflict, between first and second generation, and between orthodox JACLers and the leftist coalition. 
Yet these tensions must not be seen only in negative terms, as potential  for strife, but also as an 
opportunity to negotiate, to compromise, and to find common goals. In short, the election forced all 
participants to exchange their views and to rethink their tenets and policies. To illustrate the method 
and manners  of this  competition for votes,  I  will  examine election campaigns in two of the five 
precincts, beginning with a brief survey of the respective candidates. 
After this rather lengthy preamble, let us now turn to precinct 1 where three candidates vied for 
the post of the councilman. I will first give some basic facts on each candidate which most of the 
voters must have known, either from the Totalizer or from hearsay. 34-year-old Toby (Toshimi) Ogawa 
was married and father of one child. He managed a Japanese firm, located on Grant Ave, trading with 
oriental  art  goods and silk materials.  A graduate from the University of California,  Ogawa was a 
member of the Japanese Branch of the YMCA board. He frequently contributed to the JACL treasury 
by membership fees and other donations but took no active role in its politics.649 
Like  Toby  Ogawa,  Tad  Fujita  was  a  married  upper-class  San  Franciscan  in  his  mid-30s, 
earning well above $100 a month (Fujita ran a goldfish store). Both graduated from Berkeley, both 
were  Protestants  and  members  of  the  JACL.  Both  were  listed  as  Republicans  in  the  city  voting 
register.650 Unlike Ogawa, Fujita had been in the temporary council which associated him – probably 
for the worse – with the chaotic conditions during the first month. 
The youngest of the three candidates in precinct 1 was Yoshio Katayama. A single man aged 
28, he claimed to be 32 because he knew that the Issei attached importance to age as an indication of 
experience. Hailing from Orange County, he had been a patent attorney in Washington, D.C, and only 
shortly had come to the Bay Area. He was the only Nisei patent attorney in the entire U.S., a fact he 
frequently pointed out, as he did his high credit rating ($25,000).651 
To provide a forum for candidates to advertise their policy and vie for votes, camp director 
Frank Davis  permitted  each  precinct  to  have  one  election  rally  during  which  Japanese  could  be 
648 The Nikkei community was infused with patriarchism, probably more than the U.S. society at  large.  See Mei T. 
Nakano: Japanese American Women: Three Generations, 1890-1990, Berkeley: Mina Press, 1990, pp. 200-202. 
649 Tanforan Politics, JERS: 16:353-354; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 112. 
650 Tanforan Politics, JERS: 16:354.
651 Tanforan Politics, JERS: 16:355; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 124-125. 
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spoken. In precinct 1 the rally was held the Sunday prior to the election, in a barrack otherwise used as 
Catholic church. 500 persons appeared – there were 779 eligible voters in precinct 1 – filling the 
barrack to its capacity. Most of the people present were Issei. 
A short musical program preceded the meeting and filled the intermissions. Each campaign 
manager gave a  five-minute speech,  followed by the candidates with their  platform speeches.  All 
introductory speeches were in Japanese language. Toby Ogawa spoke entirely in Japanese although he 
had little practice in speaking the language. A spectator remarked that “he spoke very crudely, but 
spoke so earnestly and spoke the thoughts of the people so well that he was well received.”652  He 
talked about the importance of the community spirit and promised to push the administration for better 
food as well as services such as a shoe repair shop and a barber. He said that he understood that “Issei 
wanted more rice, more Japanese food, more freedom in their privileges” and promised to endorse 
these issues. In between Ogawa’s speech, parts of the audience rose on their feet, yelling, clapping, 
and hollering, evidently ordered to do so by his campaign manager.653 
Tad Fujita and Yoshio Katayama spoke some Japanese but finished in English. Fujita’s speech 
ran along the same lines as Ogawa’s but the audience claimed he appeared less convincing. Also, parts 
of his speech went by unheard as a parade of his followers passed by outside, ardently beating on 
garbage cans to attract attention.654 Katayama mainly tried to capitalize on his profession, pointing out 
that as a lawyer only he possessed the legal and professional background to properly represent the 
people.655 
After the speeches, a question period followed, in which the audience was given a chance to 
express its opinions. At first the Issei hesitated, fearing that FBI agents were planted in the audience, 
but after initial hesitations, more and more spoke up.656 They demanded “more work, more speech 
liberty and chance to gather together more.”657 Above all, Issei expressed their disappointment at the 
way their children were treated: 
[The Issei knew they] were aliens, and alien enemies at that, [but] their sons and daughters 
were part of this soil,  and [the Issei had] sacrificed everything they had, their  future, their 
money, their all so that the Nisei would not be treated like they had been treated when they first 
came here. And after [the Nisei’s] deep faith in democracy and the fair treatment and idealism 
of the American people […] the Nisei are treated like animals, torn from their meager income 
source, torn from their property, handicapped in schooling, and enclosed within barbed-wire 
fence.658 
652 Tanforan Politics, JERS: 16:347.
653 Ibid., JERS: 16:349.
654 Ibid., JERS: 16:347. 
655 Ibid., JERS: 16:349. 
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feared that FBI agents, operating undercover in Tanforan, would use any pretext to intern them and separate them from 
their families. According to camp director Davis there were indeed FBI agents in Tanforan, but their main goal was to 
investigate the gambling problem. See Minutes of the Advisory Council, July 17, 1942, JERS: 14:406-407. 
657 Tanforan Politics, JERS: 16:350. 
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On June 17, election day, each evacuee over 21 could vote, using the meal ticket and family 
number  for  verification.659 After  ballots  had  been  counted,  Tad  Fujita  (155  votes)  and  Yoshio 
Katayama (85 votes) were soundly defeated by Toby Ogawa (484 votes). Out of 779 eligible voters, 
55 percent of whom were Issei, 725 had cast their votes for a record turnout of over 93 percent.660 
The campaign in precinct 1 was hardly marked by controversial issues. An evacuee wrote in 
her diary: “How unoriginal the candidates are – they all have the same slogan – ‘Equality and Justice 
for  all  inhabitants.’”661 Indeed, Fujita’s  mantra “To coordinate  the interests  of  the Nisei and Issei 
residents,” did not differ much from Katayama’s, “Unity of Issei and Nisei for the benefit  of the 
Japanese,” or Ogawa’s, “For the people’s welfare.”662 Despite the apolitical nature of the election, 
many Nisei were impressed by their parents’ enthusiasm and democratic spirit. Charles Kikuchi, who 
covered the campaign for the Totalizer, wrote: 
It is unfortunate that they were never given citizenship; they would have made damn good 
citizens, not that they weren’t, in spite of discrimination. […] Even if this particular election 
will not mean too much, it is good for the Issei and a subtle step towards Americanization.663  
In the absence of truly controversial issues most Issei judged the candidates on criteria such as 
age,  marital  status,  sincerity and charisma. Professional standing,  too,  played a role,  but since all 
candidates were respected and successful individuals, the decision was more on character traits.664 
Toby Ogawa knew best  how to take  advantage of  this  by frequently  appearing together  with his 
attractive wife or having his little daughter carry a sign reading “Vote for daddy.”665 Also, employing 
social networks from pre-evacuation days proved an essential advantage. Particularly Ogawa was able 
to  mobilize  a  large  numbers  of  volunteers,  influential  individuals  in  the  Japanese-American 
community, which secured his landslide victory. 
In  precinct  2,  electioneering  was  different  in  character,  taking  a  course  more  along  the 
previously  mentioned  split  between  of  JACL  hardliners  and  the  left  opposition  consisting  of 
progressives and liberals. Two of the three candidates dominated the wrangle. The first candidate who 
collected  50  signatures  and  thus  qualified  for  nomination  was  Henry  Takahashi  of  the  “famous 
Takahashi clan of Berkeley.”666 Aged 38 he was married and had two children. After graduating from 
the University of California in optometry he became an active JACL member. Following December 7, 
he actively promoted the JACL’s policy of unconditional cooperation. He had the reputation of acting 
up as the “savior of the Japanese,” one of many reasons why he was rather unpopular among Japanese 
659 Diary, Doris Hayashi, pp. 69-70, June 16, 1942, JERS: 17:123. 
660 Tanforan Politics, JERS: 16:252; Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 6, June 20, 1942, p. 1.
661 Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 66, June 15, 1942, JERS: 17:121. 
662 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 5, June 13, 1942, p. 1. 
663 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 123. 
664 Precinct 1 housed exclusively family units. As unmarried men were generally not considered true “men,” being a 
husband and father already posed an advantage. For a synopsis of electoral behavior in precinct 1 see Tanforan Politics, 
JERS: 16:348. 
665 Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 66, June 15, 1942, JERS: 17:121. 
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Americans.667 The Berkeley Methodist Episcopal Church disliked him for dropping out of their church 
and founding  the  Berkeley  United  Church.  The  liberals,  too,  held  long-standing  grudges  against 
Takahashi because of his habit to redbait, that is, taunting and ostracizing the more liberal elements in 
the JACL as pro-communist.668 
A caveat must be entered at this point: neither the left-wing opposition nor JACL hardliners 
were free from name-calling. While JACLers such as Takahashi were infamous for redbaiting anyone 
who did not stick to the JACL’s party line, some radicals were not better, contending: 
The  J.A.C.L.  is  fascist,  the  administration  in  Tanforan  is  fascist,  the  Army is  fascist,  the 
pressure groups are fascist; anyone they dislike is fascist. In fact, anyone who speaks Japanese 
may be labeled fascist.669 
Before returning  to  the  main  argument  it  must  be  said,  though,  that  such  excrescence  of  heated 
partisanship was largely confined to debates within the factions. 
As a reaction to the nomination of Henry Takahashi, a pastor from the Oakland United Church 
initiated a “popular front […] to get Takahashi out.”670 Liberals and progressives soon joined the drive 
and eventually convinced the United Church to support  the nomination of Ernest  Satoshi  Iiyama, 
despite his red stigma as a founding member of the Young Democrats. The main argument behind 
Iiyama’s nomination was that as a Kibei he had it easier to attract the Issei’s votes. Indeed, the Issei 
were looking for a candidate who was willing to stand in for their interests because the administration 
had just enforced the Japanese language ban and, in general, pursued a policy that marginalized the 
Issei’s influence in Tanforan.671
Apart from his broad cultural outlook, Iiyama was far from being the ideal candidate in the 
eyes of traditional Issei. He was eight years junior to the 38-year-old Takahashi and unmarried. Born 
in the United States he was educated during the 1920s and early 1930s in Japan where he became 
fluent in Japanese. In Japan he also absorbed leftist ideas, and after his return to the United States he 
began  to  associate  with  the  progressive  movement.  In  1937  he  became  president  of  the  Young 
Democrats club. Before that he had worked several years in white-collar jobs to earn enough money to 
major at the University of California in engineering. Just prior to the evacuation he worked as clerk for 
Alameda County. While Iiyama was best known as a liberal leader, he was also member of the JACL. 
He had promoted voluntary evacuation but opposed the JACL on the issue of forced exclusion.672 
In  order  to  back Iiyama his  supporters  formed a council.  This  council  was  dominated  by 
progressive Issei,  old time anarchists,  and socialists,  some of whom came from Japan as political 
refugees.  Because  most  of  the  time  they  conversed  in  Japanese  the  council  had  to  operate 
667 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 129. 
668 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 95, 97, 100, 130; Politics, Michio Kunitani, JERS: 16:384. Almost every comment I 
found on Henry Takahashi is derogatory. His arrogance seems to be the main reason. Hostility went so far that some 
bachelors said they would attack him if he appeared around their barrack. See ibid. 
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underground.673 Some of the progressive Issei were citizens by virtue of their participation in World 
War I. To this group belonged Guy Uyama, who was made chairmen for Iiyama’s campaign. As and 
American  Legionnaire  Uyama had  taken  an  active  leadership  role  in  the  Japanese  post  in  San 
Francisco and was experienced in democratic procedures and electioneering.674 Uyama secured a list 
of all eligible voters in precinct 2, divided the precinct into wards, and assigned one Issei and one 
Nisei to contact every family unit in order to convince them to vote for Iiyama. 
Another prominent and influential supporter of Iiyama’s was Chiura Obata, art professor at the 
University of California, who was on forced sabbatical. Obata supported Iiyama by drawing posters 
that were then  plastered all over Tanforan, including in toilet bowls. In the course of the election 
candidates  reacted to  their  adversary’s  slogans.  When Takahashi’s  helpers put  up a  poster  saying 
“Don’t switch horses in mid-stream” (Takahashi was in the temporary council) Iiyama’s followers put 
one up saying: “Why vote for a horse? Vote for a man: Iiyama.” In the week prior to the election some 
mess  hall  waiters  even  started  wearing  placards  bearing  candidates’ slogans  until  the  mess  hall 
managers forbade them to do so.675 
The much anticipated rally  in precinct 2 was the first  to be held in Tanforan.  The Young 
Democrats had requested that candidates would hold only short speeches so that the question period 
could be long. Some 500 people crowded the barrack, mostly Issei, including some evacuees from 
other  precincts.  Like  in  precinct  1,  the  speeches  were  rather  undistinguished;  every  candidate 
promised to work for the welfare of all people.676 The follow-up discussion went smoothly until an 
Issei asked why they could only elect and not run for the office. The chairman of the meeting, who had 
been appointed by Takahashi, answered that everyone would do his best to see that the Issei got a fair 
hearing. Still, more interjections followed, in which Issei asked why the administration hesitated to 
give them work, and why they could not hold meetings in Japanese. To the final question Takahashi 
replied that he would “not tolerate the Japanese language from the Issei” and that he would “force 
673 Politics, Michio Kunitani, JERS: 16:383. The progressive Issei were for some reason concentrated in precinct 2. To the 
colorful personalities belonged Hoko Ikeda, who – with his Lenin like appearance, including a goatee – was arguably the 
most picturesque figure in the whole campaign. Prior to evacuation he was a resident of Redwood City and a frequent 
contributor to Doho, the organ of the Japanese Communist Party of the United States. A fellow inmate described him as 
looking “like a typical radical agitator as depicted by the Hearst press. He has a commanding voice and manner and if he 
were able to speak English, he would put Harry Bridges to shame.” (Politics,  Michio Kunitani, JERS: 16:388.) Issei 
anarchist in the Bay Area had a long tradition, reaching back to the formation of the Social Revolutionary Party in 1906. 
Another outstanding individual was Ichiro Akiya who took over the task of winning the Kibei vote. A Kibei himself he 
spoke excellently English and Japanese. He returned to the United States in the early 1930s and belonged to those Kibei 
who were infused with Marxist philosophy in Japan. Marxism was popular among intellectuals in Japan in the 1920s and 
early  1930s,  and many Kibei,  who returned to  America,  continued their  activities in  their  own clubs.  In  fact,  Kibei 
constituted the backbone of the Japanese Communist Party in the United States. In contrast, those Kibei who returned from 
Japan after 1935 tended to be pro-fascist. See ibid., JERS: 16:388-389; Karl G. Yoneda: Ganbatte. Sixty-Year Struggle of a  
Kibei Worker, Los Angeles: Resource Development and Publications, Asian American Studies Center UCLA, 1983; Yuji 
Ichioka: “A Buried Past: Early Issei Socialists and the Japanese Community” Amerasia Journal Vol. 1 (1971), pp. 1-25.  
674 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 130-131.
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676 Iiyama’s slogan was “Equal rights, equal opportunities and equal representation for all,” while Takahashi promised to 
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them to learn English.”677 
At that point the Issei were thoroughly aroused. The chairman decided to adjourn the meeting 
ten minutes early, which some people construed as an abridgement of their freedom of speech, getting 
furious to the point where they wanted to assault the chairmen. When the people began to file out, 
Hoko Ikeda, an Issei with a Lenin-like appearance, jumped on the stairs outside of the building and 
began to talk Japanese. The Nisei were afraid that the Internal Police might show up and that dire 
consequences would follow since nine o’clock was the deadline for all meetings in Tanforan. The 
Issei, however, lingered to listen. Ikeda polemized for several minutes until Iiyama, who was still in 
the barrack, rushed out to stop the harangue. Iiyama addressed the crowd in a calm voice and told the 
people that this kind of demonstration was not conductive to anything but drawing more restrictions 
from the administration. The Issei responded by giving him a rousing cheer. After Iiyama had told 
them to walk home quietly Ikeda stepped up once more and yelled “Iiyama banzai!” Echoing the call 
the crowd began to disperse.678 
In sum, the election in precinct 2 was the most emotional in all of Tanforan. After the ballots 
had been  counted,  Iiyama had won by  a  margin  of  204 votes  to  his  opponent  Takahashi.679 The 
aggressive electioneering had paid off. Some inmates voted for him simply because he was the most 
proactive candidate and had the most spectacular campaign. Others supported Iiyama on the premise 
of his political bent. Most Issei, however, voted for Iiyama because he appeared more truthful and 
convincing than Takahashi in promising to vouch for the Issei’s rights.  Again, as both candidates 
advocated essentially the same goals, it was primarily Iiyama’s charisma – to refer to Max Weber’s 
tripartite classification of authority680 – that won him the election. Finally, Iiyama relied on a strong 
social  network he had built up in pre-evacuation days, while Takahashi was unpopular within the 
Japanese-American community long before evacuation.681 
Despite the emotional character of the campaigns, once the election was over Iiyama struck a 
conciliatory tone: He asked his supporters to abstain from holding a victory parade because he did not 
want to antagonize his opponents and harm the spirit of community that he had promised to promote. 
Iiyama also suggested that members of the temporary council,  among them Tad Fujita and Henry 
Takahashi, ought to be allowed to attend the meetings of the Advisory Council elect. His suggestion 
677 Diary, Doris Hayashi, pp. 64-65, June 14, 1942, JERS: 17:120-121. 
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680 Max Weber defined charismatic authority as power legitimized on the basis of a leader’s exceptional personal qualities 
or the demonstration of extraordinary insight and accomplishment, which inspire loyalty from his followers. Weber saw 
charismatic authority not so much as character traits of the charismatic leader, but as a relationship between the leader and 
his followers. While Iiyama lacked outstanding accomplishments, sources clearly suggest that he was both easy-going and 
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was adopted.682 
In Tanforan as a whole, over 80 percent of the eligible voters turned out.683 Three of the five 
councilmen were  progressives,  two of  them Nisei  and  one  Kibei  (Iiyama).  One more  Kibei  was 
described as “sort of reactionary.” The only councilmen who had run on the JACL ticket came from 
the fifth precinct.684 In the final analysis, political ideology played only a minor role in Tanforan’s 
election. What counted most was the ability to appeal to the whole of the community. Fluency in 
English and Japanese,  integrity,  charisma, and social  networks were the imperative ingredients  to 
success. The political bent was secondary, albeit there was a clear tendency that liberal candidates 
were more successful than conservatives in garnering votes of the Issei. As a result of the election, the 
administration  faced  a  self-confident  council,  willing  to  vouch  for  the  interests  of  all  people. 
Moreover, the council was poised to challenge the administration’s policy of excluding the Issei from 
the organization of the camp, opposing the administration’s view of the Issei as “hopeless cases” and 
as a threat to the Americanization of the Nisei.685 Finally, the election brought the inmates closer 
together. This is not to say that all differences between Issei and Nisei dissolved, but the election 
clearly fostered a greater tolerance on both sides. 
If Frank Davis was upset with the election result he did not show it. During the first meeting of the 
Advisory Council, two days after its election, Davis stated that he was very much pleased with the 
conduct of the election and with the situation in Tanforan as a whole.686 Three days later, on June 22, 
the  Advisory  Council  reconvened to  discuss  how to  proceed.  First  point  on  the  agenda  was  the 
meeting time of the council. Davis suggested that it should convene regularly, “that means […] about 
every two weeks.”687 Tad Fujita argued that once a week would be more appropriate to cope with the 
pile  of  pressing  issues.  Without  awaiting  Davis’ response,  Fujita  proposed  to  vote  on  it,  and  all 
councilmen immediately raised their hands. The protocol states that Fujita’s notion was unanimously 
accepted.688 After  this  ad-hoc  expression  –  and assertion  –  of  the  council’s  will,  the  councilmen 
brought forward the concerns of their voters, which took up the remainder of the meeting. In fact, the 
discussion of everyday matters was to take up the bulk of the council’s time in all sessions. It typically 
ran like this: 
Iiyama: Are Japanese instruments allowed? There has been an instance when one person was 
told to stop.
Ogawa: If the instrument is accompanied by a song?
Davis: Get your Music Department to send out the songs, and we’ll get them translated, and 
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then we’ll use them. […]
Takahashi: When are the barber shops going to start?
Davis: Aren’t they started yet?
Takahashi: And the laundry.
Yamasaki: Are the barbers going to be put on the pay roll? 
Takahashi: What about the equipment?
Davis: We did get a line on dental chairs. There’s no way of getting equipment without getting 
a bid.689
The barrage of questions went on: Had anything been done about the shoe repair business? Who takes 
care of these truck drivers? When are the scrip books to be distributed? Are there allowances for 
councilmen? Anything new on the canteen? When will the Army issue Japanese translations of the 
administration’s bulletins?690 The six pages of typewritten protocol read more like a grilling of the 
camp director. Henceforward Davis brought at least one more Caucasian to the meetings to share the 
pressure of the councilmen. In return, to mount more pressure and to visualize the growth of undone 
business,  the  councilmen started  to  hand  Davis  a  list  with  discussion  points  in  advance  of  each 
meeting.  This list  eventually  featured about  ten points  of  “old business” and some twenty points 
regarding “new business” (see Appendix III).691 
The sheer mass of questions has several ramifications. First, it denotes that the council was 
kept busy regulating everyday needs, which left them little time to press ahead with self-government. 
Second, it demonstrates the council’s dependence on Davis’ agreement on even the most mundane 
issues. Third, it shows that in many issues Davis was handicapped because he needed the approval of 
the WCCA headquarters in San Francisco.692 (However, the requirement of the Army’s consent often 
served Davis as a pretext to dodge issues he felt uncomfortable with.) 
A  closer  look  at  the  Advisory  Council’s  protocols  reveals  that  the  administration  was 
principally opposed to  freedom of speech and freedom of assembly: When the councilmen asked 
Davis  under  which  conditions  people  could  gather  without  being  suspected  of  holding  a  “secret 
meeting,”693 he stated that it depended on “the way they were acting.”694 When asked if it would be 
acceptable when an inmate received visitors in his apartment who had a common interest in poems, 
Davis replied that the person ought to notify his house manager, who would then notify the chief of 
the Internal Police, who in turn would notify his men of the meeting being held.695 Davis’ reluctance to 
loose his grip on the control of social activities was rooted in his underlying belief that the inmates, in 
689 Ibid., JERS: 14:382-383. 
690 Ibid., JERS: 14:383-384.
691 Agenda with Mr. Davis, July 22, 1942, JERS: 14:413. 
692 For example, the administration depended on the Army’s approval regarding the translation of bulletins into Japanese. 
Only bulletins dealing with fire hazard, sanitation and police regulations could be translated without the consent of the 
WCCA headquarters in San Francisco. See Minutes of the Advisory Council, July 22, 1942, JERS: 14:414. 
693 The WCCA’s Center Regulations forbid secret meetings but were unclear as to what “secret” meant: “Evacuees are 
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any  international  problems  are  not  authorized.”  WCCA:  Concentration  Camp  U.S.A.  Regulations,  p.  14  (WCCA: 
Operation Manual, Section XXV). 
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particular the Issei, could not be trusted. However, Davis was receptive to most of the other concerns 
the council brought forward. For instance, when evacuees complained that drunken soldiers bothered 
them, Davis immediately took care of the matter.696 
Apart  from  regulating  every  day  matters,  the  council  mediated  in  conflicts  between  the 
community and the camp administration. One issue that tested the council’s role as negotiator was the 
gambling problem. Especially the Issei,  who had no regular work, gambled, but many Nisei were 
equally prone to getting addicted to the “poker mania.”697 Initially, the camp administration appealed 
to the house managers to prevent gambling – with little results, as many house managers gambled 
themselves. In mid-May, the Internal Police raided the men’s dormitory and took 88 men to the San 
Mateo jail for violating the state gambling laws.698 However, gambling continued, albeit more often 
with  chips  instead  of  money.  As  long as  Jerry  Easterbrooks  headed the  Internal  Police,  his  men 
abstained from cutting down on gambling. Easterbrooks knew that the Issei had few options to pass 
time, and he saw no harm done as long as no trouble arouse.699 Only the wives of those who gambled 
away large sums of money denounced gambling openly. Most of the gamblers claimed they had “lost 
the money” but everybody looked through their excuses. As Ben Iijima observed:  
A lot of this losing money belts is just poppycock. Men lose their money gambling and then 
they say they lost the currency at the showers in explaining the loss to their wives.700 
The situation changed when Easterbrooks was replaced. The new police chief convinced Davis 
that the administration needed to crack down on gambling. On July 17, without giving the councilmen 
advance notice, Davis announced that he had ordered the FBI to investigate the gambling problem and 
intended to take punitive measures: 
I’ve got to take disciplinary action against the [gamblers]. They’ve had their chance. I’ve talked 
to them, you’ve talked to them, I’ve talked to them again. It’s open season on gamblers. We’re 
going to get them. [Listing six names.] You can blame those men who for the rules we are 
going to get now. I should have seized those chips, cards, all along.701
After Davis had finished his accusations, Toby Ogawa defended the Advisory Council by saying that 
the council  never had been informed of the administration’s concern about  gambling.  He assured 
Davis that the councilmen would have taken care of the problem if they had known the administration 
was  bothered  by  it.  After  a  heated  discussion,  Davis  admitted  that  there  “has  been  a 
misunderstanding.”  He agreed that  the  councilmen should  first  have the  opportunity  to  solve  the 
gambling problem themselves, and only if they failed, he would have the FBI intervene and impose 
stricter rules. Ogawa concluded: “Now that we got this information, we can stamp it out.”702 The 
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697 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 5, 1942, JERS: 17:402; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 85. 
698 First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, pp. 74-75, JERS: 16:430-431; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 87.
699 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 98-99. 
700 Diary, Ben Iijima, July 12, 1942, JERS: 17:424. See also Diary, B., July 20, 1942: JERS: 16:200; Field Work Report, 
Mas Wakai, June 8, 1942, JERS: 14:363; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 87, 196, 203; Mine Okubo: Citizen 13660, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 31983, p. 103. 
701 Minutes of the Advisory Council, July 17, 1942, JERS: 14:406-407. 
702 Ibid., JERS: 14:408. 
125
meeting ended with mutual apologies for the misunderstandings, and with promises to cooperate better 
in the future. The following week the councilmen had all the known gamblers come into their session 
and made them “promise to behave or else.”703 Since then gambling did not reappear in any discussion 
with the camp director. 
Another case requiring the arbitration of the council was the case of the 21-year-old Kenji 
Ota,704 an evacuee ambulance driver who was caught speeding (the speed limit in Tanforan was 15 
mph). Ota was on the way to an emergency call when a Caucasian policeman signaled him to stop. 
Ota first ignored him, but on his way back he stopped to face the angered policeman. In the ensuing 
argument the driver accused the officer of “neglecting his duty by sitting around on his ass […].” 
When Davis got to know about the incident he ordered Ota to be transferred to another camp for 
disciplinary reasons. Ota first refused to apologize for speaking out, but he was worried about his 
mother who was seriously ill, and who would be on her own if he left Tanforan. Thus, eventually he 
apologized. However, Davis remained unmoved. To help the Nisei, his friends sent around a petition 
asking for a fair hearing but Davis still refused to budge. Finally, Ota’s friends asked the Advisory 
Council to put in a good word for the driver.705 
Davis’ reluctance to yield to was rather untypical for him. Whatever his rationale, the response 
must have caught the camp director by surprise: The incident spread like a wildfire, and after a week it 
was in everybody’s mouth (although the Totalizer did not report on it). Doris Hayashi, for example, 
reflected on the event in her diary: 
It’s  really  aggravating  when  the  officials  lose  their  tempers  so  easily  and  won’t  take  any 
criticism  […].  Of  course,  [Ota]  was  very  “sassy”  but  the  administration  shouldn’t  judge 
immediately. (After all, this isn’t the army.)706 (emphasis added)
The Berkeley YWCA board discussed the issue in their weekly gabfest: 
First of all, we discussed the limitations of the administration here […]. What aggravates us 
most is the fact that a number of officials take criticisms, and remarks personally, and extend it 
on to the official records – that is, if they don’t like someone, or have some disagreement with 
them, they put them on the black list and either refuse to give them further employment (as the 
employment director), or to give them any further concessions. We discussed the case of the 
ambulance  driver  who  was  fired  for  “insolence,  insubordination,  and  derogatory  remarks 
against the administration.” These remarks were to follow him to relocation. […] All he said 
was that this was a “dirty place,” and that there was a lot of red tape – so that he didn’t mind 
leaving. Even a comment made unthinkingly is considered as incriminating evidence, and a 
person is not given a fair hearing, or given another chance. Moreover, they don’t seem to stand 
for any comments etc. They seem to delight in gloating over the fact that we are under military 
control, and that they themselves can’t be sued by us.707 
By the time the matter was brought before Davis, the incident had gained symbolic prominence. The 
case of the outspoken ambulance driver epitomized for many evacuees the little insults and injustices 
703 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 207. 
704 The name has been changed as the documents regarding the case are confidential and names cannot be made public 
until 2015. 
705 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 194-195.
706 Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 163, July 16, 1942, JERS: 17:171. 
707 Discussions, Doris Hayashi, p. 32, July 28, 1942, 16:259. 
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they experienced daily. The resulting discontent surely had some effect on the camp director when the 
councilmen confronted him on the issue. The council urged Davis not to ship the ambulance driver to 
another camp. Chairman Toby Ogawa apologized for Ota’s behavior and stressed that the driver had 
apologized to the policeman. Although at first Davis gave himself stubborn, eventually a compromise 
was reached: Ota was not allowed to drive any more, but he could stay in Tanforan, and he was not 
blacklisted either. Further, Davis also guaranteed that no case histories were to be sent to the WRA.708 
Ota’s  case  and the  gambling  problem demonstrate  that  the  Advisory  Council  successfully 
asserted evacuee interest and, in general, strived for autonomy from administrative rule. In addition, 
the council sorted out numerous smaller conflicts and coordinated efforts to improve Tanforan’s setup: 
It helped to settle the maintenance strike and clarified various camp regulations. It cooperated with the 
Internal Police and house managers on regulations such as phonograph record collecting. It pushed 
through the laundry service, as well as the radio and watch repairing service. A shoe repair shop was 
opened, as well as a barbershop. It arranged funeral services and had streetlights put up. Last but not 
least, it established the Personal Aid Bureau to assist the Issei in personal matters, mainly by helping 
them with their correspondence to the outside.709 
Apart from mediating and serving the physical needs of the inmates, the Advisory Council sought to 
extend self-government. To understand how self-government developed, we need to consider events 
that took place before the election of the Advisory Council. On May 31, the chief of the Reception 
Center Division (a section of the WCCA) sent a memorandum to the director of each Assembly Center 
marked “confidential,” in which he expressed “grave concern” that some councils were attempting to 
develop real self-government. He stated: “It has never been my intention that these representatives 
should function in any way other than strictly advisory.” He warned the camp directors to guard 
against attempts by councils to take over administrative or directorate responsibility.710 
In spite of this memorandum, Davis stated during the first Advisory Council meeting, on June 
19, that the council was “to establish a form of representative government in this center.”711 Hence, 
although Davis knew that the Army was against self-government, he supported the formation of an 
evacuee council, knowing that the notion of self-government was critical to win the cooperation of the 
camp population. We must assume, however, that Davis was aware from the very beginning that a 
representative evacuee government would only be privileged to advise him on innocuous topics. 
Tanforan’s inmates, who did not know of the memorandum, enthusiastically tackled the task to 
set  up their  own government.  In the weeks following the election of  the Advisory Council,  each 
councilman conducted meetings in his precinct in order to select a committee of 10. Together they 
708 Minutes of the Advisory Council, July 22, 1942, JERS: 14:418; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 194-195. 
709 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 3, May 30, 1942, p. 1; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 206-207. 
710 R. L. Nicholson to Assembly Center Directors, May 31, 1942, RG 338. As cited by Taylor: Jewel of the Desert, p. 79. 
711 Minutes of the Advisory Council, June 19, 1942, JERS: 14:380. 
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formed a Constitutional Committee of 50.712 (All sessions were supervised by the Internal Police “to 
see that nothing subversive was said.”713) This committee drafted a constitution which was confirmed 
by Davis on July 13. The constitution enfranchised everyone aged twenty-one and older and provided 
for a Legislative Congress to be composed of members elected from each precinct on the basis of one 
assemblyman  for  each  200  residents.  The  Advisory  Council  took  over  the  role  of  the  executive 
branch.714 By July 25, a total of 80 candidates had been nominated for the 38 offices in Tanforan’s 
Legislative Congress. The election was scheduled for July 28.715 
The election of the Legislative Congress marked the climax of political activities, but it also a 
turning point. Starting on July 1, the WCCA issued a series of regulations restricting self-government. 
First came the announcement that only citizens would be allowed to vote or hold any elective office. 
In addition, the minimum age for candidates was raised to 23.716 Both directives were implemented 
although  they  contradicted  Tanforan’s  constitution.  As  the  evacuees  realized  that  the  authorities 
considered  Tanforan’s  constitution  null  and  void,  many  of  them  questioned  the  meaning  of  the 
election. Only after much prodding by the house managers, 69 percent of the eligible voters turned 
out, reflecting a visible drop in political interest.717 The Tanforan Totalizer promptly editorialized on 
the “general apathy of the center’s voting element:”
The temporariness of our stay here does not obviate the very real need we face to become more 
familiar with the elective process. What our assembly center may or may not be able to do 
during  our  residence  is  beside  the  point.  It  is  the  principle  of  franchise  involved  that  is 
important. And it is by this principle that much of our future in the relocation areas will be 
guided. Let us show less civil lethargy in taking advantage of our absentee voting rights in the 
coming state primaries.718 
On the same day, August 1,  the WCCA issued a revision of its  Center Regulations which 
contained a paragraph stating that  “[n]o type of  self-government  organization is  authorized in  an 
assembly center.”719 To preserve the semblance of evacuee participation, the WCCA prescribed rules 
for the election of an advisory panel. However, the election procedure made clear that the panel had 
the  sole  purpose  of  serving  as  the  administration’s  mouthpiece:  The  evacuees  were  required  to 
nominate 27 persons, from which the camp director was to select a 9-man advisory panel of Nisei and 
English-speaking Issei, in proportion to the number of Nisei and Issei in the Assembly Center. As each 
712 The Constitutional Committee of 50 was dominated by Issei, which demonstrates that at the grass-roots level they 
remained influential. See Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 153.
713 Diary, B., p. 20, June 27, 1942, JERS: 16:184; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 153. According to the WCCA’s Center 
Regulations the  Internal  Police  was  “required  to  attend  all  meetings  concerned  with  self-government.”  WCCA: 
Concentration Camp U.S.A. Regulations, p. 14. 
714 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 8, July 4, 1942, pp. 1, 4. 
715 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 12, July 25, 1942, p. 1. 
716 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 11, July 18, 1942, p. 1. 
717 Women outvoted men 51 percent to 49 percent but only one woman was elected into the 38-member congress. Some 
Issei mistook the election barometer for a weather indicator and wondered that it only registered 60 at a rather warmish 
day. Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 1; Diary, B., p. 60, July 28, 1942, JERS 16:205. 
718 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 6. 
719 WCCA Operation Manual, Supplement No. 8, Colonel Bendetsen, August 1, 1942, JERS: 12:303-306; Diary, Doris 
Hayashi, p. 207, July 27, 1942, JERS 17:193. 
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candidate needed 50 signatures and every evacuee could sign only once, at least 1350 evacuees had to 
sign petitions just to nominate 27 candidates. Furthermore, the panel could only meet at the camp 
director’s calling, and it was explicitly indicated that it was to act in a purely advisory capacity.720 In a 
letter from August 3, Davis informed the Advisory Council (now acting as Executive Council) of its 
abolishment. It reads: 
In accordance with supplement 8 to the WCCA Operations Manual of the Western Defense 
Command and the Fourth Army, WCCA, dated August 1, 1942, and received in this office 
August 3, 1942, the center Executive Council and the Center Congress as well as any and all 
other activities of the self-governing organization in this center is hereby declared dissolved. 
[…] The employment of all assigned evacuee employees in this center will be terminated as of 
the close of business today.721 
In practice, there never was real self-government in Tanforan. Davis constrained the council to 
administering the day-to-day concerns of the inmates and to advising him on innocuous topics such as 
recreation, education, religion, health and sanitation. The council was never permitted to sit in the 
meetings of the administration, and it was technically subservient to the administration.722 Yet this had 
been a compromise the evacuees were willing to work with because they had the freedom to negotiate 
the degree for self-government. The WCCA’s advisory panel, however, was simply a farce. It was not 
representative of the population, and it lacked even the pretense of power. The Totalizer, ever eager to 
appease, commented on the abolishment in its final issue:
In [August], self-government came to the end of its never too sure course. The Army order of 
August 3, dissolving all assembly center self-government bodies, came as a coup de grace to 
waning political interests.723 
Privately,  however,  many evacuees reacted embittered.724 The house managers,  who had played a 
pivotal role in the mobilization of voters during the previous two elections, refused to promote the 
advisory panel election, considering them a sham. Instead, they boycotted them: 
The general  opinion […] was that  the whole thing was a joke and an insult  to the [house 
managers]. So in making mess hall announcements, they plan to read it hurriedly in English 
only and then have quietly spreading the word around that it doesn’t mean a thing.725 
On August 19, three days before the scheduled election, only two candidates had handed in their 
nomination. This left Davis no choice but to cancel the elections.726 On August 22, a one-liner in the 
Tanforan Totalizer made his decision public.727 
The realization that self-government, limited as it was, had been thwarted, had come gradually, 
by a steady increase of restrictive measures, not as a shock. This was one reason why little protest 
720 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 15, August 15, 1942, p. 1; WCCA Operation Manual, Supplement No. 8, JERS 12:303-306; 
Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 216-217. 
721 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 206. 
722 As Sandra Taylor put it, “the center was a company shop, halfway between a company union and a prison.” Taylor: 
Jewel of the Desert, p. 79. 
723 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 19.
724 Diary, B., p. 69, August 4, 1942, JERS: 16:210; Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 206. 
725 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 217-218. 
726 Ibid., p. 230; Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 19.
727 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 16, August 22, 1942, p. 1. 
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materialized. The other reason was that the interest in self-government had indeed abated, caused by 
growing evidence at the end of August that relocation was near. The inmates became increasingly 
occupied with the upcoming move, and those who resented the Army’s order, resolved to postpone 
their resentment and fight it out later: 
J.H. was of the opinion that we should put up a fight now, but the others told him that he would 
only be jeopardizing his chances by making a “big noise” here when we were only going to be 
here for another month or so anyway.728 
That the evacuees retained their spirit of resistance is demonstrated by the following episode: 
On September 9, 1942, an advance work group of 214 evacuees left Tanforan for the Topaz Relocation 
Camp to arrange mess facilities.729 After only four days they went on strike, refusing to work for the 
Caucasian chief  stewards,  whom they  described as  arbitrary and dictatorial.  The kitchen  workers 
presented to Topaz’ director a plan that would turn over the management of the kitchens and mess 
halls to the evacuees. The director backed this plan, rebuked the Caucasian stewards, and appointed an 
evacuee steward as liaison between the administration and the chief cooks.730 In many respects this 
incident posed a repetition of events that occurred during the first weeks in Tanforan, denoting that 
evacuees were not willing to be contended with less autonomy than they had gained in Tanforan. 
Speculations  about  the  transfer  to  a  Relocation  Camp started  the  day  the  first  evacuees  entered 
Tanforan. In the beginning, expectations lacked factual basis and reflected the optimism or pessimism 
of the respective individual.731 Ben Iijima, for example, imagined that Tule Lake resembled an idyllic 
pioneer camp, until he learned that the Relocation Camp was actually a desert-like place: “That kinda 
destroyed  all  my  fondest  dreams  of  going  swimming  and  the  anticipation  of  going  to  a  place 
resembling a wooden glen.”732 As more details became known, utopian visions turned dystopian: 
We also read a letter from a resident from Poston who said that the weather (wind and dust, and 
heat) is just terrible. Everyone is just too tired to work, eat, or sleep; everything is dusty and 
hot;  appetites  are  lost;  scorpions,  rattlesnakes,  etc.  are  numerous.  Then washing  and other 
facilities are terrible. […] People faint in the mess halls, latrines, on the road, and everywhere. 
Many people die from the heat.733 
By the end of August, however, evacuees had a fairly precise idea of what Relocation Camps typically 
looked like – that they differed from Tanforan mainly with respect to climatic conditions, which were 
much  more  extreme  in  Relocation  Camps.  While  some people  felt  guarded  optimism,  they  also 
realized that they had become attached to Tanforan. As Charles Kikuchi observed: 
People have arrived at the point where they like it here and would not mind if they stayed on 
indefinitely without moving on to a relocation area. Social barriers have also broken down and 
people are on a much more equal footing. Money and former position do not mean so much as 
728 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 218. 
729 WCCA: Bulletin No. 12, March 15, 1943, p. 102
730 Norman R. Jackman: “Collective Protests in Relocation Centers,” The American Journal of Sociology Vol. 63 (1957), 
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they did on the outside.734
Notwithstanding  rumors  that  Tanforan  would  become  a  permanent  camp,  the  wartime 
evacuation and incarceration of Japanese Americans moved to its second stage. On September 5, the 
second inspection for contraband signaled the evacuees that the move was imminent. On September 9, 
the exodus began as the first major group left Tanforan.735 Yoshiko Uchida remembered:
[Part of the camp] was fenced off to provide a place for baggage inspection before the people 
boarded a train that was pulled up to a siding at the edge of camp. The departure had been 
times  for  dinner  hour  so  the  departing  group  could  slip  away  without  creating  a  major 
commotion.736 
However, most people rushed through supper and hurried back to the barricade to say goodbye to their 
friends. The head gardener of Tanforan appeared with a wheelbarrow full of flowers and gave out 
bouquets to anyone who could reach out a hand through the barricade. Several hundred evacuees had 
gathered to watch the proceedings. They were temporarily dispersed when the siren signaled the 6:30 
p.m. head count, but the minute the count was over, everybody rushed back to give their friends a 
rousing send-off. Some of the residents climbed to the stable roofs, holding aloft huge bon voyage 
signs, while others waved goodbye, to make sure that the last impression of Tanforan was a fond one. 
Armed guards, lined up along the train and on watching from sentry towers, closely scrutinized the 
scene.737 
Every time a group of evacuees left Tanforan a similar celebration was staged. Those departing 
were  hailed  and  hoorayed like  pioneers  who embarked  upon  a  journey to  an  unknown territory, 
although, in fact, they were prisoners shipped from one concentration camp to the next. The farewell 
scenes are particularly remarkable because they illustrate that in the five months of imprisonment the 
community had undergone a fundamental change. When the Japanese Americans were first evacuated, 
anxiety and angst predominated. Now, after five months of incarceration in Tanforan, the community 
had not only grown together, but had also grown more self-confident. Despite the shock of having lost 
everything, possessions and freedom, they had not lost their spirit. They had endured the first stage of 
mass incarceration with dignity, stoic composure, resilience and patience – in short, by sticking to 
same values that had sustained them all their lives. These values represented a blend of Japanese and 
American virtues, and they were to serve them well in the future course of their incarceration. 
734 Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 199, 203-204, 249. See also Diary, Ben Iijima, August 29, 1942, JERS: 17:476-477. 
735 The last group of evacuees, 355 people, left Tanforan on Wednesday, October 13. 7,673 of the 7,824 evacuees were 
shipped to the Topaz Relocation Camp in central Utah. See WCCA: Bulletin No. 12, March 15, 1943, p. 103. 
736 Yoshiko Uchida:  Desert Exile. The Uprooting of a Japanese American Family,  Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1982, p. 100. 
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Conclusions
I still hope that yesterday becomes better.
– CHARLIE BROWN738
Let us now return to the overarching question of this study: to what extent do the findings of the ethnic 
perspective of resistance hold true for the Tanforan Assembly Center.739 First of all, our study concurs 
with the findings of post-colonial historians, insofar as it clearly showed that resistance against the 
keepers persisted throughout detention, thereby refuting the stereotype of the Japanese Americans as 
“defenseless, dependent, and abiding victims of circumstance.”740 
Furthermore,  the  hypothesis  that  resistance  was  “continuous  and  purposeful”  has  been 
confirmed  as  well.741 With  respect  to  continuity,  the  first  two  chapters,  which  placed  the  camp 
experience within the wider context of anti-Orientalism, demonstrated that resistance in Tanforan had 
roots reaching back  to  the  daily  struggle for  survival  in  a  racist  American  West.  Further,  I  have 
adduced evidence for  a  continuum of  resistance  within Tanforan,  uncovering substantial  evidence 
proving that acts of resistance were common and interrelated. Finally, the Topaz kitchen worker strike 
has shown that the spirit of resistance was even carried over to the Topaz Relocation Camp. With 
regard to the purposefulness of resistance, I demonstrated – by providing a holistic view of the camp 
experience – that resistance represented a conscious act of asserting one’s interests. Be it housing, 
food, sanitation, arbitrary treatment, blacklisting, incompetence of white supervisors, or limitations of 
the freedom of assembly – protests were always related to specific issues. For each act of resistance 
there was a cause. With the exception of two stone-throwing incidents there were no documented acts 
of arbitrary violence rooted in anger and resentment. 
Having ascertained that there was a clearly discernable causation, it logically follows to ask 
what exactly caused resistance. The ethnic perspective holds that culture and ethnicity were the crucial 
factors  for  causing  resistance;  analyzing  resistance  in  the  WRA Relocation  Camps,  post-colonial 
historians  have  found that  the  main mobilizer  for  resistance  was the  WRA’s attempt  to  suppress 
Japanese cultural values, which was most visible in the discrimination against the Issei. In short, the 
ethnic  perspective  demonstrated  that  resistance  in  Relocation  Camps,  in  particular  mass  protests, 
originated primarily in the oppression of Japanese ethnic identity. 742
738 “Ich hoffe immer noch, daß Gestern besser wird.” As quoted by Jörn Rüsen:  Kann Gestern besser werden? Essays 
zum Bedenken der Geschichte, Berlin: Kadmos, 2002, p. 21. 
739 As noted in my introduction, there exists a number of synonyms for the term ethnic  perspective, most importantly 
post-colonial and cultural perspective. They are henceforth used interchangeably. 
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741 Gary Y. Okihiro: “Japanese Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation,” Amerasia Journal Vol. 1 
(1973), p. 22. 
742 Gary Y. Okihiro: “Japanese Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation,” Amerasia Journal Vol. 1 
(1973), pp. 20-34; Gary Y. Okihiro: “Religion and Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps,” Phylon Vol. 45 (1984), 
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In Tanforan, by contrast, these measures were far less intrusive. This has two reasons. First, the 
Army considered the  maintenance of  evacuees its  primary task and saw no need,  given the brief 
duration of  the Assembly Center  phase,  to introduce comprehensive “Americanization” programs. 
Regulations aiming to suppress the “Japaneseness” of inmates were merely byproducts of the WCCA’s 
security  policy,  a  policy  that  was  based  upon  deep  fears  of  the  Japanese  as  inscrutable  and 
unassimilable  aliens.  Second,  and  probably  more  importantly,  the  administration  executed  the 
WCCA’s discriminatory policies only halfheartedly. For instance, the Army banned Japanese language 
from mass meetings, but Tanforan’s administrators interpreted the rule leniently and made several 
exceptions. Also, English language classes and Americanization seminars existed, but so did ikebana 
and  origami classes.  Issei  were  barred  from  becoming  councilmen,  but  they  were  able  to  elect 
representatives who strongly advocated their interests. (Moreover, the abolishment of self-government 
after  only  two  months  annulled  the  Nisei’s  privileges.)  Perhaps  most  importantly,  former  Issei 
community leaders continued to be accepted and influential in their function as house managers who 
formed Tanforan’s unofficial government. In sum, although the administration privileged the Nisei and 
sought to minimize Japanese influence,  we cannot  speak of a  systematic  suppression of Japanese 
traditions.  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  was  no  discrimination  against  those  who expressed  their 
affiliation to Japanese culture, but these measures were not so grave that they were perceived as a 
serious threat to Japanese ethnic identity. 
If  there  was  no  threat  to  Japanese  ethnicity,  what  was  it  then  that  caused  resistance?  As 
indicated above, evacuee resistance was mobilized by administrative incompetence and arbitrariness, 
by bureaucratic procedures, and by measures that cut into their already limited freedoms. In brief, 
resistance was directed against the arbitrariness and unreason of a bureaucratic apparatus, or rather 
those  representatives  who  subordinate  their  better  judgment  to  this  bureaucracy.  This  was  the 
overarching cause for most acts of resistance in Tanforan. 
As my study has demonstrated, resistance was not simply a matter of course. The premise for 
resistance  rooted  in  disobedience  to  irrational  authority  was  the  realization  that  their  Caucasian 
keepers were not wise white men, but fallible supervisors, in some cases utterly incompetent. This 
realization did not yet exist at the outset of incarceration. One reason why it grew was that many 
inmates became aware that they were morally and intellectually superior to their keepers. Eventually 
the inmates became convinced that submission to impaired judgments of irrational authorities helped 
neither the United States nor their own situation. Related to this insight was a growing awareness that 
resistance and patriotism were not antagonistic. Every Nisei had learned in school that the United 
States was born out of an act of disobedience, in the rebellion against Great Britain. This episode was 
doubtlessly repeated in history and Americanization classes taught at Tanforan’s makeshift schools. 
Moreover,  the idea that patriotism and disobedience to irrational authorities were compatible, that 
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together they formed a cornerstone of a stable democracy, was developed and spread in the daily 
interaction between prisoners and keepers, and in discourses within the community. And as this insight 
grew,  so  did  protests.  The  spiraling  of  protests  also  suggests  that  the  poor  conditions  were  the 
originating  cause  of  the  protests,  which  then  took  on  a  life  on  their  own  even  after  conditions 
improved. 
As  a  final  remark  on  causation,  I  should  stress  the  humanistic  dimension  of  resistance. 
Resistance against the unreason of a bureaucratic apparatus – or in Erich Fromm’s words, against 
“irrational authority” – was not a matter of culture or ideology. Rather, as Fromm posits, it is rooted in 
the  “humanistic  conscience,”  which  is  based  on  “an  intuitive  knowledge  of  what  is  human  and 
inhuman, what is conducive of life and what is destructive of life.”743 The increase of resistance in 
Tanforan, then, is a classical example for the revival of the humanistic conscience. 
Having dealt with the causes of resistance, it follows logically to ask for its  goals and ends. 
The primary goal was without doubt more self-determination and freedom from administrative rule. 
This  has  been convincingly  attested.  More  pertinently,  however,  are  the questions  what  were  the 
strategies and  means to  achieve  these  ends.  As  with  respect  to  Relocation  Camps,  post-colonial 
historians  have  demonstrated  that  inmates  resisted  by moving closer  together  and  simultaneously 
revitalizing Japanese values and traditions. In other words, Japanese Americans expressed resistance 
by displaying group solidarity and returning to their Japanese cultural heritage. In the long run, this 
strategy transformed the communities profoundly, turning Relocation Camps into Japan towns whose 
“most salient community characteristics were group solidarity and the predominance of elements of 
Japanese culture.”744 In Tanforan, too, I have diagnosed an increase in group solidarity and a new 
community sense. However, this sense of community was not paralleled by an upsurge of the ethnic 
consciousness.  But  what,  then,  welded  the community  together,  and how did Tanforan’s  resisters 
express their protest, if not through the assertion of their Japanese ethnicity? 
Our synopsis of every day life in Tanforan has demonstrated that the community was welded 
together because the incarceration experience opened up the Issei’s and Nisei’s cultural horizon. In 
Tanforan’s cramped confines the two generations discovered common ground, while simultaneously 
growing more tolerant of differences. In short, the community spirit arose from a greater catholicity of 
both pro-Japanese  and pro-American inmates.  The primary  institution for  this  process  of  cultural 
harmonization was the family.745 Through the close contact with their children, the Issei developed 
more sympathy for the American habits of their children while, in return, Nisei adopted some of their 
parents’ customs.  Hence,  while  in  Relocation  Camps  resistance  was  inextricably  linked  to  the 
formation of two culturally distinctive camps, in Tanforan there was no clear divide. On the level of 
743 Erich Fromm: On Disobedience and Other Essays, New York: The Seabury Press, 1981, p. 19. 
744 Hansen & Hacker: The Manzanar Riot, p. 142. 
745 The revival of the family as the basic unit of society, as opposed to the stress of individualism in American culture, 
was probably the most “Japanese” feature of Tanforan. 
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the  individual  there  arose a  hybrid identity,  which  was  reflected  on  the  community  level  by  a 
development towards a multicultural society.746 Indeed, this development can be seen as a portent of 
the paradigmatic shift from the melting pot to the multicultural society. 
This has deep ramifications for our notion of resistance. In Tanforan, resistance was not a 
question of cultural affiliation. Although in the beginning it was indeed mostly pro-Japanese Issei who 
protested against administrative intrusion and mismanagement, it did not take long until they were 
joined by a great many ardently pro-American Nisei. Evidence pertaining to Tanforan clearly suggests 
that resistance was carried out likewise by Japanese  and American citizens,  regardless of cultural 
affiliation. Both shared the goal of attaining more freedom from administrative rule. Resistance united 
the  inmates  rather  than  dividing  them,  as  was  eminently  apparent  in  the  movement  for  self-
government, which resulted in the most unlikely alliance between anarchist, liberal and traditionalist 
forces. 
Hence,  our  study of  Tanforan  partly  concurs  with  and partly  rejects  the  findings  of  post-
colonial historians. What has been confirmed is that there was no ideological divide (i.e. between pro-
democratic and pro-fascist forces) when it came to resistance. Yet our findings refute the verdict that 
culture was the touchstone for resistance. Of course there was some discrimination against the first 
generation in Tanforan,  and sure enough, this  promoted solidarity and unity among the evacuees. 
However,  it  caused no cultural realignment,  no significant upsurge of Japanese ethnicity.  Cultural 
diversity remained a salient feature of Tanforan, and the inmates developed a sense of community 
based  on  greater  mutual  understanding  and  the  struggle  against  a  common  “enemy,”  the 
administration. Accordingly, resistance was neither in a “Japanese spirit” nor in an “American spirit.” 
Resistance was carried out by those who preferred rice and those who liked potatoes, by those who 
believed in the bible and those who followed the teachings of Buddha, by Agnostics and Deists, by 
children and elderly, by mothers and fathers, by Issei, Nisei, and Sansei. 
This  gives  rise  to  the  question  why Tanforan’s  community  took  this  particular  course  of 
cultural convergence.747 One reason for the flouting of the cultural boundaries was Tanforan’s Kibei. 
Being culturally  ambiguous themselves,  they were important  mediators between the Issei  and the 
Nisei. They avoided taking sides and formed their own distinctive group, without alienating either of 
the generations. They comprised a disproportionally large part of community leaders and played a 
crucial role in making Tanforan’s self-government as inclusive as it was, successfully balancing the 
interests of Issei and Nisei. 
The second reason was the absence of a well-organized, orthodox JACL group. In Relocation 
746 With hybrid identity I mean to say that the immigrant children were different from, but simular to, each culture. I  
mean to  denote  a  situation of  simulatneous separartion and convergence.  Hybridity  is  a  problematic term because it 
contains the notion of cross-breeding of distinct species. See Pamela Shurmer-Smith (ed.):  Doing Cultural Geography, 
London: Sage Publications, 2002, p.73.
747 We must not forget that there was indeed a generational gap in pre-evacuation days, running along cultural lines, and 
this cultural division between the generations was carried over into Tanforan.
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Camps  such  as  Manzanar,  this  small  but  influential  group  was  responsible  for  subverting  an 
integrative community consciousness by actively collaborating with the administration against “un-
American” elements. Although in Tanforan some individuals tried to do just this, they failed to occupy 
influential  positions.  Instead,  liberals  dominated  the  community  leadership.  The  editors  of  the 
Tanforan Totalizer, for instance, were persistently denigrated by orthodox JACLers for being leftists, 
but the administration stuck to the staff around Taro Katayama, even though the  Totalizer  did not 
applaud WCCA policies (but it struck a distinctly accommodationist tone).748 Likewise, Tanforan’s 
Advisory Council was free of JACLers who sought to cut down on Japanese habits. It advocated the 
interests of all those who felt unjustly treated by the administration, even taking fire for those who had 
violated camp regulations. Hence, in addition to the Kibei, Tanforan’s predominantly liberal-minded 
community leadership was another integrating force. 
A third  factor  reducing  cultural  conflicts  was  the  peculiar  leadership  style  of  Tanforan’s 
keepers, which I have earlier characterized as paternalistic and mildly authoritarian. Camp director 
Frank Davis avoided voicing racist statements, and his demeanor evoked a mix of pity and sympathy 
rather than resentment.  He usually  gave in when the evacuees made clear  that  they considered a 
regulation  unacceptable.  Caucasian  keepers  as  a  whole  comprised  a  highly  diverse  group.  Some 
undoubtedly  were  prejudiced,  but  they  kept  their  views  to  themselves.  Those  who  offended  the 
evacuees or were grossly incompetent were quickly dismissed by Davis. Most positions that required 
interaction with inmates were occupied by competent and tolerant civil servants from the Bay Area. 
Many of them knew the Japanese from pre-war days and had kept their favorable opinion despite the 
war hysteria. 
The  administration’s  attitude  to  the  evacuees  brings  up  another  issue  that  merits  re-
consideration:  by  and large,  those  administrators  charged  with  the  supervision  of  the  camp were 
caught between sympathy for the inmates and the requirement to impose stricter rules coming from 
higher up, resulting in policies that were contradictory and inconsistently imposed. The abolishment of 
self-government is the classic case for this phenomenon, and it shows that the administrators’ attitude 
towards their subjects had a temporal dimension: at the outset, those who had no direct contact with 
Japanese Americans prior to evacuation tended to view the inmates as representatives of the “yellow 
peril,” fearing that they would turn to mob rule as soon as left to their own devices. It is worth noting 
that Frank Davis and George Greene, Tanforan’s camp director and his most influential divisional 
chief, shared this fear. Yet the longer they dealt with the inmates, the more their prejudices dissolved. 
It is therefore emblematic for Tanforan that self-government was abolished by order of the WCCA, 
and not by Davis who ultimately got along well with the evacuee council. 
748 Camp newspapers run by orthodox JACLers, for example the Manzanar Free Press, explicitly lauded WRA policies, 
which alienated those with a critical stance on the evacuation. 
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The above reasons also explain why Tanforan remained a fairly quiet community throughout its five 
months  of  operation,  and  why resistance  in  Tanforan  was distinctly  peaceful.  We have  seen  that 
resistance was almost exclusively expressed through individual acts of disobedience and oral protests 
to administrative ordinances. I have demonstrated that there was an underlying discontent, but it was 
not galvanized into mass protests, such as in the Manzanar uprising. In order to account for this, let us 
recapitulate the camp’s most salient features. 
First,  as  indicated  above,  Tanforan’s  administrators  interpreted  Army  regulations  fairly 
liberally  and  allowed  a  considerable  degree  of  self-determination.  A second  feature  explaining 
Tanforan’s peaceful conduct was that the pre-war community patterns were carried over into the camp, 
unlike  in  some WRA camps,  where  the  administration  tried  to  impose  an  artificial  hierarchy  by 
assisting JACL functionaries in replacing the old Issei community leaders. This was attempted but did 
not work out in Tanforan.749 Another reason for the absence of serious frictions between the “old” Issei 
leadership and aspiring Nisei was the fact that many of the community leaders were still interned in 
the Justice Department camps, returning only gradually to reclaim community leadership. 
A fourth reason explaining the peaceful nature of resistance is the election of a broadminded 
Advisory Council which represented the whole gamut of evacuee interests. Fifth, whenever there was 
a crisis impending, the administration kept communication channels open. Hence, the evacuees had 
always  the  opportunity  to  negotiate  their  interests.750 Sixth,  there  was  a  comparatively  coherent 
population, predominantly urban and highly educated. This is not to say that rural dwellers were more 
prone to retort to violence. But there are numerous references, by administrators and inmates alike, 
showing that Tanforan’s prisoners envisioned themselves as a model community, as the best Assembly 
Center, consisting of a “higher type of people.”751 
Seventh, and perhaps most importantly, the inmates were aware that their detention in Tanforan 
was  only  temporary.  This  point  has  several  ramifications.  Many  inmates  accepted  Tanforan’s 
inconveniences because they expected to find better conditions in the Relocation Camps. This also 
explains why the inmates accepted the abolishment of self-government without significant protests. 
Further, the daily contacts to visitors and the proximity to their former homes mitigated the sense of 
isolation and prevented the inmates from succumbing to apathy and resignation. There was the feeling 
of still being part of the free society. All these points distinguished Tanforan from the WRA camps; 
749 This can be directly observed at the election of the house managers. The administration appointed a Nisei foreman to 
select the house managers, and the Nisei promptly got his peers into these positions. Eventually, however, more and more 
Issei replaced these Nisei as house managers. Thus, on the grass-roots level power gravitated back to the Issei. 
750 The  correlation  between  the  degree  of  collective  protests  and  the  utilization  of  communication  channels  is 
demonstrated by Norman R. Jackman: “Collective Protests in Relocation Centers,”  The American Journal of Sociology 
Vol. 63 (1957), pp. 264-272. Jackman argues that the development of collective protest is a function of the inability of 
contending parties to comprehend one another. In the absence of arbitration and negotiation, he says, groups develop 
divergent definitions, and conflict ensues. 
751 See,  for example,  Minutes of  the House Managers’ Meeting,  June 27,  1942, JERS:  14:502,  The First  Month at  
Tanforan. A Preliminary Report, Tamotsu Shibutani, Haruo Najima, Tomiko Shibutani, p. 45, JERS: 16:416.
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these were barren and isolated places, and nobody knew how long they would have to stay there. 
Having summarized Tanforan’s most salient features, it is now time to ask which other strategies the 
inmates developed to cope with the psychological stress of imprisonment, for resistance was only one 
reaction to incarceration. Throughout my study I hinted at  various strategies,  which shall  now be 
systematized and briefly outlined. Apart from resistance, it has been demonstrated that humor was an 
important means to deal with the humiliating experience. People learned to laugh at things that hurt 
them most. And those who learned to laugh were indeed the lucky ones. Further, I have demonstrated 
that some evacuees empathized with their custodians, thereby playing down the separation between 
prisoner  and  warden.  The guards,  they  argued,  were  actually  worse  off  than  they  were.  Another 
common strategy to make their situation more bearable was to compare Tanforan to other Assembly 
Centers, which were generally pictured as “much worse places.” Yet another pattern was to emphasize 
betterment  while  de-emphasizing  inconveniences  and  prison-like  aspects.  We  have  seen  that  the 
inmates went as far as to refer to Tanforan as a “poor man’s paradise.” Indeed, “Shangri-la” seemed to 
be a frequent appellation in everyday discourses. Also, most evacuee records, including the Totalizer, 
compare the incarceration with the frontier experience. The “frontier interpretation” certainly made 
sense with respect to the physical discomforts of camp life. Moreover, that the inmates viewed their 
imprisonment in terms of this genuinely American rite of passage betrays their American mindset.752 
Finally, a wide-spread approach to incarceration was to consider oneself as victim of pressure groups: 
it was not the people at large or the government that had put them behind barbed wire, many inmates 
argued, but a few wicked individuals with money and influence. In this scenario the incarceration was 
a derailment rather than an expression of popular hostility. All these interpretations rendered captivity 
more bearable by blending out certain unpleasant aspects. 
Most of the strategies listed above were applied by Nisei. As I have elaborated in chapter 3, the 
Issei were less bothered by the lawlessness of their incarceration because of their status as enemy 
aliens; they knew they could be legally interned and were content to stay with their families. Although 
some of the above-listed approaches have received only scant attention in my study, I mention them 
here because they add an important dimension to the explanation of how the inmates were coming to 
terms  with  their  incarceration  in  everyday  life.  However,  it  requires  a  separate  study  to  fully 
understand the function and significance of these Interpretationsmuster. 
Having discussed resistance as a means of coping with captivity, we now have to embed it into the 
752 See, for example, Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 13, August 1, 1942, p. 7, Diary, Ben Iijima, May 22, 1942, JERS: 17:361, 
Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, pp. 60-61, 67, First Month, Shibutani, Najima, Shibutani, p. 47, JERS: 16:417. The inmates 
related to the classical interpretation by Turner. See Frederick Jackson Turner:  The Frontier in American History, New 
York: Dover Publications, 1996 (orig. 1920). For a summary of more recent notions of frontier see Noreen Groover Lape: 
West of Border: The Multicultural Literature of the Western American Frontiers, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000.
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larger context of the power relations between prisoners and keepers. Our study demonstrates beyond 
doubt that power was not the sole privilege of the administration. Instead, both sides asserted power 
with  varying  success,  depending  on  the  specific  situation.  This  concurs  with  Michael  Foucault’s 
findings that power is rather a dynamic process than a fixed property that can be conquered, owned, or 
defended by a person or a  class.  Foucault’s  functional  analysis  of  power as a  constantly  shifting 
relation  in  which  two  sides  actively  participate  by  employing  different  techniques  and  strategies 
adequately explains the numerous inversions of power relations. This functional analysis of power 
does not deny that there was an imbalance in power between prisoners and keepers, but it gives a more 
realistic view of their dealings.
The evacuees’ main strategy was to argue for their  goals, appealing to the humanistic and 
democratic principles their captors claimed to adhere to. If that failed and the issue at stake unsettled a 
majority of inmates, they resorted to threats of force. As we have seen, the administration detected 
rebellious  moods early  enough –  either  through agents  of  the  Internal  Police  or  directly  through 
complaints by evacuees – and reacted by compromising. Thus overt hostilities were averted. However, 
it cannot be overemphasized that the administration was constantly afraid of a revolt, and it was this 
invisible but ever-present fear that compelled them to give way on numerous issues. Conversely, the 
administrators tried to cajole the inmates into obeying orders by appealing to their patriotism and 
goodwill, and by promising to reward orderly conduct with more freedom. If this did not work, and if 
Army orders explicitly forbade the administrators to compromise, then they could always threaten to 
call in troops although they refrained from doing so explicitly. We must assume, however, that the 
mere  presence  of  barbed  wire  fences,  watchtowers  and  armed  guards  put  the  evacuees  at  a 
disadvantage against their keepers, if the worst came to the worst. 
In  addition  to  the  conclusion  that  power  rested  not  only  with  the  administration  another 
noteworthy finding has been that power was not only  oppressive, but also  productive.753 As I have 
earlier demonstrated, repression was a prerequisite for the formation of the community identity. In a 
wider sense, the oppression of freedom and democracy in Tanforan incited the struggle for freedom 
and democracy, and ultimately strengthened the democratic conscience of the community. In other 
words, the violation of the basic democratic rights confirmed the inmates in their conviction that it 
was necessary to hold on to these principles. Hence, Tanforan stands for the dialectical relationship 
between external oppression and internal emancipation. 
To sum up, then, this study has demonstrated that resistance was a common phenomenon of everyday 
life; I have accounted for causes, goals, and strategies of resistance, pointing to the importance of 
disobedience  to  irrational  authority,  diverging  from  the  cultural-centric  model  of  post-colonial 
753 This, too, concurs with Foucault’s findings, see Gilles Deleuze:  Foucault, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992, pp. 
39-45. 
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historians who use ethnicity to explain causes, goals and strategies of resistance. Thus I was able to 
explain why resistance united the inmates rather than dividing them, and to account for the process of 
cultural harmonization in Tanforan. I have made clear why resistance remained non-violent despite the 
underlying discontent and psychological stress. Finally, I have disclosed how the evacuees made sense 
of their captivity and showed that power operated in multidirectional ways. 
The microhistorical analysis of Tanforan thus offers a picture that is too complex and dynamic 
to fit any theory, but it is closer to the historical experience. Despite this complexity, the history of 
Tanforan is still, first of all, a grand narrative of domination and resistance. I understand that grand 
narratives (sometimes meta- or master narratives), as a schema to order and explain experience, have 
been  criticized  since  the  rise  of  post-colonial  studies  on  the  allegation  that  the  colonial  other  is 
subordinated and marginalized, and that they ignore the heterogeneity and variety of human existence. 
The tendency of grand narratives to distinguish between either passive victim or heroic resistor has 
further contributed to lack of credence in them. Yet if we abandon these value judgments and replace 
the fixed dichotomies with dynamic accounts of social interaction of sentient individuals, then the 
grand narrative appears to be a feasible frame for discussing and narrating the wartime incarceration 
of the Japanese Americans. 
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Epilogue
Our brief life at Tanforan is now to end; but its memories  
will remain with us for the rest of our lives […]. What  
will these remembrances be?
– TANFORAN TOTALIZER, FINAL ISSUE754
In history as in any narrative art, nothing is more artificial than the ending – life, after all, goes on. 
This is particularly true for the present work because the Assembly Center period was only the prelude 
to the wartime incarceration of the Japanese Americans. After five months in Tanforan, the majority of 
inmates was to endure three years of captivity. 
Despite the shortness of the detention at Tanforan in comparison to the wartime incarceration 
as a whole, it has been shown to be a most revealing episode. But how did the inmates themselves 
assess their experiences at the eve of relocation? The final chapter concluded with the assertion that 
the Japanese Americans emerged invigorated from the first episode of captivity, confident of being 
able to deal with future challenges. Evacuee diaries mirror this spirit almost without exception. Ben 
Iijima’s closing remark, “Utah – Yipeh!”755 may be more exuberant than the average assessment, yet it 
represents the tendency. The Totalizer’s final issue contains several opinion polls which specify what 
gave  rise  to  the  prevalent  confidence.  In  these  polls  three  aspects  stand  out:  first,  the  evacuees 
displayed  pride  in  their  achievements;  second,  they  stressed  the  advantage  of  gaining  practical 
experiences; and third, they expressed satisfaction at the fact that factionalism had given way to a 
hitherto unknown community spirit. For instance, 18-year-old Lorraine Yamate wrote:
[I remember most] the master file work. It was extremely interesting and a good experience in 
the commercial field. I have learned to work with other people closely and found that I like to 
do things together. I’ll remember the swell music school, with its excellent staff. I also learned 
to knit here and I can make my own socks and even sweaters now.756 
House manager Henry Tanaka stated: 
I’ll remember best the way we were able to make friends with people we did not consider 
before. There used to be various cliques into which the people limited themselves. I have tried 
to get away from these small cliques while here and everybody seems to be doing the same 
thing.757
Another representative statement says:
The unique experience of living in converted stalls, the sharing of community facilities and the 
gradual molding of the people into an institutional pattern are things to be remembered. I have 
been able to observe the breakdown of the former Japanese communities into a more unified 
whole. In this testing period, I have been able to see people either ‘making’ or ‘breaking’ to this 
new life.758 
The  hint  at  “people  breaking”  reminds  us  that  not  everybody  emerged  strengthened  from  the 
experience. It is important to recall that especially the frail and elderly inmates suffered under the 
754 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 13. 
755 Diary, Ben Iijima, September 18, 1942, JERS: 17:519. 
756 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 13.
757 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 13. 
758 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 13.
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makeshift conditions. Even the Totalizer admitted, “not all was sweetness and light” (implying that for 
the most part it was), citing a former student: 
As for my preparation for the future […], I am starting to learn how to clean my house, iron my 
shirt and wash my own clothes, so that I can prepare to be a houseboy when I get out into the 
city […].759 
The  cynical  allusion  to  opportunities  gone  by  prompted  the  editors  to  reassure  the  reader  that 
“attitudes like this were rare.” Indeed, ironic remarks like this are the exception in evacuee records. 
Yet we may not forget that the Totalizer was strictly censored, filtering out critical opinions, and that 
contemporary records were shaped by the psychological need to make positive sense of this degrading 
episode.  Hence,  even  though  the  quotes  from  the  Totalizer intuit  that  inmates  experienced  the 
incarceration as a physical and educational experience – tough but rewarding – the dominant feeling 
rather was that what does not destroy you, makes you stronger. 
759 Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 12. 
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Zusammenfassung der Magisterarbeit
TANFORAN: MIKROGESCHICHTE EINES AMERIKANISCHEN "ASSEMBLY CENTERS" FÜR 
JAPANER UND AMERIKANER JAPANISCHER ABSTAMMUNG WÄHREND DES ZWEITEN 
WELTKRIEGES. 
Die  Grundlage  für  die  vorliegende  mikrohistorische  Untersuchung des  Tanforan  Assembly 
Centers bilden Dokumente der U.S.-Armee und der Lagerverwaltung, sowie Tagebuchaufzeichnungen 
und  Notizen  der  Inhaftierten,  die  Lagerzeitung,  und  schließlich  die  Sitzungsprotokolle  der 
Lagerverwaltung und des Gefangenenkomitees. Die Arbeit ist in den historischen Kontext eingeordnet 
und erklärt sowohl die Entscheidung der summarischen Internierung als auch die Interaktion zwischen 
Gefangenen und Lagerverwaltung als Fortsetzung eines tief verwurzelten Anti-Orientalismus, der sich 
an der Westküste der USA als Reaktion auf asiatische Immigranten entwickelt hatte. 
Neben der Kontextualisierung setzt die Arbeit mehrere Schwerpunkte: Ein Leitmotiv meiner 
Untersuchung ist der doppeldeutigen Charakter Tanforans: Einerseits war es ein Konzentrationslager, 
gekennzeichnet  durch  permanente  Überwachung,  tägliche  Anwesenheitsappelle,  primitive 
Lebensbedingungen,  Zensur,  Versammlungsverbot,  willkürlich  Inspektionen,  kurz,  Unfreiheit. 
Andererseits  war  die  Lagerverwaltung  bestrebt,  demokratische  und  humanitäre  Prinzipien 
umzusetzen, indem sie eingeschränkte Selbstbestimmung zuließ, Religionsfreiheit gewährte, und den 
Inhaftierten ein breites Spektrum an Beschäftigungen ermöglichte. Durch Abwägen der verschiedenen 
Aspekte arbeite ich den besonderen Charakter des Lagers heraus. In diesem Kontext untersuche ich 
außerdem wie die Gefangenen mit der als unrecht empfundenen Unfreiheit umgingen und analysiere 
Mechanismen wie Verdrängung, Humor, Protest sowie Sympathie mit den Wärtern. 
Einen wichtiger Gesichtspunkt der Analyse ist das Widerstandsparadigma. Ich untersuche, ob 
und auf welche Weise die Gefangenen Widerstand leisteten. Dabei stellt sich heraus, dass Proteste weit 
verbreitet waren, allerdings selten offen auftraten sondern sich in alltäglichen Handlungen äußerten. 
Widerstand, in der Regel durch administrative Willkür provoziert, verfolgte zumeist den Zweck ein 
möglichst hohes Maß an Autonomie zu wahren bzw. zu erringen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die 
Frage gestellt wie Macht ausgehandelt wurde, und wie Konflikte zwischen Internierten und Aufsehern 
ausgetragen wurden. Es zeigt sich, dass die Ausübung von Macht nicht einseitig sondern wechselseitig 
war.  Die Analyse dieses  dynamischen Prozesses offenbart  Strategien und Handlungsmuster  beider 
Seiten. 
Schließlich beleuchtet die Arbeit kulturelle Konflikte der Generationen und weist nach, dass 
die Erfahrung der  Gefangenschaft  zur  Toleranz hinsichtlich kultureller  Unterschiede zwischen der 
ersten und der zweiten Generation von Immigranten beitrug. 
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Glossary & Abbreviations
Assembly  Center –  A  temporary  incarceration  camp  for  Japanese  Americans  uprooted  under 
Executive Order 9066. Altogether sixteen of these emergency concentration camps were set up by the 
WCCA to confine civilians of Japanese ancestry, pending the construction of more permanent inland 
Relocation Camps. 
CAD – Civil Affairs Division. Created by order of the Commanding General DeWitt on March 10, 
1942, it was responsible for formulating plans for the exclusion of civilians of Japanese ancestry from 
the West Coast (see WCCA). 
CEO – Civilian Exclusion Order. One CEO was issued for each of the 108 geographical units that 
made up the area to be evacuated. There was one CEO per approximately 1,000 Nikkei. 
CWRIC – Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. The Commision was 
established by act of Congress in 1980 to review the wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans and 
to recommend appropriate remedies. 
FRB – Federal Reserve Bank.
Issei – First generation Japanese immigrants. Born in Japan they were barred by law from gaining 
U.S. citizenship. 
JACL – Japanese American Citizen League. 
Kibei –  American-born  children  of  the  Issei  who  were  sent  back  to  Japan  for  education  or 
employment. 
NSRC – National Student Relocation Council. 
Nikkei – People of Japanese descent. 
Nisei – Second generation Japanese Americans, born in the USA and citizens by right of birth. Nisei is 
used throughout this work synonymously with “American-born,” including the Sansei. 
Sansei – Third generation Japanese Americans. 
WCCA –  Wartime  Civil  Control  Administration.  Created  by  order  of  the  Commanding  General 
DeWitt on March 11, 1942, the WCCA was the operating Agency of the CAD, responsible for setting 
up, equipping and running the Assembly Centers. 
WDC – Western Defense Command. Comprising the eight westernmost states, it was headed since 
1940 by Lieutenant General John DeWitt who at the same time commanded the Fourth Army. 
WPA – Works Progress Administration.  Created in 1935 by presidential  order,  the WPA was the 
largest  New  Deal  agency.  It  was  a  “make  work”  program  that  provided  jobs  and  income  to 
unemployed during the Great Depression. 
WRA –  War Relocation Authority. Established by presidential order on March 18, 1942, this civil 
institution was responsible for running the ten Relocation Camps. 
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Tables
TABLE 1: Japanese Americans in California, 1890-1940 
      (Modell (ed.): Kikuchi Diary, p. 5; Daniels: Concentration Camps, p. 6.)
Japanese in 
United States
Japanese in 
California
Percentage of U.S. 
Japanese in 
California
Total 
California 
Population
Percentage of 
Japanese in 
California Population 
1890    2,039   1,147 56.3 1,200,000 0.1
1900  24,326 10,151 41.7 1,485,053 0.7
1910  72,157 41,356 57.3 2,377,549 1.7
1920 111,010 71,952 64.8 3,426,861 2.1
1930 138,834 97,456 70.2 5,677,251 1.7
1940 126,947 93,717 73.8 6,907,387 1.4
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
TABLE 2: Japanese Americans in the United States, 1900-1940 
      (Daniels: Asian America, p. 115.)
Japanese in 
United 
States
Japanese 
(Percentage 
of Total)
Japanese on 
Pacific 
Coast
Japanese 
(Percentage 
of Total)
Japanese in 
California
Japanese 
(Percentage 
of Total)
1900 24,326 0.03 18,269 0.7 10,151 0.6
1910 72,157 0.08 57,703 1.4 41,356 1.7
1920 111,010 0.10 94,490 1.7 71,952 2.1
1930 138,834 0.11 119,892 1.5 97,456 1.7
1940 126,948 0.09 112,353 1.2 93,717 1.4
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Census. 
TABLE 3: Japanese Americans in the United States, First and Second Generation, 1920-1940  
         (Daniels: Concentration Camps, p. 21.)
Total Alien Native Percentage of Native-Born
1920 111,010 81,383 29,672 26.7
1930 138,834 70,477 68,357 49.2
1940 126,947 47,305 79,642 62.7
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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TABLE 4: Japanese Americans in the WDC, by States and Military Areas, April 1940
      Underlined numbers denote areas from which Japanese Americans were forced to leave.
      In all other areas, curfew and travel restrictions were imposed. 
      (U.S. Army: Final Report, p. 79.) 
State All Areas Military Area 1 Military Area 2 Military Areas 3-6
Total, WDC 
   Area 117,364 107,704 5,281 4,379
   Arizona      632      362    270 –
   California 93,717 89,483 4,234 –
   Oregon   4,071   3,843    228 –
   Washington 14,565 14,016    549 –
   Idaho   1,191 – – 1,191
   Montana      508 – –    508
   Nevada      470 – –    470
   Utah   2,210 – – 2,210
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
TABLE 5: U.S. Army Assembly Centers, 1942
      (U.S. Army: Final Report, p. 184; CWRIC: Personal Justice Denied, p. 138.) 
Assembly Center Maximum Population Dates Occupied New Using Agency
Fresno, CA     5,120 (Sept. 4) May 6 – Oct. 30 4
th Air Force Technical Training 
Command
Marysville, CA     2,451  (June 2) May 8 - June 29 VII Army Corps
Mayer, AZ        245  (May 25) May 7 - June 2 Forestry Service
Merced, CA     4,508  (June 3) May 6 - Sept. 15 4th Air Service Area Command
Pinedale, CA     4,792  (June 29) May 7 - July 23 4th Air Force
Pomona, CA     5,434  (July 20) May 7 - Aug. 24 Ordnance Motor Transport
Portland, OR     3,676  (June 6) May 2 - Sept. 10 Portland Port of Embarkation
Sacramento, CA     4,739  (May 30) May 6 - June 26 Signal Corps
Puyallup, WA     7,390  (July 25) April 28 - Sept. 12 9th Service Command
Salinas, CA     3,586  (June 23) April 27 - July 4 VII Army Corps
Santa Anita, CA   18,719  (Aug. 23) March 27 - Oct. 27 Ordnance
Stockton, CA     4,271  (May 21) May 10 - Oct. 17 4th Air Service Area Command
Tanforan, CA     7,816  (July 25) April 28 - Oct. 13 North. California Sector, WDC
Tulare, CA     4,978  (Aug. 11) April 20 - Sept. 4 VII Army Corps
Turlock, CA     3,661  (June 2) April 30 - Aug. 12 9th Service Command
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TABLE 6: Civilian Exclusion Orders pertaining the Tanforan Assembly Center (Major Groups)
      (U.S. Army: Final Report, pp. 363-366.) 
CEO Posted Counties Evacuated Civil Control Station Number of Evacuees Ordered to Leave
19  April 24   Contra Costa & Alameda   Berkeley             1,182
20  April 24   San Francisco   SF (Bush St)             1,892
27  April 30   Alameda   Oakland 1                832
28  April 30   Alameda   Oakland 2                662
34  May 3   Alameda   Hayward             1,211
35  May 3   San Mateo   San Mateo                891
41  May 5   San Francisco   SF (Buchanan St)                848
81  May 15   San Francisco   SF (O’Farrell St)                279
96  May 23   Santa Clara   San José                  36
TABLE 7: Evacuees Entering Tanforan Assembly Center, 1942 (Major Groups)
      (WCCA: Bulletin No. 12, March 15, 1943, p. 100.) 
April 28 April 29 April 30 May 1 May 6 May 7 May 8 May 9 May 10
Groups
Entering 421 631 1,092 919 907 606 1,102 1,007 812
Total 
Population 421 1,052 2,144 3,063 3,969 4,575 5,677 6,684 7,496
TABLE 8: Other Reasons of Entering and Leaving
       (WCCA: Bulletin No. 12, March 15, 1943, pp. 100-103.) 
Births Deaths Jails, INS 
Internment 
Camps
Furlough Mixed 
Marriage
Other
Entering 64 49* 36
Leaving 22 21 38 36
* 30 from Fort Lincoln, Bismarck (North Dakota); 7 from Fort Missoula (Montana); 2 from Santa Fee (New Mexico); 1 
from San Quentin Prison (California); 8 from Sharp Park (California); 1 from U.S. Marshal. 
TABLE 9: Evacuee Occupational Survey
       (Diary, Doris Hayashi, p. 229, August 9, 1942, JERS: 17:206.) 
Professions Prior to Evacuation Percentage
  Clerical, Sales and Kindred   14.0
  Domestic Workers   10.0
  Housewives (part time)     9.1
  Operatives     9.0
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  Service Workers     5.4
  Farmers, Farm Laborers     5.0 
  Professional     4.3
  Property Managers and Officials     4.2
  New Workers (no Training)     4.2
  Craftsmen and Foremen     3.3
  Semi-Professional     2.7
  Unemployables (Students under High School Age, People above 65, Disabled)   25.3
  Total   96.5
TABLE 10: The Educational Program in Tanforan
      40 percent of all evacuees took part in classes. 90 percent of the elementary and high 
      school students were advanced by the schools which they attended prior to evacuation.
      (Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 15.) 
Opening Date Original Enrollment
Final 
Enrollment Increase
Number of 
Teachers
First Aid        May 18        230          50     -180*         1
Art        May 25        500        636      136       15
Music        May 25        280        498      218         9
Elementary        May 25        550        658      108       26
Junior High        June 15        225        233          8         9
High school        June 15        670        680        10       18
Adult Ed.        June 18        282        558      276       14
Co-op. Ed.        July 6          10        112      102         1
Kindergarten        July 7        101        101 –         5
Flower 
Arrangement
       July 23          80        125        45         2
Total 2,928 3,651 100
* First Aid graduated most of its students.
TABLE 11: Evacuees Leaving Tanforan, 1942 (Major Groups)
      A total of 7,824 evacuees were transferred to Relocation Centers, of which 7,673 went to 
      Topaz, Central Utah.
      (WCCA: Bulletin No. 12, March 15, 1943, p. 102.) 
Sept. 
9
Sept. 
15
Sept. 
16
Sept. 
17
Sept. 
18
Sept. 
19
Sept. 
20
Sept. 
21
Sept. 
22
Sept. 
26
Sept. 
27
Sept. 
28
Sept. 
29
Sept. 
30
Oct. 
1
Groups 
Leaving 215 502 485 514 499 509 521 500 518 526 514 516 516 532 534
Popula-
tion Left 7,576 7,075 6,590 6,077 5,587 5,071 4,550 4,050 3,532 3,006 2,492 1,977 1,461 931 400
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APPENDIX I
WRA Relocation Centers
Central Utah (Topaz), Utah
Abraham, Millard County; 140 miles southwest of Salt Lake City
First arrivals: 215 from Tanforan and Santa Anita Assembly Centers (CA)
Maximum population at one time: 8,130; total: 11,212
Evacuees from: California
Operation: from September 11, 1842 to October 31, 1945
Colorado River (Poston), Arizona
Colorado River Indian Reservation, Yuma County; 12 miles south of Parker
First arrivals: 250 from Mayer Assembly Center (AZ)
Maximum population at one time: 17,814; total: 19,534
Evacuees from: Assembly Centers in Salinas, Santa Anita, and Pinedale (CA); Mayer (AZ)
Operation: from May 8, 1942 to November 28, 1945
Gila River (Rivers), Arizona 
Gila River Indian Reservation, Sacaton, Pinal County; 50 miles south of Phoenix
First arrivals: 520 from Turlock Assembly Center (CA)
Maximum population at one time: 13,348; total: 16,655
Evacuees from: Fresno, Santa Anita, Stockton, Tulare, and Turlock (CA)
Operation: from July 20, 1942 to November 10, 1945
Granada (Amache), Colorado
Granada, Prowers County; 140 miles east of Pueblo
First arrivals: 212 from Merced Assembly Center (CA) 
Maximum population at one time: 7,318; total: 10,295
Evacuees from: Merced and Santa Anita Assembly Centers (CA)
Operation: from August 27, 1942 to October 15, 1945
Heart Mountain, Wyoming
Vocation, Park County; 13 miles northeast of Cody
First arrivals: 290 from Pomona Assembly Center (CA) 
Maximum population at one time: 10,767; total: 14,062
Evacuees from: California, Oregon, and Washington
Operation: from August 12, 1942 to November 10, 1945
Jerome (Denson), Arkansas
Jerome, Chicot and Drew Counties; 30 miles southwest of Arkansas City
First arrivals: 202 from Fresno Assembly Center (CA) 
Maximum population at one time: 8,497; total: 10,241
Evacuees from: California
Operation: from October 6, 1942 to June 30, 1944 (Last camp to open, first to close.) 
Manzanar, California
Manzanar, Inyo County; 5 miles south of Independence 
First arrivals: (as Assembly center) from Bainbridge Island (WA) 
Maximum population at one time: 10,046; total: 11,062
Evacuees from: California and Washington
Operation: from March 22, 1942 (as Assembly Center) to November 21, 1945 
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Minidoka (Hunt), Idaho 
Gooding, Jerome County; 25 miles northeast of Twin Falls
First arrivals: 210 from Puyallup Assembly Center (WA) 
Maximum population at one time: 7,381; total: 10,295
Evacuees from: Oregon and Washington
Operation: from August 10, 1942 to October 28, 1945 
Rohwer, Arkansas
Rohwer, Desha County; 0.5 mile north of Rohwer
First arrivals: 250 from Santa Anita and Stockton Assembly Centers (CA) 
Maximum population at one time: 8,475; total: 11,928 
Evacuees from: California 
Operation: from September 18, 1942 to November 30, 1945
Tule Lake (Newell), California
Newell, Modoc County; 35 miles southeast of Klamath Falls, Oregon 
First arrivals: 447 from Portland (OR) and Puyallup (WA) Assembly Centers 
Maximum population at one time: 18,789; total: 29,490 
Evacuees from: Assembly Centers in Mayer (AZ); Manzanar, Marysville, Pinedale, Pomona, Salinas 
and Walerga/Sacramento (CA); Portland (OR); Puyallup (WA)
Operation: from May 27, 1942 to March 20, 1946 (Last to close.)
Source: Inada: Only What We Could Carry, pp. 419-421. 
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APPENDIX II
Timetables, Tanforan Elementary School
First Grade 
8:45 – Americanization
1. Pledge of Allegiance
2. Singing of America
9:00 – Arithmetic
1. Time telling
2. Simple addition
3. Simple subtraction
  9:30 – Language, seatwork
10:00 – Play period
10:25 – Milk period: introducing cleanliness and etiquette
10:40 – Reading
11:10 – Creative arts, stories and music 
Third Grade: 
8:45 – Americanization
1. Pledge of Allegiance
2. Patriotic songs
9:00 – Drill writing (Monday and Tuesday)
– Thought problems, written problems and review on arithmetic (Wednesday - Friday)
9:30 Related reading or drill
1. Poetry appreciation 
2. Composition 
10:00 – Play period
10:25 – Milk period: introducing cleanliness and etiquette
10:40 – Reading
11:10 – Creative arts (Monday, Thursday, Friday)
– Stories and poems (Tuesday)
– Nature study (Wednesday) 
Source: Education Report, Frank E. Kilpatrick (Director of Education), July 1, 1942, JERS: 14:283-
284. 
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APPENDIX III
Agenda for the Advisory Council Meeting, July 22, 1942 
 
Old business 
1. Office supplies
2. List of administration staff and their duties
3. Important regulations to be translated into Japanese; especially bulletins 19 and 20 
4. Requests of the Totalizer brought up before
5. Street lights [flood lights in front gates were completed by June 8, while street lights are still  
     insufficient] 
6. Meeting without administration present (time element) 
7. Time keeping system of the councilmen 
8. Canteen matters; articles coming in; traffic control; newspapers to be sold elsewhere 
9. Contraband: Japanese printed matters; a letter was sent up but nothing was done about it 
New Business
1. Clarification on workers 
2. Banking problem: extend hours, charge for government check, getting another bank 
3. Is the Council allowed to meet representatives from outside agencies? 
4. Form of our Executive Council Bulletin – pen type?
5. Black list 
6. Passes to go out of this center for certain businesses 
7. Package problem 
8. Second siren 
9. Disinfectants and possibility of buying equipment for barbers 
10. Shoe repair shop 
11. Speaker’s program 
12. Election rally for primary election 
13. Pay check adjustments 
14. Sand on gravel roads 
15. Visits and transfers to other assembly centers 
16. If an election chairman happens to be working, can he get one day off to work on the election 
without having his pay deducted? 
17. Meeting with different administrative heads 
18. Clarification on whether the minutes can be opened to the public
19. Platforms for little children in washrooms 
20. Directory of people in this center for the Council
Source: Agenda with Mr Davis, Minutes of the Advisory Council, July 22, 1942, JERS: 14:413.
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APPENDIX IV
Administrative Messages to Tanforan Residents, September 12, 1942
TO THE RESIDENTS:
As the operations of the Tanforan Assembly Center near completion and its residents are destined for 
Shangri-la, let us pause in retrospect and contemplate the events and happenings since that day of 
April 26, 1942, when some 400 of the residents arrived as a vanguard of our Center, which was in 
such a short time to become home and habitation for some 7800 persons.
Time, work, patience and perseverance have transformed what was, on that eventful day, a rather 
gloomy,  muddy,  inconvenient  converted  racetrack  into  the  semblance  of  a  living  community  of 
business, social, spiritual, educational, recreational and leisure time activities. 
Time has passed, as it is wont to do; the work has been provided by the willing hands of the residents, 
the trials and tribulations have tried the patience of all concerned and perseverance has overcome 
many obstacles – all of which have resulted in the Tanforan Assembly Center we view in these days of 
departure. 
I,  as the present Center Manager, express to you a sincere appreciation of your cooperation in all 
phases of center activity and congratulate you in your work “well done.” 
FRANK E. DAVIS
Center Manager
TO THE RESIDENTS:
With the closing of Tanforan Center and the moving to a relocation center near at hand, the residents 
can look back on a difficult job well done.
Too much credit cannot be given to the residents for their full cooperation and assistance in making 
the past four months at Tanforan the success we believe it to have been. 
Because of the many activities of the Service Division, space will not permit, with one exception, the 
naming of individuals who have been of such great assistance to this division. However, I take this 
means to express my appreciation and thanks to each and all. 
To Mrs. Mary Koba, who worked expertly with me as my secretary, I am most grateful – for long 
hours and volume of work, without a complaint and always a smile. 
I  am sure  the  same spirit  shown in  this  Center  by  the  residents  will  carry  them through  in  the 
relocation center, and to all I wish good luck. 
GEORGE A. GREENE
Supervisor, Service Division 
Source: Tanforan Totalizer, Issue 19, September 12, 1942, p. 1. 
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